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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Identification of the research problem 
The resource-based view of the firm (RBV) (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1974; 
Wernerfelt, 1984; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991; Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993) along with the knowledge-based view (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 
1996b, 1996a), competence-based theory (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) and the 
concept of dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997) suggests that 
knowledge is the most important resource at the disposal of a firm pursuing 
competitive advantage. In the light of this, it is often suggested that managerial 
attention be directed at knowledge and knowledge-related resources. Scholars 
claim, however, that the literature of the RBV has not been able to provide 
satisfying suggestions for management (see e.g., Williamson, 1999; Priem & 
Butler, 2001). The knowledge-based and competence-based views have come 
with instructions to management that have been too wide and have not provided 
sufficient explanation to prompt managerial intervention (Williamson, 1999: 
1093-1094). This has led Spender and Grant (1996: 9) to argue that the question 
of management has remained “a sort of black hole of strategic analysis”.  
The field of intellectual capital (IC) has been trying to cast light into this “black 
hole” by suggesting numerous methods for identification, measurement and 
reporting of knowledge and knowledge-related resources, that is, the IC of the 
firm (e.g., Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Roos & Roos, 1997; Sveiby, 1997; 
Sullivan, 1998; Lev, 2001). The aim of visualizing and reporting IC is to make 
knowledge amenable to managerial intervention (Mouritsen, Larsen & Bukh, 
2001; Mouritsen & Larsen, 2005). In addition, the literature of knowledge 
management has provided a wide range of codifying, distributing and sharing 
technologies as means of knowledge management (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; 
Binney, 2001).  
In spite of the numerous methods supporting  knowledge and IC management, we 
still do not know how to manage the kind of knowledge and IC which is supposed 
to be a source of competitive advantage for the firm (Powell, 2001; Priem & 
Butler, 2001). Not all kinds of knowledge and IC are equally valuable for the 
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firm. Knowledge that is embedded in individual experiences (Polanyi, 1958) and 
organizational routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and capabilities (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997) is the most valuable, since it cannot 
be imitated and substituted by competitors (Barney, 1991). This makes such 
knowledge theoretically more interesting in pursuit of a competitive advantage.  
The management problem is, however, that the theoretically most valuable 
knowledge is the “least identifiable and measurable” (Spender & Grant, 1996: 8). 
Much of this knowledge is inherently unobservable and bundled with various 
objects, processes and relationships in an organization (Latour, 1987; Mouritsen 
& Larsen, 2005: 373). Thus, on the one hand it is desirable to make the most 
valuable knowledge – organizationally embedded knowledge – amenable to 
managerial intervention, yet on the other hand, the inherently unobservable and 
bundled nature of such knowledge makes this almost impossible. This has 
resulted in a situation where the same reasons that make certain types of 
knowledge valuable for competitive advantage, constitute the biggest obstacle to 
managerial intervention (Spender & Grant, 1996).  
Scholars have tried to tackle the problem by continuously working on the 
development of new classification and measurement methods for IC, as if a better 
measurement instrument were the solution to the problem. More than 30 
classification and measurement methods of IC have been suggested to make 
knowledge and knowledge-related resources amenable to managerial intervention 
(Andriessen, 2004b). Nevertheless, these methods are incapable of 
operationalizing the most valuable parts of IC, since it is not possible to 
disentangle knowledge from the grip of other organizational resources 
(Chaharbaghi & Sandy, 2006). Neither are these methods of IC management 
acknowledged in practice (Marr, Gray & Neely, 2003; Lönnqvist, Kunansivu & 
Sillanpää, 2008). Thus, up to now there has been no method that is able to make 
organizationally embedded knowledge available to allow direct managerial 
intervention.  
What about the possibility of indirect managerial intervention? Several scholars 
have outlined a role of management which does not rely on identifying and 
objectifying stocks of knowledge, but which instead creates an environment for 
IC growth via knowledge integration (e.g., Nonaka, 1994; Grant, 1996a; Nahapiet 
& Ghoshal, 1998) and communicative action (e.g., O’Donnell, O’Regan & 
Coates, 2000). Mouritsen and Larsen (2005) have argued, however, that a 
managerial role focused merely upon creating an environment does not allow for 
sufficient managerial intervention. It mainly induces knowledge integration and 
learning processes without having an effect on particular domains of knowledge 
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that are integrated and obtained by learning. It does not enable managers to 
intervene in the development of organizationally embedded knowledge in such a 
way that those categories of knowledge are nurtured which most benefit 
organizational strategies and the company’s competitive position in the market. 
Hereby, the problem is that direct manipulation of organizationally embedded 
knowledge is problematic, whereas the existing approaches of indirect managerial 
intervention are not satisfactory.  
At the same time, there are management practices in strategic management, 
management control, and many other fields, that successfully deal with various 
types of objects – people, material substances and relationships – that are closely 
related to knowledge. Knowledge is strongly interrelated with these objects, but 
there is only a limited understanding of how these managerial methods affect 
knowledge. The initial attention of these methods, as of management controls for 
instance, has not been placed on knowledge but the behavior of individuals. 
Knowledge is merely assumed to be one of the factors influencing the choice 
between these methods. For instance, Turner and Makhija (2006) suggest 
methods of management controls (behavioral, outcome and clan controls) are 
chosen according to the types of knowledge in the firm; nevertheless, it has not 
been explained how these controls affect knowledge. Thus, it is not clear whether 
and how these controls, which are originally directed at the people and material 
substance of an organization, do contribute to the knowledge and IC of the firm. 
Scholars complain that direct methods of identifying and reporting IC have not 
been acknowledged in practice (e.g., Marr, Gray & Neely, 2003), but they have 
not directed attention to the methods that already work in practice (Kujansivu, 
2008). The present study argues that instead of trying to directly affect knowledge 
by measurement and with the reporting tools of IC, it is necessary to consider the 
bundled nature of knowledge and investigate the effects of other managerial tools 
that work in practice but do not initially address knowledge. We do not know how 
management methods affect knowledge which is bundled with the same 
organizational objects and processes that these managerial methods were 
originally directed at. Clarifying this would widen our understanding of the 
options available to manage the most valuable part of IC, that is, knowledge that 
is embedded in organizational processes.  
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1.2 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of the dissertation is to answer the question:  
How can the creation and application of valuable intellectual capital 
be affected by managerial intervention?  
The study investigates the opportunities to intervene in the creation and 
application of valuable IC. In defining valuable IC the study builds on the RBV 
(Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991), knowledge-based view (Conner & Prahalad, 
1996; Grant, 1996b, 1996a), competence-based theory (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) 
and the concept of dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). Relying 
on these concepts, the present study uses the term valuable intellectual capital in 
referring to organizational level knowledge and capabilities, which are aligned 
with organizational strategies and environmental circumstances. In addressing the 
question of managerial intervention, the study reviews a wide variety of 
approaches and methods of knowledge and IC management. In addition to 
reviewing the knowledge and IC management literature, this study also takes a 
closer look at the field of management control which directs managerial attention 
to various organizational phenomena closely related to knowledge. For instance, 
several methods and procedures of management controls focus on organizational 
activities during which knowledge is applied, or on products and services through 
which the effect of knowledge is revealed. Thus, this dissertation investigates the 
forms of managerial intervention by exploring the literature of different research 
disciplines.    
The empirical study of the dissertation is conducted to clarify how decision-
making is guided in building IC valuable to the organization. Up to now, there are 
few studies on how knowledge is actually managed; which kinds of managerial 
procedures and control systems actually serve their purpose, and how they serve 
the creation and management of knowledge and knowledge-related resources in 
practice. Marr, Grey and Neely (2003: 441) have suggested focusing more on 
empirical research to test the existing theoretical models to “prove that the 
measurement of IC is really worthwhile”. In the present study, however, the aim 
is not to test the existing theoretical IC frameworks to prove their worthiness, but 
to study the existing management procedures that already work in practice. 
Management must be studied in its original settings to clarify the mechanisms of 
management methods (Burns & Kaplan, 1987). The rationale of practice has a 
potential to contribute to the conceptual grounds and improvement of theoretical 
concepts to make the existing theory align with the reality in practice.  
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1.3 Research method 
The empirical study was conducted in three small and medium-sized enterprises 
operating in the Finnish biotechnology sector. The study aimed to identify the 
companies’ managerial methods and procedures and the ways they affect the 
creation and application of organizationally embedded knowledge. The objective 
of the study requires its respondents to answer what as well as how-questions. 
Therefore, the study analyzes a rich selection of case data to explore, as well as to 
explain, the effects of managerial methods in practice. The field visits took place 
during the period from September 2005 to June 2006, and involved 53 interviews, 
several observations and analysis of numerous documents.   
The research method of the present study is important to the existing literature, 
since there is a general lack of case studies about knowledge and IC management 
(Marr, Gray & Neely, 2003). There are some case studies of action research about 
knowledge and IC management, (e.g., Mettänen, 2005; Bornemann & Alwert, 
2007; Lönnqvist & Kujansivu, 2007), a large number of purely theoretical studies 
(e.g., Grant, 1996a; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997; O’Donnell, O’Regan & 
Coates, 2000; Andriessen, 2004a; Schultze & Stabell, 2004; Spender, 2006), but 
only a few studies that seek to interpret working practices in organizations (e.g., 
Kloot, 1997; Johanson, Mårtensson & Skoog, 2001; McNamara, Baxter & Chua, 
2004). Therefore, the research method of the present study is relevant in the wider 
field of IC and knowledge management research. 
Companies from the biotechnology sector have been chosen mainly because 
knowledge and IC are more critical to the success of these companies than they 
would be for many others. Biotechnology firms are similar to knowledge 
intensive firms (Starbuck, 1992; Ditillo, 2004), in the sense that knowledge 
constitutes a critical part of their resources. Biotechnology firms use knowledge 
as an input, transferring that knowledge into products and services. For a 
biotechnology firm, knowledge is also important as an output in the form of new 
innovative technologies (Gittelman & Kogut, 2003). 
There are several studies on IC and knowledge management conducted in the 
biotechnology sector (e.g., Pisano, 1994; Cumby & Conrod, 2001; Palacios-
Marqués & Fernando, 2003; Boekestein, 2006). The present study is, however, 
notably different. The existing studies involve statistical IC measurement 
techniques (e.g., Palacios-Marqués & Fernando, 2003) and the external reporting 
of non-financial data (e.g. Cumby & Conrod, 2001). The present study differs by 
not merely looking at biotech organizations but investigating the management 
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with a deeper look at the processes and internal dynamics of organizational 
knowledge and capabilities.  
The purpose of the present study is not to describe the practice of biotechnology 
firms but to derive empirical implications for the general questions of knowledge 
management – to uncover the ways in which the creation of valuable IC can be 
affected managerially. The results of the case studies are acquired using the 
rhetoric of contextual generalization (Lukka & Kasanen, 1995). The results are 
generalizable to the theory (Yin, 2003) in terms of widening our understanding of 
the  management of valuable IC of the firm. 
1.4 Contribution of the study 
The study makes the following contributions. First, the dissertation develops a 
theory of implicit knowledge management in which the framework of knowledge 
categories and knowledge flows are outlined with propositions about the effects 
of managerial intervention. By building on the RBV, the knowledge-based view, 
and the concept of IC and organizational learning, the theory of implicit 
knowledge management invites a new perspective on knowledge management. In 
the proposed theory, managerial attention is paid to knowledge objects, human 
actors and the context in which knowledge is created and applied. Directing 
managerial attention to these elements, it is possible to affect various flows of 
knowledge in building the valuable IC of the firm. Thus, the theory of implicit 
knowledge management sheds new light on the anatomy and development of 
organizational knowledge and capabilities, overcoming the practical problems in 
knowledge operationalization.  
Second, the study contributes to the strategic management literature by 
overcoming the theoretical paradox1 of the RBV. Briem and Butler (2001: 23-24) 
have claimed that existing research has cited Barney’s (1991) RBV statements 
without providing new explanations of the work’s constructs. The present 
research is different in the sense that it provides an explanation of how the most 
valuable resources can be managed without falling into the theoretical paradox of 
the RBV. The implicit means of managerial intervention allow managers to affect 
                                                 
 
1
 The practical problems are related to the difficulties in disentangling knowledge from other 
resources for the purpose of its objective observation and manipulation. The theoretical paradox 
relies in the RBV causality statements suggested by Barney (1991). The overview of the paradox 
is presented in Appendix 1 (see also Lado, Boyd, Wright & Kroll, 2006). 
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the creation and application of its most valuable resource – organizationally 
embedded knowledge – without jeopardizing its valuable characteristics. 
Third, the study outlines the role of management control in implicit knowledge 
management. In existing literature there are many discussions about the 
relationships between knowledge and types of management controls. However, in 
discussing types of controls existing studies have mainly directed attention to the 
choice between the controls, whereas knowledge of the firm has tended to be 
considered merely as one factor influencing this choice (see e.g., Ouchi & 
Maguire, 1975; Ouchi, 1977; Eisenhardt, 1985; Snell, 1992; Merchant & Van der 
Stede, 2003; Turner & Makhija, 2006). For instance, Turner and Makhija (2006) 
suggest the methods of management control available to manage various types of 
knowledge. They suggest behavioral, outcome and clan control be chosen 
according to the types of knowledge in the firm; nevertheless, they do not explain 
whether these controls would have an effect on knowledge, or if they did, how. 
Similarly, several studies have suggested that the design of management 
accounting depends on the types of information in the organization (see e.g., 
Chenhall, 1986). Much less attention has been paid to the effects that the 
implementation of different types of controls may have on knowledge in the firm. 
The present study suggests management controls influence various flows of 
knowledge. Furthermore, the paper finds that outcome control has a considerable 
effect on the diversity of knowledge, providing the direction in which 
organizational capabilities evolve. At the same time the formal and informal 
structures of communication, information sharing and decision-making facilitate 
the processes of organizational learning through which organizational knowledge 
and capabilities – the valuable IC of the firm – is built. 
Fourth, the paper shows that the path of building organizational capabilities is 
largely affected by activation triggers which are recognized and acted upon with 
the help of management control procedures. Activation triggers are events that 
encourage knowledge exploration, increasing knowledge and capabilities of the 
firm (Zahra & George, 2002). The present study shows how activation triggers 
shape the IC of the firm, encouraging processes of organizational learning and 
affecting organizational knowledge and capabilities. The desired organizational 
outcome determines the intensity of the trigger, whereas the intensity of the 
trigger determines the speed and organizational level at which the processes of 
organizational learning take place. In managing activation triggers management 
controls (a) help in discovering activation triggers in time, (b) provide supporting 
procedures in reacting to triggers, and (c) induce certain directions in developing 
the knowledge and capabilities of the firm. Consequently a combination of 
existing resources, a management control system and emerging activation triggers 
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allow the firm to build highly firm-specific, inimitable and non-substitutable IC 
(Barney, 1991; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). 
1.5 Structure of the study 
The dissertation is organized as follows (see Figure 1). The introduction chapter 
presents the background of the research and the motivation behind it, with an 
explanation of the research objective. It also provides a short overview about the 
research method and contribution of the study to the existing literature. 
The second chapter starts with a short introduction to the concepts and theories 
applied in the dissertation. The chapter explains the value of organizational 
knowledge and capabilities with the assistance of Barney’s (1991) resource 
attributes. Thereafter the framework for creating organizationally valuable IC is 
outlined. The three-dimensional framework of knowledge is built to illustrate the 
categories and flows of knowledge in a firm in building organizational knowledge 
and capabilities. 
The third chapter explores the opportunities for managerial intervention. The 
literature of knowledge and IC management is explored in relation to the realist 
and non-realist epistemologies of knowledge. While the scope of the dissertation 
is somewhat broad, no attempt is made to investigate all possible methods of 
management. The selection is made from among the existing management 
methods to delineate the prevailing tendencies in existing management 
approaches. In addition to the knowledge and IC management methods, the role 
of management control is explored. 
The fourth chapter introduces three case studies which interpret management 
methods in practice. Firstly, the chapter provides the description of the research 
method, and the overview of the processes and tools in data collection. This 
section also addresses the reliability and validity of the study. Secondly, the 
chapter provides the case descriptions. In case studies A and B the study shows 
how managerial attention is placed on knowledge objects, the behavior of human 
actors and the context in which knowledge is developed and exploited. Some 
actor-networks are briefly described to show how knowledge is implicitly 
affected by the management control procedures of the firm. The case studies 
outline the roles of management control and activation triggers in affecting the 
knowledge flows and building IC of the firm. After that, case C shows the 
circumstances which lead to a more explicit kind of knowledge and IC 
management. The case study also shows how difficult it is to direct the 
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managerial attention to potential capacities (i.e. knowledge), since people know 
more than can be expressed in written forms.  
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Figure 1. Structure of the study 
 
The fifth chapter draws on the theory section and results of the case studies to 
develop a theory of implicit knowledge management. The chapter outlines the 
effects of three types of managerial intervention. It provides propositions of how 
the implicit kind of knowledge management has an effect on the development of 
organizational knowledge and capabilities. After outlining the main theoretical 
propositions, the chapter explains the value of the theory for research and 
practice. The final chapter offers the conclusions drawn from the study. 
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2 STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES IN BUILDING 
VALUABLE INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 
The present chapter investigates the theoretical foundations of building 
organizationally valuable IC. The chapter begins by introducing the concepts 
related to knowledge and IC to provide the terms and definitions for the coming 
discussion. Thereafter the creation of valuable IC is discussed and illustrated at 
individual and organizational levels. Finally, the three-dimensional framework of 
knowledge is developed while demonstrating how valuable IC – a source of 
sustainable competitive advantage – is built in the firm. 
2.1 Concepts applied in the study  
The concept of knowledge has been evolving since the era of classical Greek 
philosophy, whereas the discussions about organizational learning and knowledge 
as an organizational resource were initiated in strategic management literature 
only a few decades ago (Argyris, 1978; Daft & Weick, 1984; Barney, 1991; 
Nonaka, 1994; Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996a; Spender, 1996; Kim, 
1998). In addition, the concept of IC started to evolve from a slightly distinct 
stream of literature in the early 1990s (Sveiby, 1989; Hudson, 1993; Brooking, 
1996; Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Stewart, 1997; Sveiby, 1997). Despite their 
slightly different origins, the concepts of organizational learning, knowledge 
management and IC are highly intertwined, sharing a common theoretical ground 
and often meeting the same scholarly purposes. The subsequent discussion starts 
with the theoretical explanation of the importance of knowledge as an 
organizational resource, and, from there, the concepts of knowledge management, 
organizational learning and IC will be introduced. 
The basic concept of the present dissertation, the concept of knowledge, is rather 
vague, having different meanings for different people in different situations, as 
well as for different cultures (Andriessen & van den Boom, 2007). Plato’s 
definition of knowledge as a “justified true belief” (by Plato in Meno, Phaedo, 
and Theaetetus) has been widely used (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), as well as 
criticized from various perspectives discussing the conditions of truthfulness and 
justification (see e.g., Gettier, 1963). Grant (1996b: 110) has applied the 
definition according to which “knowledge is that which is known”. Alvesson and 
Karreman (2001: 998) have criticized these kinds of general definitions arguing 
that “researchers seem to have difficulties in saying something distinct about the 
specific content of  knowledge that presumably is so central in their work”.  
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Despite the criticism, this dissertation follows Grant’s (1996b: 110) definition for 
two reasons. Firstly, the present study is not geared to enter the debate on Plato’s 
definition of knowledge (Gettier, 1963; Thalberg, 1969). Secondly, Grant’s 
(1996b: 110) definition of knowledge is open to various types of knowledge that 
are relevant to the firm. This definition is indeed vague, but corresponds to the 
general nature of knowledge – knowledge is not definable per se, since it does not 
exist per se, but is related to things and relationships in an organization 
(Mouritsen, Larsen & Bukh, 2001: 738-739). 
The reasons for the large scholarly interest in knowledge as an organizational 
resource can be found in statements of the resource-based view (RBV) (Penrose, 
1959; Rubin, 1973; Rumelt, 1974; Wernerfelt, 1984; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; 
Barney, 1991; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). The basic standpoint of the RBV 
suggests that organizational resources are the source of a firm’s competitive 
heterogeneity (Penrose, 1959). It is an “inside-out perspective” (Rouse & 
Daellenbach, 2002), perceiving the source of competitive advantage rather 
differently from the approach of competitive forces (Porter, 1980). According to 
the competitive forces approach, or the market-based perspective, a firm chooses 
its strategy and acquires the necessary resources from the market. According to 
the RBV, however, a firm is largely defined through its existing resources (Teece, 
Pisano & Shuen, 1997). Differences in firms’ existing resources allow them to 
gain advantages in the market.  
The definitions of resources in the RBV have covered all kinds of sources.  
Wernerfelt (1984) defines resource as “anything, which could be thought of as a 
strength or weakness of a given firm”. Examples of resources cited include skilled 
personnel, brand names, machinery, trade contracts, efficient procedures 
(Wernerfelt, 1984), assets, capabilities, organizational processes, company 
attributes, information (Barney, 1991) and  knowledge  (Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1991; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Grant, 1996b, 1996a).  
Not all kinds of resources are equally relevant to the achievement of competitive 
advantage, however. Knowledge has been considered far more important to 
competitive advantage than other resources of the firm. More specifically, the 
most important resource theoretically, is considered to be the kind of knowledge 
that is organizationally embedded. The large amount of interest in such 
knowledge has mainly been sparked by the causality statements made by Barney 
(1991; 1995; 2001). Barney (1991) states that a resource can be, or may become, 
a source of sustainable competitive advantages if it is:  
– valuable, 
– rare, 
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– inimitable, 
– non-substitutable. 
Being valuable to the firm means that a resource or set of resources “exploit 
opportunities or neutralize threats in a firm’s environment” (Barney, 1991: 106). 
A resource is rare if it is not simultaneously implemented by many other firms. 
Inimitable means that a resource must be “imperfectly imitable” in order to be a 
source of sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991: 107). Finally, being 
non-substitutable means that there are no equivalent substitutes for that resource 
in the market. In addition to these characteristics, scholars have also suggested the 
characteristics of a resource termed appropriability and durability (Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993).  
Since tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958) and knowledge that is highly embedded in 
organizational routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; 
Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997) fall most probably into the category of resources 
that are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable, the interest of strategic 
management literature has clearly been drawn to these types of knowledge. The 
knowledge-based view (Grant, 1996b), competence-based theory (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990; Conner & Prahalad, 1996) and dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano 
& Shuen, 1997), being complementary to the RBV, have all investigated the ways 
that organizationally embedded knowledge is a source of competitive advantage 
for the firm. 
Many scholars have also outlined challenges to and contradictions found within 
the RBV (e.g., Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999; Powell, 2001; Priem & Butler, 2001; 
Rouse & Daellenbach, 2002; Hoopes, Madsen & Walker, 2003; Lado et al., 
2006). For instance, Hoopes et al. (2003) have identified other sources of 
competitive heterogeneity, such as industry structure, that are not covered by the 
RBV rationale. Priem and Butler (2001) and Lado et al. (2006) have argued that 
some of the propositions of RBV scholars have been conflicting. In addition, 
Powell (2001) and Hoopes, Madsen and Walker (2003) suggest that due to the 
analytical propositions of Barney’s (Barney, 1991) RBV framework, the 
falsification of the causality statements is not possible. Despite the criticism, the 
RBV has been very popular in a wide variety of management studies, increasing 
dialogue between different research areas (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992), and 
providing the basic standpoint from which to perceive organizationally valuable 
resources, such as knowledge (Marr & Roos, 2005).   
Since the RBV and knowledge-based view posited the importance of 
organizationally embedded knowledge, various concepts have investigated the 
creation and application of such knowledge. Figure 2 provides a simplified 
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illustration of how the RBV and concepts of knowledge management, 
organizational learning and IC can be positioned in the process of attaining 
competitive advantage and superior organizational performance.  
 
 
Figure 2. General relationships between the concepts 
 
As noted earlier, the RBV and knowledge-based view explain the causality 
between organizationally embedded knowledge and competitive advantage. The 
causality between organizational performance and sustainable competitive 
advantage2 is suggested in strategic management research (Grant, 2002). The 
concepts of knowledge management, organizational learning and IC do not 
explain the causality between organizational knowledge and competitive 
advantage, but concentrate on the opportunities for management to intervene in 
the development of organizational knowledge and capabilities. For the definitions 
of the concepts see also Appendix 2.  
The literature of these concepts is fragmented, however, and has a high level of 
diffusion in its interpretation of and approaches to them (see Shrivastava, 1983; 
Scarbrough & Swan, 2001; Kaufmann & Schneider, 2004). To sketch out some 
basic parameters: the literature of knowledge management focuses on the types 
and flows of knowledge suggesting numerous loosely coupled methods to support 
managerial intervention (Styhre, 2003). Much of the attention is placed on tacit 
and explicit, and individual and organizational levels of knowledge in suggesting 
codifying, restoring, distributing and sharing mechanisms to make individual 
                                                 
 
2
 The philosophical and logical foundations of the causality hypotheses between competitive 
advantage and superior organizational performance have also been criticized (see e.g., Powell, 
2001).  
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knowledge available to an organization (Davenport & Prusak, 1998). Many 
studies of knowledge management literature also have a significant orientation 
towards the field of information systems (Wilson, 2002).  
The concept of organizational learning has been introduced to explain how new 
knowledge and learning is developed in an organization (Argyris, 1978; Daft & 
Weick, 1984; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kim, 1998). The concept has been 
applied in terms of information processing (Huber, 1991), cognitive limitations 
(Levinthal & March, 1993), and the processes that build the absorptive capacity 
of the firm in which data is acquired and turned into organizational knowledge 
and actions (Daft & Weick, 1984; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 1998; Zahra & 
George, 2002). 
Several scholars perceive IC as an end product of knowledge management and 
organizational learning (e.g., Lennon & Wollin, 2001), consisting of the 
knowledge stocks and knowledge-related assets of an organization (Brooking, 
1996; Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996; Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Roos, Roos, 
Dragonetti & Edvinsson, 1997; Stewart, 1997). One definition frequently 
referenced is that suggested by Stewart (1997: 101) according to which IC is 
“knowledge, information, intellectual property, experience – that can be put to use 
to create wealth. It is collective brainpower or packaged useful knowledge”. The 
economist Galbraith used the term intellectual capital as early as 1969 (Hudson, 
1993: 15), whereas the active discussions about its meaning, content and the 
options for managerial intervention started about two decades later. Some 
scholars prefer the term intellectual assets (e.g., Sveiby, 1989; Sveiby, 1997; 
Caddy, 2000), while others started to use the term intellectual capital (e.g., 
Brooking, 1996; Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996; Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Roos 
et al., 1997; Stewart, 1997; Petty & Guthrie, 2000). Often the terms intellectual 
capital and intangibles are used interchangeably to refer to the same phenomenon 
(e.g., Harrison & Sullivan, 2000; Joia, 2000; Johanson, Mårtensson & Skoog, 
2001). Other scholars draw a distinction between these terms perceiving 
intangibles as a limited financial accounting term (e.g., Caddy, 2000). In this 
paper, the term intellectual capital (IC) is used throughout the study to refer to the 
collection of knowledge and knowledge-based resources and the ability to use 
those resources. Thus, IC includes individual as well as organizational level 
knowledge and capabilities bundled together with other organizational resources. 
The components of IC cover a span reaching from single human skills to complex 
knowledge bundles, such as brand names, patents and customer relationships. In 
literature it is very popular to speak about IC in terms of  the categories of human 
capital, structural capital and relational capital (Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Roos 
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et al., 1997; Stewart, 1997; Sullivan, 1998). Several categories of IC are also 
presented in Appendix 3. The categorization of IC is not, however, relevant in the 
present study, since the aim is not to disentangle the parts of IC. The dimensions 
of human, structural and relational capital are considered only as metaphors 
(Mouritsen & Larsen, 2005) in discussing some parts of case studies (in chapter 
4).  
Some scholars consider IC to include only organizational level knowledge 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998: 245) defining it as “a valuable resource and a 
capability for action based in knowledge and knowing”. Other scholars include 
individual as well as organizational level knowledge and assets related to 
knowledge (e.g., Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996; Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Roos 
et al., 1997; Stewart, 1997). Drawing on the RBV and knowledge-based views the 
present study applies the term valuable intellectual capital in referring to the 
theoretically most valuable knowledge and knowledge-related resources – 
organizational level knowledge and capabilities, which are aligned with 
organizational strategies and environmental circumstances.  
The development of the IC concept has been slightly distinct from the concepts of 
organizational learning and knowledge management, since the IC concept has its 
own origins. Initiated by the interests of consultancy, the early progress of the IC 
concept was similar to certain fashions in management (Abrahamson, 1996) in 
outracing the traditional views of organizational assets. The original views of IC 
were rather static, perceiving IC as consisting of various types of knowledge as 
assets that are available for the firm (e.g. Brooking, 1996; Edvinsson & Sullivan, 
1996; Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Roos et al., 1997; Stewart, 1997). Lately, 
however, in parallel with the static view the dynamic dimensions of IC in 
generating organizational knowledge and capabilities have been discussed (see 
e.g., Lennon & Wollin, 2001; Habersam & Piber, 2003; Rastogi, 2003; Kianto, 
2007). Consequently, the development of the IC concept has been moving closer 
to the ideas of knowledge management and organizational learning.  
The RBV and concepts of knowledge management, IC and organizational 
learning share an interest in organizational knowledge and capabilities. These 
concepts overlap in terms of their interest in organizationally embedded 
knowledge, improving our understanding of the mechanisms operating beneath 
the surface of organizational action and competitive advantage. Better 
understanding of these mechanisms should lead to opportunities for managerial 
intervention – to influence the development of organizational knowledge and 
capabilities according to the firm’s strategies and environmental conditions. 
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The common interest of these concepts in organizationally embedded knowledge 
has also led to the common problems of managerial intervention. Management 
has not been an easy task, since the highly ambiguous and idiosyncratic nature of 
knowledge makes it difficult to capture. Before addressing the question of 
management in the present study, however, it is necessary to understand the 
general structure and mechanisms with which a valuable IC – consisting of 
organizational knowledge and capabilities – is built. Thus, the discussion in the 
subsequent sections outlines the structures and processes relevant to create 
valuable IC. 
2.2 The creation of inimitable and non-substitutable 
intellectual capital  
2.2.1 Creation and existence of knowledge 
There are many views about the ways organizationally valuable knowledge is 
created. The common standpoint is that the creation of organizational knowledge 
always starts with individual knowledge (Argyris, 1978; Grant, 1996b; Sanchez, 
2001a: 8–9). The creation of individual knowledge can be explained by the help 
of Grant’s (1996b: 110) simple definition, according to which “knowledge is that 
which is known”. This definition indicates that there is a thing which is known 
and somebody who knows of it. Thus, the subsequent discussion does not attempt 
to specify the general meaning of knowledge, but outlines the elements that give 
rise to the creation and existence of various kinds of knowledge.  
In general, there are three elements that are necessary for the creation of 
knowledge (see also Figure 3) being:  
– a human actor 
– a knowledge object 
– a context. 
A human actor is a central part of the triangle, representing the entity that knows 
about some thing. An individual freely makes choices, acting according to an 
interpretation of situations faced. Different people learn different things in an 
organization and use their knowledge differently (Spender, 1996). 
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Figure 3. The triangle of knowledge  
 
A knowledge object represents a focal object that knowledge is about. Individual 
knowledge is a person’s understanding of an object, procedural or declarative 
knowledge about the object or the ways in which the object can be used (Polanyi, 
1958: 174-175). An individual can gain some knowledge, or learn something, but 
the learning always takes place about some thing or phenomenon. We know about 
some object and we cannot separate our knowledge from that object. The object 
gives meaning and significance to knowledge. Knowledge is not independent of 
these objects. Knowledge does not exist and have value per se, but is connected to 
objects (Mouritsen, Larsen & Bukh, 2001). As Mouritsen, Bukh and Bang (2005: 
32) state:  
“Knowledge is not an entity by itself; it has to be connected with things, 
phenomena or relations. It is knowledge about something rather than 
knowledge per se.” 
These objects are the things and artifacts of the real world. In an organization, 
these represent all the material substances, such as materials, products, suppliers, 
customers, as well as the processes and technologies of how to exploit the 
material substances.  
One person can have different types of knowledge and skills, and they may relate 
to one object or many objects. To perform a particular task usually involves many 
objects. For instance, in order to polish a shoe one needs to know at least about 
the following objects: a shoe that needs to be polished, a brush, and a suitable 
polish. Firstly, the person has to be aware of these objects. Secondly, he or she 
has to know how to use these objects in theory. And finally, the person has to be 
able to apply the theory in practice. Not to mention the fact that there are a variety 
of shoe-polishing techniques and other options that will contribute to the end 
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result - well or poorly polished shoes. In principle, none of these types of 
knowledge would exist without these objects and the human actor.  
The context represents other objects and people, existing organizational 
knowledge and processes, as well as situations and relationships that a human 
actor is engaged at different times. In an alternative context, knowledge objects 
can acquire novel meanings, opening up new ways of thinking and doing. The 
context includes a temporary element in the form of different situations in which 
individuals create and exploit knowledge, but it also includes formal and informal 
structures of an organization, which are generally more sustainable in nature.  
Organizational hierarchy and procedures of communication represent formal 
structures, whereas organizational culture and social ties build up informal 
structures that give rise to the creation and application of knowledge. In addition, 
tools for communication and information storage form an important part of the 
context. 
All these elements, the human actor, the knowledge object and the context, play a 
relevant role in the creation and existence of knowledge. Knowledge can never be 
created if any of these entities are missing. Different situations, objects and 
human actors sustain various kinds of knowledge, since “no one has ever 
observed a fact, a theory, or a machine that could survive outside of the networks 
that gave birth to them” (Latour, 1987: 248). 
In perceiving the role of these elements, some philosophical questions can be 
raised. The question of the relationship between the subject (human actor) and the 
object especially, has been debated over the centuries. It has been repeatedly 
asked, what forms knowledge, is it the human actor or the fundamental nature of 
the object (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1997; Venzin, Krogh & Roos, 1998). This question 
is addressed and debated from several epistemological standpoints (see Appendix 
4). In order to simplify the discussion, the existing views have often been reduced 
to two epistemologies (see e.g., McNamara, Baxter & Chua, 2004: 54):    
1. A realist epistemology of knowledge, 
2. A non-realist epistemology of knowledge.  
The realist epistemology of knowledge, also referred to as objectivism, has a 
highly positivist belief that the world is objective and consists of stable rules and 
means-and-ends relationships. This view corresponds with cognitive psychology, 
later developed as cognitivism theory, which considers the mind as an 
information-processing system of objective reality. Here it is also termed 
cognitive epistemology of knowledge (Venzin, Krogh & Roos, 1998). The realist 
epistemology has a dualist view in which knowledge objects and knowledge are 
perceived as independent from the knower (McNamara, Baxter & Chua, 2004). 
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Since reality is “out there”, knowledge is gained through the methods of scientific 
discovery. The content of knowledge is determined by the fundamental nature of 
the knowledge object.  
In non-realist epistemology, also termed the subjectivist or relativist view, the 
mind of a human actor is central to knowledge creation. Kant suggested a 
constructivist view in which the discovery is mediated by human beings making 
their knowledge always conditional and subjective, tentative and situated 
(McNamara, Baxter & Chua, 2004). Individuals are always interpreting 
everything around them and creating a context-sensitive meaning. Knowledge is 
not determined by the nature of knowledge objects, but is largely dependent on 
the cognitive structures of the human actor. Similarly, formal and informal 
structures of the context are dependent on the cognitive interpretations that the 
human actor gives to these structures.  
In addition to the realist and non-realist epistemologies of knowledge, there are 
many other perspectives distinguished in the literature. For instance, Schultze and 
Stabell (2004) have discussed four discourses in perceiving knowledge: a neo-
functionalist, a constructivist, a critical and a dialogic discourse (see Appendix 5). 
The neo-functionalist and critical discourses, can be seen as representing realist 
views of knowledge, perceiving knowledge as either an asset or a representation 
of power. The constructivist and dialogic discourses carry the ideas of non-realist 
perspectives. In particular, the constructivist discourse follows the Kantian 
critique, in which knowledge is created and shaped by self-interpretation and 
subjective impressions of the world, whereas dialogic discourse considers all 
knowledge as representations of discipline.  
Scholars have argued that one study cannot take multiple epistemologies of 
knowledge but has to make a choice between the epistemologies (e.g., Schultze & 
Stabell, 2004: 568). Latour (1993; 1999), on the other hand, has a different 
opinion, criticizing the dualistic subject-object poles. He claims that in the realist 
pole the world of science is non-human, determined by things that exist per se. In 
the non-realist pole, the world of science is “entirely limited to humans, 
absolutely divorced from what things are in and for themselves” (Latour, 1999: 
9). Earlier Latour (1993) suggests that it is necessary to consider a mixture of 
these poles in studying various phenomena. Several studies have agreed with this 
view by acknowledging the role of a human actor as well as that of knowledge 
objects and the context that gives rise to the existence of knowledge (see e.g., 
Mouritsen, Larsen & Bukh, 2001; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2003; Mouritsen, Bukh & 
Bang, 2005). The present study follows this stream of research by not only 
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acknowledging the role of human actors, but also recognizing the importance of 
objects and the context in the creation of knowledge.  
2.2.2 Structure of building intellectual capital 
Knowledge may or may not have an effect on focal objects, artifacts, other people 
or relationships. Mouritsen et al. (2001) outline that in order for knowledge to be 
valuable it has to have an effect on something. Knowledge may stand as an 
awareness of some thing or be turned into actions. The philosopher, Ryle, 
provided the distinction between propositional knowledge and practical 
knowledge (Hyman, 1999: 434). Propositional (i.e. possessed) knowledge is 
being aware of some fact, whereas practical (i.e. practiced) knowledge means 
knowing how to perform an act. Further, the question is whether a person just 
knows how to perform an act or whether he/she is actually able to turn this 
knowledge into action. In the same vein, Cook and Brown (1999) talk about 
possessed and practiced knowledge (also called knowing).  
Returning to the shoe-polishing analogy, a person has to know about many 
objects – the brush and the polish amongst others – to accomplish something with 
another object, an unpolished shoe. The knowledge can be either about the focal 
object or about the practical reasoning, experience and skills of the process of 
how to do something. Nevertheless, if the person does not apply that knowledge 
in action (does not polish a shoe, for instance), the knowledge does not have an 
effect. The shoe might stay unpolished due to a lack of motivation or a shortage 
of practical skills. If the person applies the knowledge (does polish the shoe), 
knowledge has an effect on the focal object (the shoe becomes polished and a 
newly-bought brush and polish become used). In the same way, knowledge that 
has an effect on something is more valuable for a firm. 
Often knowledge is not identifiable as a simple awareness but recognizable only 
as an ability to do something (Spender, 1996; Hyman, 1999). In particular, tacit 
knowledge emerges only in action (Polanyi, 1958). The present study still 
acknowledges this distinction, since it is necessary to know something in order to 
be able to act, even though the creation and application of knowledge may often 
happen simultaneously. The existence of propositional knowledge does not 
automatically determine the fact that a person will take an action. For instance, 
Pfeffer and Sutton (1999; 2000) point to managerial knowledge that remains 
unapplied creating a gap between knowledge and doing.  
Knowledge can remain at an individual level or be shared among several 
individuals or groups in organization (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). 
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Many people may have knowledge about the same focal object, but it does not 
necessarily imply that they share their knowledge. In fact, their knowledge may 
differ significantly. For instance, an electronic and a mechanical engineer may 
work individually applying their expert knowledge of engineering on a particular 
machine (a knowledge object). Figure 4 shows the abstract picture of the different 
knowledge that two individuals have about a knowledge object. 
 
 
Figure 4. Expert knowledge of two individuals 
 
Individual knowledge, either propositional or practiced, is theoretically not as 
interesting as knowledge that is shared, since individual knowledge cannot create 
a sustainable competitive advantage for the firm. The problem is that the 
knowledge of these individuals (for instance, the knowledge of the electronics and 
mechanical engineers in Figure 4) is imitable by competitors since it is considered 
as tradable factor in markets (Barney, 1991; Alvesson, 2000). “Individuals come 
and go, but organizations preserve knowledge, behaviors, mental maps, norms, 
and values over time” (Daft & Weick, 1984: 285). Thus, the expert knowledge of 
individuals cannot possibly create advantages that last for a longer period.  
Knowledge that is shared represents a common understanding of individuals or 
groups of individuals about knowledge objects and nurtures common behavior 
amongst members of an organization. Figure 5 presents an abstract picture of 
knowledge that is shared by two individuals. The arrow in between the two 
individuals refers to their continuous interaction and communication (Nonaka, 
1994) through which shared knowledge is built. Figure 5 illustrates the 
individuals’ common understanding of some knowledge object. However, 
organizational knowledge is not a sum of individual’s knowledge. In fact, an 
organization may know even less than its members (Argyris, 1978: 9). Only a part 
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of the knowledge that exists is shared between members of organization, since the 
processes of building organizational knowledge are quite complicated3. However, 
it does not necessarily mean that organizational knowledge includes only shared 
knowledge. It is rather a combination of individual and shared knowledge that 
nurtures common behavior and enables the firm to take coordinated actions. 
 
 
Figure 5. Shared knowledge 
 
Zahra and Georg (2002) have suggested that organizational knowledge can also 
take the form of propositional knowledge and knowledge in practice, forming 
both a  potential and a realized capacity for the firm. Knowledge that is not 
applied in actions remains a potential capacity of the firm. In Penrosian terms, 
knowledge of potential capacity stays as a mere resource of the firm without 
generating services that it can potentially render (Penrose, 1959: 25). Knowledge 
that is turned into action becomes a realized capacity of the firm (Zahra & 
George, 2002). Mouritsen and Koleva (2005) have studied patents and suggested 
the existence of packaged and unpackaged knowledge. Packaged knowledge 
represents the potential capacity of the firm and unpackaged knowledge stands for 
realized capacity, being applied in organizational processes and turned into 
actions. Unpacking knowledge enables it to turn into valuable activity and 
processes. 
Relying on the above discussion, the following matrix can be drawn (see Figure 
6) with the four categories of knowledge along the dimensions of individual and 
organizational knowledge, and potential and realized capacities. In reality, the 
dimensions of individual and organizational level knowledge exist in a 
continuum. For instance, several scholars have also considered a group level 
                                                 
 
3
 These processes will be introduced in chapter 2.2.3. 
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knowledge (e.g., Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Crossan, Lane & 
White, 1999).  
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Figure 6. Categories of knowledge in the firm4  
 
The basic level knowledge in that present matrix, individual knowledge, has 
already been discussed in a previous section. A person has knowledge about some 
object but the effect of knowledge does not emerge since the individual is not 
engaged in action. Nor is this knowledge shared.  
The effect of individual knowledge would emerge in individual actions. 
Individual actions are shown by two knowledge triangles in the second quadrant 
of the matrix in which two individuals apply their individual knowledge. The 
knowledge of these individuals has an effect on the products, services or some 
other phenomena of an organization.  
Organizational knowledge represents the potential capacity of the firm. It 
includes knowledge that is shared among the individuals5. The high path-
                                                 
 
4
 The concept of potential and realized capacity is applied (Zahra & George, 2002) to represent 
propositional knowledge and practical knowledge in action. The terms of potential and realized 
capacities are going to be used alongside the terms of organizational knowledge and capabilities 
through the remainder of the dissertation. 
5
 In Figure 6 the number of two individuals is chosen to simplify the triangles. In reality, it takes 
more than two people to build organizational knowledge and capabilities. 
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dependency and complexity of the processes of developing organizational 
knowledge make such knowledge more difficult for competitors to imitate  
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997), but organizational 
knowledge as propositional knowledge does not directly lead to competitive 
advantage but provides the basis for actions by the organization. It also provides 
organizational flexibility to quickly react to environmental changes (Zahra & 
George, 2002). Learning and new ideas that are not turned into productive 
activities can serve as a source of future competitive advantage.  
Organizational knowledge and the ability to act, build organizational 
capabilities in which knowledge held by individuals and by the organization is 
integrated into and applied as part of the processes of the organization (Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; 
Kasunoki, Nonaka and Nagata, 1998). Capabilities consist of organizational 
routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) in which an organization’s embedded 
knowledge is turned into action. The explanation of the difference between 
knowledge and capabilities can be drawn from the distinction of resources and 
capabilities suggested by Amit and Schoemaker (1993: 35): 
“Capabilities, […] refer to a firm’s capacity to deploy Resources, usually in 
combination, using organizational processes, to affect a desired end. They 
are information-based, tangible or intangible processes that are firm-specific 
and are developed over time through complex interactions among the firm’s 
Resources.” 
Given this, some knowledge may remain as a potential capacity of the firm, not 
being turned into actions. Alternatively, individual and organizational level 
knowledge and other resources may be exploited in repeatable patterns of actions, 
so building organizational capabilities6, that is, the realized capacities of the firm.  
The arrows presented in Figure 6 between the dimensions of knowledge are 
drawn to suggest the general causality in which each dimension and process of 
knowledge creation precedes other dimensions and processes in creating the basis 
of competitive advantage. These dimensions of knowledge do not exist 
independently but build on each other (Zahra and George, 2002). As for instance, 
                                                 
 
6
 There are two types of capabilities in the firm: functional capabilities and integrative capabilities 
(Verona, 1999). Functional capabilities include various technological capabilities, such as R&D, 
production and marketing, whereas integrative capabilities enable the building of these 
capabilities via external and internal knowledge absorption that is supported by managerial 
processes and structures. The present discussion is rather about the creation of functional 
capabilities.  
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the existence of individual knowledge facilitates individual actions and is also a 
basis for the creation of organizational knowledge. Similarly, organization-level 
knowledge as potential capacity is the basis for the creation of organizational 
capabilities. Weaknesses in potential capacities constrain the latter realized 
capacities. As we cannot do more than we know, we cannot create realized 
capacities without the existence of potential capacities of the firm. 
In addition, knowledge is being transformed as it flows between the dimensions 
of the matrix. There is interplay between potential and realized capacities, as well 
as between individual and organization-level knowledge, during which new types 
of knowledge and abilities emerge. As Cook and Brown (1999) argue, there is a 
“generative dance” between knowledge and knowing that is an important source 
of new knowledge and organizational innovation. Potential capacities are not 
merely turned into realized capacities, but new meanings and skills can be 
created.   
In reality, there are numerous relationships that are not represented by the arrows 
in Figure 6. For instance, organizational level knowledge has an effect on 
individual and group level understanding due to the feedback mechanisms of 
learning (Crossan, Lane & White, 1999). Individuals or groups of individuals 
create a shared understanding that becomes institutionalized at an organizational 
level, where they start to feed the same context in which they were originally 
created. In this way organizational knowledge and capabilities become a part of 
the context in which individual knowledge is created. Thus, knowledge does not 
only flow from the individual to supplement organizational level knowledge but 
organizational level knowledge becomes a part of the context in which individual 
level knowledge and actions occur.   
The dimensions of knowledge presented in the matrix are not always identifiable, 
since much knowledge cannot possibly be determined before its application in 
action. For instance, the existence of tacit knowledge would emerge only in 
realized capacities, because a person may not be aware of his or her knowledge 
before its actualization in a particular situation. It is not expressible without the 
action (Polanyi, 1958). Therefore, the creation of potential and realized capacities 
often takes place simultaneously (Zahra & George, 2002). Spender (1996) 
suggests four types of knowledge: conscious, automatic, objectified and collective 
(see Table 1). Implicit knowledge emerges only in “doing” i.e. the effect of 
knowledge is visible only in actual activity or as a result of the activity (as a 
nicely polished shoe, for instance). Thus, potential capacities that are largely 
based on implicit knowledge are usually not observable. In this case only the final 
effects of knowledge indicate the existence of such knowledge. In other words, 
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without actions neither the existence nor the effects of such knowledge would 
emerge.  
 
Table 1. Different types of organizational knowledge  
 Individual  Social 
Explicit knowledge Conscious Objectified 
Implicit knowledge Automatic Collective 
Adapted from Spender (1996: 52) 
 
This, however, makes some types of knowledge highly important contributors to 
the firm’s competitive advantage. Capabilities consist of various types of 
knowledge of which a large part are implicit. They are theoretically most 
interesting as a source of potential advantages in the market, since these 
capabilities are most likely inimitable, non-substitutable and rare.  Barney (1991: 
107-108) has argued that inimitability of a resource is achieved in one of or a 
combination  of the following ways: 
– a resource is obtained along a unique historical path of the firm; 
– the link between a resource and competitive advantage is “causally 
ambiguous”; 
– a resource is “socially complex”.  
The creation of capabilities is generally considered as a highly path-dependent 
and complex process (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997), 
dependent on the historical conditions and development of a firm. The automatic 
and collective knowledge embedded in capabilities make them complex and 
causally ambiguous. Collective knowledge, in particular, is by nature a socially 
complex phenomenon (Spender, 1996).  These types of knowledge, among other 
more identifiable patterns of knowing, create synenergies in a capability, making 
capabilities impossible to objectively observe or transfer to another organization 
(Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997; Kasunoki, Nonaka & Nagata, 1998; Makadok, 
2001). In particular those capabilities which largely include collective knowledge 
are highly inimitable since the existence of such knowledge emerges only in 
collective actions; it is not tradable in the market and it is difficult to transfer to 
other organizations (Spender, 1996). 
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Barney (1991) has also suggested the characteristics of rareness and value of a 
resource. The rareness of a resource does not depend only on types of knowledge 
and the historical path of a firm’s development. The question of rareness is rather 
ambiguous. Rareness can have two dimensions, depending on the combination of 
physical rareness in the factor market or the supposed value that results from the 
firm’s particular resource combination (Black & Boal, 1994). Therefore one 
cannot actually know how rare the resource has to be in order to be a source of 
competitive advantage, since rareness depends not only on firm-specific intrinsic 
characteristics of the capability but its uniqueness in the market. However, the 
unique patterns of a firm in developing its capabilities increase the probability 
that the strategies derived from these capabilities are relatively rare in the market. 
Similarly, the characteristic of value does not only depend on the nature of a 
resource. A resource should correspond to environmental circumstances in order 
to be valuable (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). Thus, the matrix introduced above 
(Figure 6) does not reflect the value of a resource, since the value of a resource 
does not depend so much on its intrinsic structure but the position of the resource 
in the market. The question of value will be further discussed in chapter 2.3. 
2.2.3 Processes of building intellectual capital 
In creating organizational knowledge and capabilities it is not only important to 
capture the structure of knowledge categories, but more importantly, the 
processes in which they are created and formed. Knowledge is not only 
interesting and important because of what it is, but also in terms of “how 
knowledge of various kinds can be acquired” (Hyman, 1999: 434).  There are 
various processes of organizational learning (Argyris, 1978) that continuously 
generate flows of knowledge from the external environment to the firm, and 
between the knowledge dimensions inside the firm. From the external 
environment, new information and knowledge is acquired to build potential 
capacities. At the same time there are many dynamic flows of knowledge inside 
the firm: from ideas to actions, from individual know-how to shared meanings, 
from shared knowledge to organizational actions etc. The flow of knowledge 
constantly takes place at various unconscious and conscious levels within 
organizational members, finally revealing itself in products and services, and 
customer behaviors. 
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Figure 7. Processes of organizational learning  
 
There are several processes of organizational learning that build organizational 
knowledge and capabilities7 (e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Grant, 1996a; Zahra & George, 2002). Figure 7 represents the directions along 
which processes of organizational learning generate flows of knowledge from the 
external environment to potential capacities, between potential and realized 
capacities, and individual and organizational levels of knowledge.  
Literature suggests organizational learning is highly rooted in individual learning 
but requires more than inquiry from individuals. “Individual learning is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for organizational learning” (Argyris, 1978: 
20). Organizational learning starts as individual level learning with recognizing 
and intuiting relevant information (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Crossan, Lane & 
White, 1999). After the step of recognition and intuition of new and relevant 
information, the following processes of organizational learning build potential 
and realized capacities of the firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 
2002): 
– acquisition, 
                                                 
 
7
 Many scholars also consider organizational learning itself as a specific organizational capability 
(e.g., Verona, 1999;  Zahra & George, 2002).  
 Acta Wasaensia     29 
  
– assimilation,  
– transformation, and 
– exploitation. 
These processes are often perceived and termed differently. For instance, March 
(1991) uses the concepts of knowledge exploration and exploitation. Processes of 
exploration increase potential capacities, whereas exploitation builds realized 
capacities of the firm. March (1991: 71) describes these processes in the 
following way, 
“Exploration includes things captured by terms such as search, variation, 
risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation. 
Exploitation includes such things as refinement, choice, production, 
efficiency, selection, implementation, execution.” 
Kloot (1997) distinguishes processes of knowledge acquisition, information 
distribution, information interpretation and organizational memory in which the 
creation of organizational memory means storing and institutionalizing new 
knowledge. The present study applies the terminology suggested by Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) and Zahra and George (2002). Thus, the terms of knowledge 
acquisition, assimilation, transformation and exploitation are applied. 
Knowledge acquisition starts at the individual level, where new information is 
obtained. Scholars have also used the term scanning of the external environment 
in referring to knowledge acquisition (e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984: 285).  
Assimilation processes comprise a firm’s routines of analyzing and sharing 
information. The process of assimilation is also termed as interpretation in which 
new information is interpreted through existing cognitive maps of the 
organization (Daft & Weick, 1984). It is suggested that organizational learning  
via acquisition and assimilation of external information increases the potential 
capacity of the firm and its ability to react to changes in the external environment 
(Birchall & Tovstiga, 2005). The alternative process to assimilation is 
transformation of knowledge (Todorova & Durisin, 2007). 
The assimilation or transformation of knowledge is conducted at either an 
individual or a collective level. To create organizational knowledge, the collective 
interpretation and understanding of objects and artifacts of an organization is 
necessary. Integration of knowledge can be considered as inducing the creation of 
organizational knowledge from individual capacities, as well as contributing to 
knowledge assimilation, transformation and exploitation processes (Grant, 1996a, 
1996b). The process of knowledge integration is influenced by the structural, 
cognitive and relational dimensions of social interactions (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
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1998), taking place via combinations of tacit and explicit knowledge that span 
individual, group and organizational level conversions (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995). Grant (1996b; 1996a) suggests that integration and application of 
knowledge is the essence of organizational capabilities, it is “knowledge 
integration rather than knowledge itself” that matters in this process.  Knowledge 
integration does not only allow communication of existing meanings to the higher 
levels of an organization, but the generation of new meanings and ideas. 
Consequently, organizational level potential capacities become significantly 
richer than a mere sum of the individual knowledge would have been. 
The last process, exploitation of knowledge, represents the process in which 
knowledge is applied in organizational actions. According to Argyris and Schön 
(1978) and Daft and Weick (1984: 286) organizational learning happens when 
interpreted knowledge is turned into action. Thus, a mere increase in potential 
capacities without turning new capacities into actions does not represent 
organizational learning. Organizational learning means repeated exploitation of 
new capacities in which new organizational routines emerge (Nelson & Winter, 
1982). 
In reality, there is a mixture of processes that flow along a diagonal of the matrix 
from individual knowledge to capabilities. The  processes start with intuiting 
something at the individual level, then involve interpretation processes at the 
individual and group level, and end with the process of institutionalization in 
building organizational capabilities (Crossan, Lane & White, 1999). These four 
processes are not distinct but intertwined with knowledge integration. In practice, 
it is impossible to objectively observe and distinguish each of the processes. The 
processes of knowledge acquisition, assimilation, transformation and exploitation 
can occur simultaneously and a time lag between the processes does not 
necessarily exist (Zahra & George, 2002). For instance, organizational 
capabilities can also be built by learning-by-doing and mechanisms of 
communicative action (Habermas, 1987; O’Donnell, O’Regan & Coates, 2000). 
Individuals learn simultaneously from the actions they take (Argyris, 1978). 
Figure 7 represents the processes of learning in a simplified manner, whereas the 
more elaborate processes can be seen in Appendix 6.  
Knowledge that is largely tacit, such as automatic knowledge (Spender, 1996: 
52), can be integrated via communicative actions (see Figure 7). O’Donnell 
(2004) suggests that the key to building organizationally valuable intellectual 
capital, unobservable and bundled organizational knowledge and capabilities, lies 
in ongoing interactions of activities in which individuals build shared knowledge. 
In such a way feelings, communications, thoughts and activities become 
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intertwined into a set of processes in which collective knowledge emerges in 
organizational actions. 
Due to the stickiness and path-dependency of the processes of organizational 
learning (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), it is rather difficult 
for the firm to extend its capabilities in any extreme way or build new capabilities 
in other fields of business. Penrose (1959) has suggested that resources can be 
created quickly, but to convert them into productive services takes time. Similarly 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997: 528) suggest, 
 “Because of imperfect factor markets, or more precisely the non-tradability 
of ‘soft’ assets like values, culture, and organizational experience, 
distinctive competences and capabilities generally cannot be acquired; they 
must be built. This sometimes takes years – possibly decades.” 
The cumulativeness of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) also 
implies that the processes of extending a certain technological domain of 
capabilities in one period will give rise to more efficient processes in the next 
period, meaning that the effectiveness of the processes of knowledge acquisition, 
assimilation, transformation and exploitation in one period will positively affect 
the same processes in the next period (Zahra & George, 2002). The negative side 
of this accumulation is, however, the creation of high path-dependency (Levinthal 
& March, 1993). 
There are numerous individual and organizational factors that affect the processes 
of organizational learning. For instance, acquisition and assimilation of 
knowledge are limited by the cognitive limitations of individuals. Research in 
cognitive psychology shows that people are generally unable to process more than 
nine items of information simultaneously (Miller, 1956; Baddeley, 1994). 
Therefore, individual limitations affect the absorptive capacity of an organization 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), influencing the creation of organizational 
capabilities. The processes of organizational learning are also inhibited by 
different and conflicting views and the way that people tend to withheld 
information (Argyris, 1978). The firm’s ability to acquire new knowledge and 
integrate it into existing capabilities is also largely dependent on the structure and 
availability of external sources, and firm’s internal communication structures 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kim, 1998; Zahra & George, 2002). A more thorough 
picture of the factors influencing organizational learning is presented in Appendix 
7. 
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2.3 The framework of building valuable intellectual 
capital 
The amounts of organizational knowledge and capabilities do not determine their 
usefulness, since not all kinds of organizational level knowledge and capabilities 
are equally beneficial to the firm. Alvesson and Karreman (2001: 999) argue that 
“Knowledge is not necessary functional, useful, and a generally good thing”. 
Even learning might not be valuable, since "there is no reason to assume that new 
knowledge will be useful [...]" (Penrose, 1959: 114). For the firm it is not enough 
to have intellectual capital which is inimitable and non-substitutable by 
competitors but is not valuable in the market. Firms are forced to keep up with 
changes in the market – globalization, new technologies and customer demands. 
Inimitability and non-substitutability of organizational knowledge and capabilities 
do not guarantee that the products and services of the firm will meet customers’ 
needs. Resources have to supply valuable outcomes to the marketplace. Barney 
(1991: 106) explains that being valuable to the firm means that a resource or set 
of resources should “exploit opportunities or neutralize threats in a firm’s 
environment”. Therefore, in addition to inimitability and non-substitutability, 
organizational knowledge and capabilities should have the potential to generate 
an outcome, which is congruent with environmental circumstances.  
Strategic management literature addresses the link between a firm’s strategies and 
its environmental circumstances (Porter, 1980; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Grant, 
2002). The need for a fit between environmental circumstances and 
organizational characteristics, such as organizational values, structure, and 
processes, has been introduced in congruence theory (Nightingale & Toulouse, 
1977). The theory seeks to find a fit between various organizational components 
in order to achieve more effective organizational behavior8. Among many 
possible fits, literature has outlined the importance of the following alignments:  
– the alignment of an organizational strategy with environmental conditions;  
– the alignment of organizational behavior with the chosen strategy.  
Since emergent types of strategies9 are flexible and adaptive to  changes in the 
environment (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) they can be considered as generally 
                                                 
 
8
 The term organizational behavior is explained by Argyris (1978: 13) as decisions and actions of 
individuals, which are governed by collective rules of an organization. 
9
 According to Mintzberg (1978) there are intended and emerged strategies. Intended strategies are 
formed by explicit and purposeful planning as a priori guidelines for action. The strategy that is 
finally realized may be significantly different, since strategy gradually evolves and new 
strategies emerge due to the managerial decisions in reacting to environmental changes. 
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more aligned with environmental circumstances. However, in conceptualizing the 
emergent types of strategies Mintzberg and Waters (1985) consider the alignment 
of a strategy with environmental circumstances, but not the alignment of 
organizational resources and behaviors with the  strategies chosen initially.  
Regarding the formulation of a firm’s strategy, there are significant differences in 
views of the RBV (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984) and competitive forces 
(Porter, 1980). Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) explain the main differences 
between these approaches. According to the competitive forces approach, a firm 
can freely choose its strategy based on industry structures, and acquiring the 
necessary resources from the market. According to the RBV, however, a firm is 
largely defined through its existing resources. Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997: 
514) argue,  
“Resource endowments are ‘sticky’: at least in the short run, firms are to 
some degree stuck with what they have and may have to live with what they 
lack.”  
Thus, according to the RBV a new strategy of the firm is rather a renewed version 
of previous strategies, not a fresh move toward the market, since this strategy is 
largely formulated by relying on existing resource endowments. Since the RBV 
sees strategies as largely dependent on existing resources, it means that a 
significant part of a firm’s knowledge and capabilities are always aligned with its 
chosen strategies.  
Nevertheless, the existing knowledge and capabilities of the firm cannot be 
entirely aligned with organizational strategies for at least three reasons. First, 
individuals share only partially congruent goals with an organization (Ouchi, 
1979). The ways in which they learn and act may not be aligned with 
organizational strategies. Second, increasing competition forces companies to 
strive for a competitive position in the market and choose the business strategies 
that challenge existing resources. Formulating seemingly impossible goals are a 
form of “resource leverage” to overcome the constraints that existing resources 
represent for the firm (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Hence, firms tend to function on 
the edge of their constraints constantly aiming a little higher than the existing 
knowledge and capabilities allow. And third, rapid changes in the environment 
force the firm to change its strategies, but the path-dependency of organizational 
knowledge and capabilities (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Levinthal & March, 1993) creates a gap between the necessary strategies and the 
firm’s ability to act. As a result, the strategic plans of the firm may change faster 
than the firm’s capabilities can be extended. Thus, there are many circumstances 
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in which the knowledge and capabilities of the firm may not be aligned with its 
current strategies. 
Figure 8 shows a three-dimensional framework built to consider the congruence 
of knowledge and functional capabilities with organizational strategies. The two 
dimensions of the matrix presented earlier represent the bottom of the cube, 
whereas the dimension of congruence is shown on the vertical axes. The value of 
the following framework lies in highlighting eight categories of knowledge from 
which different effects on organizational performance may occur. The figure 
combines static and dynamic views of knowledge in building the basis for 
sustainable competitive advantage of the firm.  The framework relies on the 
following assumptions: 
– managers choose strategies according to their perception of a firm’s existing 
resources and environmental circumstances; 
– the definition of a strategy is constantly adapted to environmental 
circumstances, but changes in organizational knowledge and capabilities take 
more time. 
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Figure 8. Three-dimensional model of creating competitive advantage 
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The following eight categories of knowledge exist and are continuously created in 
an organization: 
1. Individual knowledge, incongruent with organizational strategies. In this 
situation a person has knowledge that is not beneficial (being either neutral or 
negative) to organizational strategies and environmental circumstances. This 
category can also be determined as a lack of knowledge – insufficient or 
missing knowledge for the necessary actions of the firm. The firm is interested 
in expert knowledge that is aligned with organizational interests as much as 
possible. The firm would probably not hire a person without the necessary 
knowledge of the field or of the profession. Nevertheless, the question is not 
just a field of professional knowledge but also the correspondence of 
individual knowledge and willingness with the current strategies of the firm.  
This category of knowledge does not have to be entirely disadvantageous for 
the firm, however. Taken from a more positive angle, this category of 
knowledge may include some new ideas, albeit either not aligned with current 
organizational strategies or not communicated to other organizational 
members. 
2. Individual actions, incongruent with organizational strategies. More 
critical than incongruent knowledge are incongruent actions.  Negative actions 
represent harmful behavior of individuals and a waste of the firm’s resources. 
The effects of these actions can be harmful to current strategies and 
organizational performance. Reasons for these kinds of actions may lie in a 
lack of knowledge or a lack of motivation amongst individuals.  
3. Shared knowledge, incongruent with organizational strategies. The 
existence of such knowledge can have either negative or positive effects on an 
organization. On the one hand, such knowledge may exist in the form of 
negative attitudes towards higher-level managers and organizational goals, 
and have a negative effect on organizational performance and constrain the 
achievement of organizational objectives.  
On the other hand, as a result of knowledge integration mechanisms, various 
new ideas may emerge for new products or services or about unique ways of 
doing things. These ideas may not be aligned with the current strategies of an 
organization, but may initiate new strategies and be beneficial for the future 
organizational performance. Thus, this kind of knowledge can be a source of 
organizational innovation. Weiping (2006) has suggested that having 
knowledge in areas other than are covered by current strategies makes an 
organization flexible, whereas having too much knowledge in areas outside 
organizational strategy (without turning it into beneficial strategy) may harm 
the prosecution of the organization’s current strategies. 
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 This category of knowledge can also consist of contacts and partnerships that 
were beneficial during the implementation of the firm’s past strategies. These 
contacts may become relevant again in the future.  
4. Organizational capabilities, incongruent with organizational strategies. 
Organizational culture and belief systems may sometimes be harmful, causing 
institutional routines and actions that do not benefit organizational goals. 
These may be a result of poor strategic communication or inconsistency of 
managerial systems with organizational strategies. These kinds of routines 
may cause failure in implementing organizational strategies, resulting in poor 
organizational performance. These capabilities can also be things and 
behaviors that an organization has not been able to unlearn (Huber, 1991: 104-
105) after a change in strategy.  
Viewed from a slightly more positive angle, some of these actions can be a 
source of experience and learning which may become useful in the future. 
5. Individual knowledge aligned with organizational strategies. The 
recruitment of people with expert knowledge required by the organization 
would fall into this category. It provides a basis for necessary actions. This 
knowledge must be turned into productive actions in order for the organization 
to benefit from its employees. 
6. Individual actions aligned with organizational strategies. The actions of 
experts aligned with the organization’s interests are unique and valuable; 
nevertheless, competitive advantage cannot be sustainable, because 
individuals are not inimitable resources of the firm (Daft & Weick, 1984; 
Barney, 1991).  
7. Organizational knowledge aligned with organizational strategies. These 
include shared knowledge that is aligned with organizational strategies. This 
category of knowledge may include packaged knowledge (Mouritsen & 
Koleva, 2005), contacts and networks with partners that are not applied but 
may become beneficial in the near future. Recognized but unrealized 
opportunities to implement new actions can also fall into this category. 
8. Organizational competences consist of a set of organizational capabilities 
oriented towards organizational goals (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Teece, Pisano 
& Shuen, 1997; Sanchez, 2004). Organizational competences can only be built 
by adjusting organizational knowledge and capabilities to the opportunities and 
threats of the environment. In a competence, the actions of individuals and 
groups of individuals are integrated into productive organizational processes 
and routines, moderated by the management systems of an organization. 
Competences exist in layers, where the lower level competences consist of 
basic manufacturing capabilities (operational skills and techniques) whereas 
the higher level competences are built on various coordinated capabilities for 
building up organizational functions and business units (Rumelt, 1994).  
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In order to build business strategies and organizational competences in 
congruence with environmental circumstances, managers need to recognize signs 
from the environment – the signs about emerging opportunities and threats. Any 
chance to gain advantage in the market is limited by the firm’s ability to 
recognize the opportunities and be able to respond to them (Penrose, 1959: 32). 
Ansoff (1980:133) calls these signs strategic issues and defines them as follows: 
“a strategic issue is a forthcoming development, either inside or outside of 
the organization,  which is likely to have an important impact on the ability 
of the enterprise to meet its objectives. An issue may be a welcome issue, 
an opportunity to be grasped in the environment, or internal strength which 
can be exploited to advantage. Or it can be an unwelcome external threat, or 
an internal weakness, which imperils continuing success, even the survival 
of the enterprise.”  
An organization responds to these issues by adapting its present capacities to the 
new circumstances. When a necessary change of organizational behavior is 
possible based on existing potential capacities the processes of organizational 
learning constitute single-loop learning (Argyris, 1978). Sometimes, however, 
changes in an environment require a significant extension of potential capacities 
in order to attain new levels of organizational behavior. Argyris (1978) terms that 
double-loop learning.  
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Figure 9. Emerging activation triggers 
 
38      Acta Wasaensia 
Zahra and George (2002) have termed the emerging strategic issues activation 
triggers and explained how an activation trigger induces a firm to increase its 
potential and realized capacities in order to adapt to new situations. Figure 9 
summarizes the types of strategic issues, i.e. activation triggers, faced by a firm. 
Usually external opportunities and threats force changes in organizational 
knowledge and capabilities in order to implement new business strategies. Teece, 
Pisano and Shuen (1997: 524) argue that “a shift in the environment is a far more 
serious threat to the firm than is the loss of key individuals, as individuals can be 
replaced more readily than organizations can be transformed”.  
Internal opportunities enable a company to improve existing organizational 
capacities, whereas an internal threat may show a critical misalignment of 
organizational capacities with the current business strategy. However, 
misalignment of individual knowledge (potential capacity) cannot easily be 
detected as a threat for an organization. Incongruent individual knowledge is also 
less harmful (sometimes even beneficial) than incongruent realized capacities. 
Knowledge from other fields of interest may potentially become beneficial in the 
future despite being incongruent with the current organizational strategies. New 
ideas generated by individuals or groups of employees (represented as knowledge 
category 1 and 3 in Figure 8) can potentially become an internal opportunity for 
the firm – a source of a new business strategy. On the other hand, individual 
actions and capacities realized at an organizational level that do not serve the 
current environmental circumstances and business strategy of the firm may 
promote an unreasonable allocation of resources and so have a detrimental effect 
on organizational performance. Thus, incongruent realized capacities may 
represent a serous internal threat to the firm. 
It is not only the categories of knowledge that are important, but finding a suitable 
balance between them. In building organizational competence, the balance 
between potential and realized capacities should be aligned with environmental 
circumstances to reduce the risks to the firm in building competitive advantage. 
Weiping (2006) has outlined the importance of  balancing knowledge exploration 
and exploitation strategies in different environmental circumstances. Since 
potential capacities give the firm the flexibility to react quickly to environmental 
changes (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002), a firm must radically 
increase its potential capacity when facing a rapidly changing environment 
(Levinthal & March, 1993; Weiping, 2006). If the firm does not widen its 
potential capacity, new external opportunities will remain unrecognized and the 
firm will create a strong tendency to ignore the demands of the long run 
(Levinthal and March, 1993). On the other hand, excessive growth of potential 
capacities in a relatively stable environment leads the firm to experience a growth 
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of knowledge without an application of this knowledge in productive activities. 
The firm may find itself pushed “into traps of ceaseless exploration and suffer the 
costs of experimentation without gaining many of its benefits” (Weiping, 2006: 
149). Consequently, the potential capacity will rapidly increase without any 
increase in realized capacity and the firm’s overall performance. Thus, in the light 
of a strategic development and change the tension between investing more in the 
processes of generating potential or realized capacities is critical for the firm 
(Crossan, Lane & White, 1999). 
To summarize, the discussion of the present study started from the concept of 
individual knowledge as a part of the knowledge triangle. A matrix was 
developed and presented to illustrate the creation of organizational knowledge 
and capabilities, representing the inimitable and non-substitutable IC of the firm. 
Further, the processes of organizational learning were outlined in building 
organizational knowledge and capabilities. In this section, a third dimension has 
been added to discuss the eight categories of knowledge. The three-dimensional 
framework (a cube) was presented to illustrate the creation of inimitable, non-
substitutable, and valuable IC.  
In order to build valuable IC of the firm, two concerns should be pointed out: (1) 
the ability of the firm to recognize internal and external activation triggers; and 
(2) the willingness and ability to react to these activation triggers. The abilities to 
recognize and react to environmental changes set boundaries for the development 
of valuable IC, and thus, competitive advantage. The question of management 
becomes critical, since without managerial concern external and internal 
activation triggers may not be recognized or the firm might not be able to react to 
these triggers. Since individuals share only partially congruent goals (Ouchi, 
1979), organizational knowledge and functional capabilities may not be built in 
the necessary domains of the firm. The desirable flows of knowledge across the 
dimensions of the cube would simply not emerge without the necessary 
managerial attention. Therefore, the next chapter explores the opportunities for 
managerial intervention in building organizationally valuable knowledge and 
capabilities. 
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3 MANAGERIAL INTERVENTION APPROACHES 
This chapter explores the existing literature to clarify the ways in which 
companies can build valuable organizational knowledge and capabilities through 
managerial intervention. The first section provides a short overview of the 
purposes of knowledge management and management control. The second section 
provides a discussion of various managerial approaches, analyzing their effects on 
knowledge flows in relation to the three-dimensional framework of knowledge. 
The third section discusses the types of management controls as possible means 
of managerial intervention.  
3.1 Relevant concepts and disciplines 
Despite the fact that ex ante insights into the link between a firm’s resources and 
competitive advantages are severely limited for any manager (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993: 33-34), studies of knowledge management suggest that 
managerial care is very necessary to develop knowledge and capabilities of the 
firm (see e.g., Barney & Spender, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 1996a; 
Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997; Davenport & Prusak, 1998). Similarly, the 
literature of IC outlines the importance of management nurturing the source of 
competitive advantage and reaching higher levels of organizational performance 
(e.g., Hudson, 1993; Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996; Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; 
Roos & Roos, 1997; Stewart, 1997; Sveiby, 1997; Sullivan, 1998). There are 
many research disciplines that propose different means of managerial 
intervention. Figure 10 shows the example of the concepts and methods 
introduced in the literature. It presents a value chain of a firm in relation to 
different managerial concepts. The three-dimensional framework of knowledge 
presented at the end of the previous chapter falls mainly into the gray area in the 
figure.  
Starting from the left side of Figure 10, input controls enable the firm to acquire 
the necessary combination of expertise and skills for the organization (Snell, 
1992). Strategies of personnel selection and training enable the firm to acquire 
and develop individual level knowledge and experiences for the firm. Dewar and 
Dutton (1986) studied innovations in the footwear industry and found that an 
input control, in the form of investment in technical experts, plays an important 
role in facilitating process innovation. The problem is, however, that input 
controls mainly address ways of selecting and training individuals without leading 
to sufficient creation of organizational level knowledge. An input control helps to 
choose between available expert knowledge, but does not have much control over 
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what happens later and how organizational knowledge is created. Similarly, 
human resource management (Schuler & MacMillan, 1984) and human resource 
accounting (Flamholtz, 1974) do not have the means to intervene in the creation 
of organizational knowledge. Implementation of accounting and cost-based 
approaches to human resources has been problematic (Roslender & Dyson, 1992; 
Johanson, 1999). In addition, Johnson (2002) and Chaharbaghi and Sandy (2006) 
have argued that mere monetary-based decision-making in managing 
organizational knowledge and capabilities is not meaningful.  
 
 
Figure 10. Relevant managerial concepts 
The ultimate goals of knowledge management10 and management controls11 are 
similar – to facilitate the achievement of competitive advantage and a higher 
performance level for the firm. The initial focus of these disciplines is different, 
however. The focus of management control is fundamentally on organizational 
action, whereas the field of knowledge management tries not only to influence the 
organizational action but also to affect the inputs of these actions, namely 
individual and organizational knowledge. To put it simply, the primary purpose of 
knowledge management has been to affect the individual and collective 
knowledge of organizational members – to primarily intervene in what the 
                                                 
 
10
 To simplify the present discussion the perspectives of knowledge management and IC have 
been considered together as representing the discipline of knowledge management. 
11
 The present study uses the term management control to refer a broad perspective of controls, 
not limited to accounting control but including the processes from direct surveillance and 
feedback systems to social controls (Simons, 1995: 5), and from formalized procedures (Simons, 
1990) to informal practices and routines (Preston, 1986). 
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organization knows to further relate this knowledge to the organizational actions. 
The function of management control has generally been described as to affect the 
behavior of organizational members – to intervene in what the organization does. 
The definitions of management control outline its function as that of directing the 
behavior of actors towards the strategic objectives of an organization. For 
instance, Anthony (1988: 10) suggests that management control is “the process by 
which managers influence other members of the organization to implement the 
organization’s strategies”. Ouchi (1979) suggests that management control 
systems provide a means of obtaining cooperation among individuals and 
organizational units who may share only partially congruent objectives, directing 
their activities toward organizational goals. In a similar vein, Flamholtz, Das and 
Tsui (1985: 35) define management controls as “attempts by the organization to 
increase the probability that individuals will behave in ways that will lead to the 
attainment of organizational objectives”. Therefore, the primary object of 
management control is what the organization does – the individual and collective 
activity of organizational members that build up organizational behavior. 
The field of strategic management covers all the above-mentioned functional 
areas of research, relating the inputs, processes and outputs of the firm more 
strongly to the pursuit of competitive advantage. In strategic management 
research the questions of what the organization knows and what the organization 
does have been considered in a wider environmental context. The RBV (Penrose, 
1959; Rumelt, 1974; Wernerfelt, 1984; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991), 
the knowledge-based view (Grant, 1996b), and competence-based theory 
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Conner & Prahalad, 1996) have addressed the 
relationships between the inputs, processes and competitive advantage.  The 
concept of dynamic capabilities in particular provides a strategic perspective 
explaining the firm-specific mechanisms through which organizational 
capabilities are adjusted to environmental circumstances (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 
1997).  
The concept of strategic control, as a part of strategic management, aims to 
provide tools and methods to align organizational strategies and behavior with the 
external environment (Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985; Simons, 1987a; Bromwich, 
1990; Dent, 1990; Simons, 1990; Kaplan & Norton, 1996). The primary question 
is whether the organizational objectives and the consequent behaviors are 
congruent with environmental circumstances. The strategic controls provide a 
lens through which an organization recognizes the signals from the environment, 
(the external activation triggers) to make the necessary adaptations to its 
organizational strategies and behavior (Atkinson et al., 1997). It has been 
suggested that the link between controls on environmental screening and 
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competitor analysis is especially strong in new-economy firms, probably to cope 
with rapidly changing environments (Granlund & Taipaleenmäki, 2005). Taking 
strategic and management controls together, its mechanisms aim to facilitate the 
development and implementation of business strategies. However, the focus of 
managerial intervention is primarily directed on the question of what the 
organization does, and less on individual and organizational knowledge that 
might be necessary for these actions.   
Since organizational actions require the necessary knowledge and ability to act, 
the field of management control has lately made several steps closer to the field of 
knowledge management by drawing attention to organizational learning. For 
instance,  Kloot (1997) has investigated the effects of management control on 
organizational learning. Henri (2006) has studied the suitability of controls in 
nurturing various types of organizational capabilities. Ditillo (2004) explains the 
role of management control in processes of knowledge integration. In addition, 
various managerial frameworks have been proposed to introduce a knowledge-
based perspective into management control systems (e.g. Hartmann & Vaassen, 
2003; Leitner & Warden, 2004).  
It is not always meaningful, however, to distinguish management accounting and 
control mechanisms from the methods suggested by other management 
disciplines. Today’s management accounting and controls cover a wide variety of 
activities and processes, making it difficult to define management accounting and 
control systems per se (Bjornenak & Olson, 1999; Ittner & Larcker, 2001). For 
instance, Grant (1996b) discusses knowledge management and suggests several 
managerial mechanisms similar to management control without mentioning the 
term management control. In addition, non-financial measurement systems that 
are known in management accounting and control literature are suggested to be 
very similar to the IC management methods (Bontis, Dragonetti, Jacobsen & 
Roos, 1999; Petty & Guthrie, 2000). Despite of the similarities they are not the 
same, however (Mouritsen, Larsen & Bukh, 2005). Therefore, the present study 
explores their views of managerial intervention in different sections, 
distinguishing these disciplines based on a source of the studies and terminology 
applied.  
The following sections will explore the approaches of knowledge and IC 
management and the types of management controls related to organizational 
knowledge and capabilities. It should be noted, however, that the following 
theoretical discussion of the means of managerial intervention does not provide a 
fixed framework for empirical testing, but merely provides the basis for the 
analysis of the case studies detailed later. 
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3.2 Approaches in knowledge management and 
intellectual capital literature  
3.2.1 Different approaches to knowledge management 
The views and methods found in both knowledge and IC management literature 
are highly diffused. Methods of knowledge management have covered the issues 
from a wide variety of areas from individual awareness to organizational action. 
For instance, several studies have considered knowledge management as 
encouraging the processes that integrate individual knowledge and actions into 
organizational learning (Nonaka, 1994; Grant, 1996a; O’Donnell, O’Regan & 
Coates, 2000), increasing the  absorptive capacity of the firm (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990), or building procedures through which organizational  
capabilities can be adjusted to environmental circumstances (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Weiping, 2006). 
At the same time, the literature of IC has proposed numerous methods for 
measuring and reporting IC (see e.g., Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996; Edvinsson & 
Malone, 1997; Roos et al., 1997; Sveiby, 1997; Sullivan, 1998; Bontis, Keow & 
Richardson, 2000; Lev, 2001; Viedma, 2001).  
Despite the plethora of views and methods in the literature there are recognizable 
tendencies that allow the existing approaches to be distinguished from one 
another. These tendencies proceed from the underlying assumptions about the 
creation and existence of knowledge (Venzin, Krogh & Roos, 1998: 63; 
McNamara, Baxter & Chua, 2004; Schultze & Stabell, 2004; Spender, 2006). 
Styhre (2003: 45) has suggested that “knowledge can be a wide variety of things, 
depending on what perspective we have on knowledge”. Depending on the 
perspective that is chosen in each study, knowledge and IC management can also 
be a wide variety of things.  
Most of the IC and knowledge management studies can be considered as having 
either realist or non-realist views that affect their perceptions of management12. 
Studies that adopt the realist epistemology of knowledge consider knowledge as 
an object that can be directly affected either in quantitative or qualitative terms 
(see Table 2). Its size and value are seen to be of importance to the firm, 
enhancing the total value of the firm and gaining superior performance. The 
metaphor for knowledge is “asset”. In studies of non-realist epistemology, on the 
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 The realist and non-realist epistemologies were briefly introduced in chapter 2.2.1. 
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other hand, the importance of the mind as a creator of knowledge is 
acknowledged. The metaphor for knowledge is “mind”. (Schultze & Stabell, 
2004: 556) 
 
Table 2. Two perspectives on knowledge management13  
 Realist perspective  Non-realist perspective 
Metaphor of 
knowledge 
Asset Mind 
View of human actor, 
knowledge object, 
knowledge and context 
Dualism: these entities can be 
independently observed and 
manipulated 
These entities are highly 
entangled and construct each 
other 
The focus of 
management  
Identification, measuring and 
reporting stocks of knowledge 
Codification, storing, 
distributing knowledge 
Instructing the behavior of 
individuals 
Encouraging flows of knowledge 
by influencing formal and 
informal structures of 
communication and interaction 
Encouraging certain types of  
behaviors in an organization 
 
In the literature of knowledge and IC management the assumptions of realist and 
non-realist epistemologies have directed the managerial focus on stocks of 
knowledge, human behavior or the context in which knowledge is created and 
applied (see Figure 11). For instance, many studies have taken the realist 
approach, being concerned with the identification of knowledge stocks to make 
them accessible to managerial intervention (e.g., Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996; 
Sveiby, 1997; Sullivan, 1998; Bontis, Keow & Richardson, 2000; Lev, 2001; 
Viedma, 2001). In addition, several scholars see knowledge management as 
information processing, focusing on mechanisms and tools for codifying, storing 
and distributing knowledge (Wilson, 2002).  
Alternatively, studies of the non-realist perspective do not objectify knowledge 
(e.g., Grant, 1996a; O’Donnell, O’Regan & Coates, 2000). Instead of trying to 
make knowledge accessible they perceive the managerial role as influencing the 
context – to encourage the processes and mechanisms of organizational learning 
                                                 
 
13
 In this table the metaphors of knowledge are adopted from Schultze & Stabell (2004: 556). 
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in which human actors build organizational knowledge and capabilities. Several 
studies also focus on training and development or the behavior of human actors as 
a part of knowledge and IC management systems (e.g., Edvinsson & Malone, 
1997; Mouritsen, Larsen & Bukh, 2001; Stovel & Bontis, 2002). A few studies 
also pay attention to knowledge objects and their role in the creation and 
application of knowledge (e.g., Mouritsen, Larsen & Bukh, 2001; Gherardi & 
Nicolini, 2003).  
 
 
Figure 11. Central focus of knowledge and IC literature 
 
In addition to realist and non-realist perspectives on knowledge and IC 
management, there are many other perspectives distinguished in the literature. For 
instance, Mouritsen (2006) has discussed the ostensive and performative theories 
of IC. Chaharbaghi and Sandy (2006) have described the rational and non-rational 
perspectives on knowledge management. The explanation behind the rational 
versus non-rational is slightly different from the realist and non-realist distinction. 
The rational perspective has been seen as a normalizing, disciplinary approach, 
grounded in logic, restricting individual actions and variety of thought, whereas 
the non-rational perspective encourages the free flow of individual capabilities 
and potential.  
The interest of the present study is in exploring the existing managerial 
approaches. The existing views of management are focused on different parts of 
the knowledge triangle, having different effects on the processes of organizational 
learning. The following sections explore the effects of the existing management 
approaches in developing valuable IC of the firm. The discussion draws some 
parallels with the three-dimensional framework introduced in chapter 2.3.    
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3.2.2 Managerial focus on knowledge 
In the realist epistemology of knowledge the managerial focus is directly placed 
on knowledge. Schultze and Stabell (2004) call this perspective the explicit 
management of knowledge, since it requires identification and disentanglement of 
knowledge from other organizational phenomena. Scholars have suggested 
objectification of knowledge to serve two managerial purposes: 
1. To build institutional memory and make knowledge available across the 
organization; 
2. To make knowledge manageable as an asset similar to tangible resources. 
The first is well known in the literature of knowledge management. Studies of 
knowledge management have suggested various methods for codifying and 
distributing knowledge to build organizational memory and make it available 
across the organization (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Davenport & Prusak, 1998). 
Wilson (2002) claims, however, that studies of knowledge management inform 
about information or data management, not about knowledge management.  
Considering the entities of the knowledge triangle, by codifying knowledge one 
leaves the context and/or human actor out of the knowledge triangle. In doing so, 
knowledge is reduced to information, a structured data, which it is possible to 
save in and retrieve from an information system. Information that is codified can 
later be used for various purposes, independently from its original creators 
(Hansen, Nohria & Tierney, 1999).  
Firms that have standardized products and services can gain from knowledge 
codification strategies, since knowledge codification enables them to build 
individual and organizational actions on an existing knowledge base, creating an 
economy of reuse (Hansen, Nohria & Tierney, 1999). In this way, knowledge 
codification favors knowledge flows along one of the horizontal axes in the cube 
(see chapter 2.3, Figure 8) – from potential capacities into realized capacities. 
Alvesson and Karreman (2001: 1007) claim that the purpose of codification is to 
standardize and simplify things, enabling organizations to “gain leverage from 
relatively unskilled – and cheaper – workers”.  
Since one of the purposes of codification strategy is to make codified knowledge 
available across the organization, it also supports knowledge flows from 
individual to organizational level capacities. However, codification tends to omit 
proper description of the context, and because of that, human judgment is always 
necessary to reapply this information elsewhere (Morris & Empson, 1998). 
Pfeffer and Sutton (1999) have suggested that there is much more knowledge in 
stories and gossip than in mere information found in data systems. Thus, codified 
knowledge (i.e. information) does not necessarily serve the same activities and 
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processes in different parts of an organization. This information is impersonal and 
needs a human actor for it to be turned into knowledge. Information that is stored 
does not replace knowledge. Therefore, without any other managerial 
mechanisms involved in addition to codification, new organizational knowledge 
and capabilities may not be created.  
The second purpose of knowledge objectification has been introduced as being to 
make the stocks of organizational knowledge amenable to managerial 
intervention. Knowledge is perceived as an asset in order to make it manageable. 
Numerous studies of IC assume management to have a direct effect on the size of 
knowledge without considering the mechanisms in which knowledge is created 
and applied (e.g., Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996; Roos & Roos, 1997; Stewart, 
1997; Bontis, Keow & Richardson, 2000). This view also forms the basis of the 
RBV (Barney, 1991; Conner & Prahalad, 1996). Barney’s framework of the RBV 
(Barney, 1986, 1991, 1995, 2001) is one of the examples of the realist view of 
knowledge, since its main statements about the management of resources do not 
consider the difference between knowledge and other assets of the firm. The 
framework suggests identifying valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable 
resources, and reducing all production inputs, including knowledge, to elements 
comparable to tangible resources.  
To make organizational knowledge and capabilities manageable, the IC literature 
has made great efforts to identify stocks of knowledge. As a result, a plethora of 
IC taxonomies have been suggested (see also Appendix 3). The most widely used 
taxonomy suggests IC  consists of human, structural and relational (i.e. customer) 
capital (Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Roos et al., 1997; Stewart, 1997; Sullivan, 
1998).  In some studies two components of intellectual capital, such as human 
capital and structural capital, have been distinguished, whereas some customer 
and relational aspects are enclosed within structural capital (e.g., Sveiby, 1989; 
Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Roos et al., 1997). Some authors have distinguished 
a fourth component of structural capital, outlining the importance of innovation 
capital (Bounfour, 2003b),  technology (Mouritsen, Bukh, Larsen & Johansen, 
2002) or intellectual property (Brooking, 1996). What is common in these 
taxonomies is that these categories try to classify IC according to the focal 
objects, the people and relationships that the knowledge is about or related to – 
the entities that signify organizational knowledge. In doing so, it makes 
knowledge more visible, since the entities around which knowledge bundles are 
created can be more easily identified.  
Most of the management methods suggested in the IC literature have taken the 
realist approach to knowledge. Management is largely seen as consisting of IC 
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measurement and reporting (e.g., Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996; Edvinsson & 
Malone, 1997; Roos & Roos, 1997; Roos et al., 1997; Sveiby, 1997; Sullivan, 
1998; Bontis, Keow & Richardson, 2000; Lev, 2001; Viedma, 2001; Andriessen, 
2004b). Scholars have suggested more than 30 methods for the classification, 
measurement and reporting of IC (Andriessen, 2004b, 2004a).  In general, realist 
methods of IC management represent three streams of research:    
1. The first stream focuses on IC measurement and reporting as an internal 
management tool for IC (e.g., Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996; Roos & Roos, 
1997; Sveiby, 1997; Andriessen & Tissen, 2000; Bontis, Keow & Richardson, 
2000; M'Pherson & Pike, 2001).  
2. The second stream of research takes an external view of IC, attempting to 
evaluate and benchmark firms based on the size of their IC (e.g., Roos et al., 
1997; Stewart, 1997; Sullivan, 1998; Lev, 2001; Viedma, 2001). These 
methods try to estimate knowledge and knowledge-related resources in 
monetary terms as intangible assets of the firm; calculate the difference 
between a company’s market capitalization and its stockholders’ equity as the 
value of IC; or compare the relative ROAs14 of different firms and industries 
as an indicator for IC. The ideas of these models are somewhat similar to 
those of human resource accounting (Flamholtz, 1971).  
3. The third research stream covers external reporting issues, and discusses the 
information deficiencies that arise from the shortcomings of the traditional 
accounting systems, trying to report IC in accounting terms (e.g., Lev, 2001; 
Maines et al., 2002; Seetharaman, Sooria & Saravanan, 2002; Wyatt, 2002). 
Many models implicitly address both aspects, internal and external reporting. 
The realist methods have gained in popularity due to the simplicity of their 
statements, as well as to their practical orientation. Suggestions for management 
are mainly normative, generating a large number of methods with little theoretical 
explanation (Andriessen, 2004a; Kaufmann & Schneider, 2004). Despite the 
seeming simplicity, these methods are popular mainly in academic literature and 
consultancy, gaining little acceptance in practice (Marr, Gray & Neely, 2003). 
One of the critical problems is that these models encourage management to focus 
only on identifying and quantifying organizational knowledge without 
considering the application of knowledge  – thus the focus is placed mainly on the 
existing potential capacities of the firm. Most methods of IC management focus 
primarily on the what-question, without considering the processes in which 
organizational knowledge and capabilities are created and applied (Leitner & 
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 Return on Assets. 
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Warden, 2004). Many methods of IC management have focused on stocks of 
knowledge in different categories of IC. However, the categories of IC are 
relevant only when they are considered in the sense of their usefulness for 
organizational actions (Mouritsen, Larsen & Bukh, 2001: 747). Enhancing the 
growth of IC as a stock of organizational knowledge does not necessarily lead to 
superior action and the improved performance of the firm.  
Some studies, however, do relate the measurement and reporting of knowledge 
stocks to their value and usefulness for organizational strategy (e.g., Marr, 
Schiuma & Neely, 2004; Mouritsen, Bukh & Marr, 2004; Marr & Roos, 2005), 
and doing so, encourage the recognition of the knowledge-related resources and 
capabilities that benefit organizational performance and success.  Thus, in relating 
potential and realized capacities to organizational strategies, these methods 
consider the flows of knowledge along the vertical axes in the prior model of this 
study (chapter 2.3, Figure 8), increasing the congruence of potential and realized 
capacities with the strategies of the firm. 
The most critical problem of IC measurement and reporting models is that the 
realist methods of IC management sacrifice the characteristics of knowledge, such 
as heterogeneity, dynamics and tacitness, for the simplicity of management 
method, ignoring the fact that these characteristics of knowledge give rise to its 
high value compared to other resources. Knowledge is located  in the system of 
ongoing practices; being relational and mediated by artifacts; rooted in a context 
of interaction; and is dynamic and provisional (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2003). The 
value lies especially in tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958) that is embedded in 
organizational knowledge and capabilities (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Teece, 
Pisano & Shuen, 1997), since it makes the IC of the firm very difficult for 
competitors to imitate (Barney, 1991). The parts of IC, which are usually 
classified and measured in these oversimplified models, have lost their most 
valuable characteristics, since the role of human actor(s) and context is often 
overlooked in these models. Consequently, the management of IC is largely 
turned into a non-human concept (Mouritsen & Flagstad, 2005).  
The realist methods of IC face an insuperable challenge of identifying something 
that is basically unidentifiable and immeasurable. The present study agrees with 
Priem and Butler (2001: 32), who argued that since organizational knowledge and 
capabilities consist largely of unobservable knowledge, such as tacit knowledge, 
“it is likely to be quite difficult for practitioners to effectively manipulate that 
which is inherently unknowable”. The problem is, however, not only common in 
IC research but in research on human science in general (Dreyfus, 1986). It is 
common for scholars of human sciences to take a realist view and to try to follow 
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natural sciences. They attempt to reach theoretical explanations that would predict 
the behavior of their phenomena as in the physical sciences. In doing so, they face 
a similar conflict as in IC models - not being able to attain the objective 
theoretical explanations about the phenomenon that include the human being. The 
problem of identifying and objectifying something that can hardly be objectified 
is, thus, somewhat intrinsic to the realist approaches.  
In addition to the practical problems, there is also a theoretical paradox according 
to which any attempt to manage organizationally embedded knowledge15  would 
undermine sustainable competitive advantage of the firm (see Appendix 1) 
(Schultze & Stabell, 2004: 562).  The problem is that the causality condition of 
the RBV suggests that a resource is a source of sustainable competitive advantage 
for as long as it has not been identified (Barney, 1991; Powell, 2001). As Powell 
(Powell, 2001: 884) states: 
“… competitive advantage propositions not only contain unobservables, but 
have the specially ironic feature that their entities and phenomena only 
function properly so long as no one observes or understands them”. 
Turning knowledge into some explicit form will decrease the firm’s ability to 
generate sustainable competitive advantage. Thus ironically, in order to uphold 
the value of organizationally embedded knowledge, the firm should not attempt to 
manage it (Schultze & Stabell, 2004: 562).  
3.2.3 Managerial focus on context and actors 
Many non-realist studies argue that managerial focus should be placed on the 
context in which knowledge is created and applied. According to Nelson and 
Winter (1982) the role of the firm is to provide the context for the organizational 
members to act within. Since processes of organizational learning are not readily 
visible and often occur simultaneously with knowledge application (Grant, 
1996b), it is only possible to affect the environment in which these processes take 
place. Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) have stated that the way in which a firm is 
organized, enhances the positive relationship between the knowledge-based 
resources and firm performance. Similarly, several scholars suggest nurturing 
knowledge integration and communicative actions by use of a suitable working 
                                                 
 
15
 Schultze & Stabell, (2004: 562, 569-570) have highlighted the paradox in relation to tacit 
knowledge. The present study suggests that the paradox is related to organizational knowledge 
that includes tacit knowledge, since only tacit knowledge does not serve as the basis for 
sustainable competitive advantage due to its inimitability.  
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environment (e.g., Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 1996a; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998; O’Donnell, O’Regan & Coates, 2000). In focusing management attention 
on nurturing the context, human actors are empowered (Armistead & Meakins, 
2002) and have a large degree of autonomy in their communications and 
activities.  
Encouraging a social environment facilitates knowledge integration, increasing 
the knowledge and capabilities of the firm. By encouraging social integration the 
firm can lower the barriers to information sharing, increasing the absorptive 
capacity of the firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) and, thus, enhancing the 
efficiency of  organizational learning. Tracey, Tannenbaum and Kavanagh (1995) 
studied the post-training behaviors of employees and found that the working 
environment plays an important role in transferring knowledge into actions. Thus, 
by affecting the working environment managers can also enhance the transfer of 
knowledge into actions, facilitating the development of organizational 
capabilities. In this way, the possible gaps between potential and realized 
capacities can be reduced (Zahra & George, 2002).  
In addition, by facilitating particular structures of the context, for instance the 
system of gatekeepers, it is possible to enhance particular processes of 
organizational learning (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002). The 
gatekeepers constitute the function of interface, being key people who acquire 
certain types of knowledge from the external environment or act as the interface 
between subunits of the firm. These people are able to translate vital external 
information to other groups of individuals. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that 
external gatekeepers play a large role in the acquisition of knowledge, whereas 
internal gatekeepers can be important in the assimilation of knowledge, allowing 
better internal distribution of expertise.  
To a certain extent it may also be possible to construct information storing and 
communication procedures to affect the ways in which human actors store and 
distribute knowledge (Armistead & Meakins, 2002). In this way, managerial 
focus is placed on behavior of human actors. Scholars argue, however, that 
behavioral instructions for building organizational knowledge and capabilities are 
hardly meaningful (see e.g., Alvesson & Karreman, 2001). Thus, it is rather an 
encouraging environment and enabling environmental structures (i.e. the context 
of knowledge triangle) that facilitate the processes of knowledge assimilation and 
integration, enhancing the creation of potential capacity of the firm. Suitable 
working environment conditions would further assist these capacities to be turned 
into actions.  
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Mouritsen and Larsen (2005) argue, however, that focusing merely on context 
does not allow for sufficient managerial intervention. It is not possible to affect 
the types of knowledge that are created and applied in the firm. It does not allow 
managers to affect knowledge creation and application in the way that only those 
categories of knowledge would be created and applied that are congruent with 
organizational strategies. To allow greater managerial intervention, studies have 
suggested focusing on the development and training of human actors to 
strengthen the basis of the IC (see e.g., Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Mouritsen, 
Larsen & Bukh, 2001; Stovel & Bontis, 2002). Focusing on training and the 
development of individual skills – an input to the actor’s knowledge – enables 
management to build the basis for new potential capacities that should go on to 
build the realized capacities of the firm.  
Alternatively, literature has also directed managerial attention to the processes 
and activities during which knowledge has an effect in an organization. In so 
doing, the management focus is also placed on actors’ behavior and 
organizational processes. For instance, measuring the activities in which 
knowledge is exploited puts greater emphasis on activities as opposed to the 
stocks of knowledge (Johanson, Mårtensson & Skoog, 2001: 719-720). Similarly, 
Johnson (2002) takes the pluralist view of IC and suggests that firms identify 
some visible IC elements and manage the remaining, tacit and unobservable 
knowledge, as “knowledge work”. In doing so, management’s attention is 
directed towards individual level actions and organizational capabilities in which 
knowledge is exploited.  
In the same vein, several scholars have suggested that managers focus on the firm 
as being capable of doing something – the activities in which IC is translated to 
the effects on the objects and processes of an organization (see e.g., Larsen, Bukh 
& Mouritsen, 1999; Mouritsen, Larsen & Bukh, 2001). In focusing on individuals 
and their collective actions, the IC report may combine a wide array of 
organizational knowledge into a narrative that makes the relationships between 
the elements, that initially give rise to organizational knowledge and capabilities, 
stronger (Mouritsen, Larsen & Bukh, 2001).  
In summary, many non-realist studies have portrayed managerial focus as 
creating a good organizational context, and encouraging knowledge flows 
between individual and organizational levels of knowledge. Managerial focus 
directed only at the context, however, fails to affect the types and disciplines of 
organizational knowledge created and applied in an organization. It encourages 
the creation of new potential and realized capacities, but lacks the option to align 
these capacities with organizational strategies. In directing managerial focus onto 
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the activities of actors in which knowledge is exploited, it is possible to influence 
the congruence of individual and collective knowledge to organizational 
strategies.  
3.2.4 Managerial focus on knowledge objects 
One of the opportunities, whish has attracted little attention in the literature, is to 
place managerial focus on knowledge objects. Several scholars see knowledge 
management through a post-structuralist lens, a view in which the central role of 
human construction in knowledge creation is complemented by a plurality of 
objects and artifacts (Mouritsen, Larsen & Bukh, 2001; Gherardi & Nicolini, 
2003). This view is based on actor-network theory (ANT) (Latour, 1987). 
According to actor-network theory, a knowledge object does not have to be a 
passive entity but may induce human actors to act (Latour, 2005). An object may 
engage various other objects, actants and their knowledge in building the entire 
actor-network around itself. For instance, the shoe as an object that needs to be 
polished engages a person and other objects (brush and polish) in an actor-
network. Without the existence of the unpolished shoe, the shoe brush and polish 
remain unnecessary. The existence of the unpolished shoe, thus, generates the 
need for the other objects and the need for an action.  
Individual, group or organizational level knowledge that is related to similar 
objects or outcomes makes up knowledge bundles (skills of handling production 
materials, for instance). Knowledge bundles exist and are shaped by human 
actors, knowledge objects and the context in which knowledge is created and 
applied. In the RBV these are known as resource bundles (Penrose, 1959; 
Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Dierickx & Cool, 1989); nevertheless, the RBV never 
details these bundles but only mentions their existence. Various knowledge 
bundles build organizational knowledge and capabilities. Knowledge objects of 
an organization (products, materials, technologies) remain in the center of these 
capabilities.  Henderson and Clark (1990) argue that technical knowledge in an 
organization tends to be organized around the components from which the 
product is composed. In a similar vein, Sanchez  (2001b) suggests that a firm’s 
products and processes determine the structure of knowledge and create the 
knowledge architectures of the firm. These architectures are largely defined by 
the structure within which knowledge objects are organized in the firm.  
In realist studies of IC much of the effort has been directed towards distinguishing 
these knowledge bundles into categories related to employees; processes and 
structures; and to partners and customers, generally called human, structural and 
relational capital respectively (e.g., Stewart, 1997; Sveiby, 1997). Nevertheless, 
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mere categorization of the firm’s IC according to the types of knowledge objects 
is not very useful in instructing management on organizationally embedded 
knowledge (Mouritsen & Larsen, 2005). Alternatively, knowledge objects can be 
brought to the forefront of managerial attention by looking at the products or the 
customer behaviors on which organizational knowledge has a final effect. For 
instance, Mouritsen, Larsen and Bukh (2001) direct managerial attention towards 
knowledge objects by relating the IC of the firm to the things and relationships 
that knowledge affects. 
Spender (1996) has touched on the management of knowledge objects from a 
slightly different angle. He has suggested that management should be interested in 
the situations where knowledge is absent, since an absence of knowledge is 
discernible and admittedly more critical for managers. The suggestion is that 
management focuses its attention on possible knowledge gaps that should be 
filled, encouraging information searches and knowledge acquisition in the 
necessary disciplines. Usually, a lack of knowledge is identifiable as an 
incomplete knowledge about some thing or process – about some knowledge 
object or a lack of ability to perform some task. Consequently, information 
searches and learning would be particularly directed to the areas related to some 
object or activity, increasing the potential capacity of the firm in the required 
disciplines.   
To sum up, there are only a few studies that consider knowledge objects in 
discussing knowledge and IC management. The existing literature recognizes the 
role of knowledge objects in creation and existence of knowledge, but there is 
very little understanding of how knowledge objects may become relevant for 
management purposes. The ways in which a managerial focus on things and 
artifacts of an organization may affect the flows of knowledge are far from clear.  
3.3 Mechanisms of intervention in management 
control literature  
3.3.1 The indirect effects of management controls  
The initial focus of management control has not been on organizational 
knowledge. For instance, strategic planning and budgeting consist of mechanisms 
that function as a filter, detecting and selecting information about activation 
triggers from the external environment. These are functions that provide relevant 
information to managers to ensure that organizational objectives and resources, 
56      Acta Wasaensia 
mainly tangible resources and employees’ behaviors, are aligned with 
environmental circumstances – to ensure that what the organization does is 
congruent with its external environment. To some extent it is also concerned with 
what the organization knows in terms of organizational awareness of 
environmental circumstances.  
The primary focus of managerial and operational control has been on the actions 
of organizational members during which knowledge is exploited, and perhaps 
new knowledge implicitly created, but managerial attention has rarely been on 
organizational knowledge per se. Taking strategic, management and operational 
control together, they include “processes for planning, budgeting, cost control, 
environmental scanning, competitor analysis, performance evaluation, resource 
allocation, and employee rewards” (Simons, 1991: 49). Knowledge has usually 
been considered as an implicit part of the inputs, content and output of these 
processes, but rarely split into its constituent parts for managerial consideration. 
Knowledge has simply not been countable16. 
Management control deals mainly with the manipulation of visible and tangible 
elements in an organization. Much of the performance information is produced by 
management accounting methods, collecting numerical and financial data from 
various parts of an organization and summarizing it for higher levels of 
management (Emmanuel, Otley & Merchant, 1990: 97). The main tools of 
management control contribute to planning and performance measurement along 
with feedback and reward mechanisms (Flamholtz, Das & Tsui, 1985). The focus 
of planning and performance measurement has mainly been on the effective and 
efficient employment of tangible resources and making employees’ behavior 
congruent with organizational objectives. It is generally realized capacities that 
are subject to performance evaluation – measuring the activities and the outcomes 
of these activities – but not knowledge as an input to these activities. Thus, 
management control addresses the realized capacities of the firm, having less 
effect on the potential capacities of the firm. 
The only detectable knowledge, a relevant part of potential capacities, which can 
be considered to be created by management control, is the collective knowledge 
about the organizational objectives. This can be considered as a major type of 
organizational knowledge to which management control can contribute. By 
communicating information about the goals and strategies of the organization to 
its members, management encourages a common understanding of the things that 
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 There are few exceptions (e.g., Ratnatunga, Gray & Balachandran, 2004). 
 Acta Wasaensia     57 
  
are important to the success of the organization. Thus, an awareness of the 
organization’s objectives is the kind of knowledge that management controls can 
affect. It is not so clear, however, how management control can affect other types 
of knowledge (i.e. potential capacities), which would facilitate turning the 
awareness of the organization’s goals into productive activities. Capabilities are 
built from complex bundles of knowledge of which awareness of organizational 
goals forms only a part of the potential capacities.  
In recent decades, however, the popularization of non-financial measurement 
systems has directed scholarly attention to potential capacities within firms. The  
non-financial measurement methods emerged in the management accounting and 
control literature of the mid-1980s, almost at the same time as the rise of IC and 
knowledge management literature (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). The initial idea of 
these methods was to enhance decision-making with a wide variety of internal 
and outward-looking performance measures. The benefits of non-financial 
measurement systems have been suggested to be a greater degree of management 
satisfaction in using non-financial accounting information in their decision-
making (Ittner, Larcker & Randall, 2003) and the consequent positive effect on 
organizational performance (Baines & Langfield-Smith, 2003; Ittner, Larcker & 
Randall, 2003).  
Several scholars have argued that the scorecard methods of measurement are 
similar to the methods of IC management and help manage knowledge and IC in 
the firm (Bontis et al., 1999; Petty & Guthrie, 2000). By measuring intangibles as 
well as their corresponding activities (Johanson, Mårtensson & Skoog, 2001) non-
financial measurement systems encompass elements from both potential and 
realized capacities of the firm. To be more precise, however, methods of non-
financial measurement address only a portion of the potential capacities, since 
tacit and organizationally embedded knowledge is not available for identification 
and measurement. There are also several conceptual differences between the 
approaches of balanced scorecard and IC systems. Mouritsen, Larsen and Bukh 
(2005: 10) suggest: 
“they [IC and balance scorecard methods] differ in terms of strategy 
(competitive strategy versus competency strategy), of organisation (vertical 
versus lateral relations), of management (detailing versus visualising 
objectives), and of indicators (related causally versus bundled 
complementarily). Available balanced scorecards present a story about the 
firm’s budget, while available intellectual capital statements narrate the 
firm’s resources.” 
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Thus, balanced scorecard type methods do not serve knowledge and IC 
management well. They do not allow sufficient managerial intervention in 
organizational knowledge and capabilities.  
Apart from the attempts at non-financial reporting, a majority of management 
accounting and control methods do not intend to directly affect knowledge. The 
effects of management controls on organizational knowledge (other than 
awareness of organizational goals) can be considered as side effects of these 
controls, rather than as their primary agenda. Due to the indirect nature of such 
effects, explanations of the mechanisms of and relationships between 
management controls and various kinds of organizational knowledge have been 
rather ambiguous. The processes of organizational learning and management 
controls are highly intertwined. Management controls affect and are affected by 
organizational learning (Gray, 1990; Kloot, 1997). For instance, there is a two-
sided relationship between management control and common knowledge. On the 
one hand, common knowledge increases the probability that the individuals act 
according to the expectations of the organization, enhancing the congruency of 
activities and strengthening the control of the organization (Sunder, 2002). On the 
other hand, management control is generally considered to enhance 
communication structures (Simons, 1995). The appropriate structures of internal 
communication make individuals aware of other capabilities of an organization 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) increasing the likelihood of creating more common 
knowledge in the organization. Overlapping knowledge and an expectation of 
behavior also form the basis for organizational culture (Sunder, 2002). Further 
organizational culture and common knowledge facilitate knowledge integration 
and support knowledge assimilation and transformation processes (Grant, 1996a).  
Despite the complexity and the indirect nature of the effects that management 
control may bring to knowledge, recently several studies have shed more light on 
the role of management control in affecting both potential and realized capacities.  
Kloot (1997) has studied the relationships between organizational learning and 
management control in two municipalities in Australia. The case studies show 
that differences in management control systems influence organizational learning 
and the success of an organization in implementing organizational change. Kloot 
(1997: 69) explains the role of management control as follows:  
“Management control systems affect the perception of the environment, and 
generative learning is a response to perceived changes in the environment. 
Management control systems affect the understanding of what those 
changes mean, how and what solutions might be generated, and a 
perception of whether the time has come to uncouple the organization from 
old structures and operating paradigms to move to new structures and 
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paradigms. In addition, as the organization learns and changes, it may 
change its structures and its control systems to accommodate the changes.” 
Management control characteristics also determine whether single loop or double 
loop learning is encouraged in an organization.  Kloot (1997: 69) suggests that 
double loop learning is supported by freely and frequently available accounting 
information about internal and external activation triggers; participative decision-
making; shared visions; training and development of employees; and performance 
measurement systems that allow more horizontal control rather than vertical 
hierarchies of control.   
In addition, knowledge codification tools as a part of management control 
systems make knowledge appropriable and store past experiences to inform future 
actions (Morris & Empson, 1998; Chang & Birkett, 2004; Leitner & Warden, 
2004). Management control systems produce various kinds of information, not 
only to provide a basis for managerial decision-making but in the form of 
instructions available across the organization, policies and relevant information 
on technologies stored in databases. As already mentioned in chapter 3.2.2 
scholars have different opinions on whether codification would enhance 
organizational learning. Levitt and March (1988) suggest that this kind of 
information supports organizational learning. Others claim, however, that 
codification strategies tend to shape only the present capacities of the firm, 
hampering the mechanisms of learning (Alvesson & Karreman, 2001: 1007).  
Scholars have also studied the effects of diagnostic and interactive use of 
management controls (Simons, 1990; 1991; 1995) on organizational learning 
(e.g., Henri, 2006). The diagnostic use of management controls involves 
performance measures that are monitored through management-by-exception, 
correcting the deviations emerging from the performance measures as mistakes in 
actors’ behavior.  An interactive use of management control, on the other hand, 
increases variations in behavior and nurtures learning throughout the 
organization. Through the involvement of top management, an interactive 
dialogue is stimulated throughout the organization integrating different levels of 
managers and specialists into a collective communication and decision-making 
process.  
In terms of the knowledge triangle, the interactive use of management controls 
places an emphasis on the context in which individuals learn and behave. It 
affects the structure of communication processes, encouraging knowledge 
integration in two ways. Firstly, communication between different managerial 
levels induces common understandings and interpretations across the 
organizational hierarchy. Secondly, improved communication enhances the 
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awareness of the capabilities of other employees and departments of the firm, 
further improving knowledge integration mechanisms (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
At the same time, the common understandings of organizational goals ensure that 
new potential capacities are congruent with organizational strategies. Empirical 
studies have also shown the positive effect of interactive control systems on 
organizational capabilities by encouraging dialogue and directing organizational 
attention onto strategically important domains (see e.g., Henri, 2006). Thus, 
interactive use of management controls can increase and widen organizational 
level potential capacities by encouraging mechanisms of knowledge integration 
and the creativity of organizational members. By encouraging innovation, 
interactive use of management controls also supports the creation of new 
strategies of the firm (see e.g., Simons, 1991).  
To sum up, management control has an effect primarily on realized capacities, 
indirectly affecting the creation of potential capacities. Therefore, the mechanisms 
of management controls in affecting organizational knowledge and capabilities 
are quite ambiguous. Lately, however, studies have also shown several roles of 
management controls in affecting the processes of organizational learning. 
Nevertheless, more investigation is necessary to clarify the role of management 
control in intervening in the creation of organizational knowledge and 
capabilities. 
3.3.2 The effects of behavioral, outcome and clan controls  
Methods of management control encompass a large spectrum of mechanisms 
primarily addressing the manipulation of physical resources and organizational 
activities. In order to better understand the indirect effects that management 
controls may have on knowledge, the following discussion relates particular types 
of controls to the knowledge triangle. From the array of existing methods, the 
present study discusses behavioral, outcome and clan controls.  
Behavioral, outcome and clan controls have gained lots of scholarly attention in 
regarding the types of knowledge in the firm (see e.g., Ouchi & Maguire, 1975; 
Ouchi, 1977; Eisenhardt, 1985; Snell, 1992; Cardinal, 2001; Merchant & Van der 
Stede, 2003; Turner & Makhija, 2006). Similarly, studies have suggested that the 
design of management accounting depends on the types of information in an 
organization (see e.g., Chenhall, 1986). Firms are advised to choose between 
these types of controls based on their awareness of cause-and-effect relationships 
in the firm’s processes. Nevertheless, the effects of these controls have rarely 
been discussed because information and knowledge is considered merely as a 
factor influencing this choice, not as a result of implementing these controls.  It 
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has not been explained in enough detail, whether and how these controls may 
affect knowledge. The following discussion elaborates on the possible roles of 
clan, behavioral and outcome controls in the creation of organizational knowledge 
and capabilities.   
In management control systems an actor’s behavior is either directly affected by 
bureaucratic instructions or motivating leadership mechanisms. These approaches 
have rather different effects on knowledge flows. Adler and Borys (1996) 
distinguish coercive and enabling bureaucracy. A coercive bureaucracy sets 
formalized task descriptions to directly affect actors’ behavior (see also Figure 
12). An enabling bureaucracy represents a management influence of the context 
in which the human actor behaves. Behavioral controls can be largely paralleled 
with coercive bureaucracy. It specifies the tasks that individuals are accountable 
for and controls these tasks through personal surveillance or restrictions of actions 
(Ouchi & Maguire, 1975; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003). Behavioral controls 
are usually suggested for use in cases where there are clear relationships between 
means and ends; between actions and desired results (see e.g., Ouchi, 1977; 
Eisenhardt, 1985; Snell, 1992; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003; Turner & 
Makhija, 2006). They are also applicable in processes of low task uncertainty 
where the causes and effects of individual actions are clear (Hirst, 1981).  
 
 
Figure 12. The focus of different types of management controls  
 
In terms of the processes that build organizational capabilities, behavioral 
controls are primarily directed at the activities in which individuals and groups 
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exploit knowledge. These activities are usually replicable in a similar manner 
limiting the space of creativity. Grant (1996a) suggests a managerial mechanism 
for knowledge management – a direction, which basically overlaps the concept of 
behavioral control. He suggests the direction to be suitable, for instance, in cases 
of fast food preparation, nutrition, hygiene or aircraft maintenance operations. 
Any learning that may take place during these activities probably serves the need 
of the same actions.  Therefore, this type of control primarily has an effect on 
actions that turn existing potential capacities into realized capacities. 
Clan controls are largely related to enabling bureaucracy and empowerment. In 
directing the managerial focus onto the context in which human actors behave, 
the opportunities for knowledge creation and application are wider. Actors have 
greater autonomy and self-determination in decision-making. Clan controls are 
said to increase the goal-congruency of individuals (Ouchi, 1979; Eisenhardt, 
1989a). Ouchi (1979) suggests that clans are based on a comprehensive 
socialization process which reduces goal incongruence between organizational 
members, so affecting knowledge integration and the congruence of 
organizational knowledge with the firm’s strategies. 
With the increase in uncertainty, cause-and-effect knowledge becomes more 
incomplete and, thus, behavioral controls are not applicable and clan controls are 
insufficient. For instance, in research and development organizations, where the 
number of exceptions is high, behavioral controls are not suitable (Abernethy & 
Brownell, 1997). In these situations, outcome controls are suggested. The 
outcome controls provide an explicit definition of results, usually in the form of 
output measures, that are required from the employees (Ouchi & Maguire, 1975; 
Eisenhardt, 1985; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003). The outcome controls define 
the desired result with some knowledge object but not an actor’s behavior or 
activities that lead to the desired results. Therefore, they are suitable in tasks 
where knowledge about the results is determined but the means to the end are 
difficult to specify  (Eisenhardt, 1985; Snell, 1992). Turner and Makhija  (2006) 
suggest using outcome control in cases where the process-related knowledge is 
tacit, incomplete and diverse and the outcome-related knowledge is explicit, 
complete, and non-diverse. 
In general, outcome control provides greater creativity (Cardinal, 2001). 
Individuals can choose their actions and opportunity-seeking and learning is 
encouraged. On the other hand, the results may be defined in the short-term, 
which minimizes opportunity-seeking and creativity. This places the emphasis on 
the exploitation of existing knowledge. For instance, Hoskisson, Hitt  and Hill 
(1993) found that an over-emphasis on short-term results of the managers 
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decreases the intensity of R&D investments. Thus, the possible effects of 
outcome controls on organizational knowledge and capabilities depend on the 
ways the outcome controls are applied in organizations. However, any sound 
conclusions cannot be made on the effects of outcome controls, since its influence 
on organizational knowledge and capabilities have not received much attention in 
the literature. 
To sum up the entire third chapter, there are different means available to support 
managerial intervention depending on the perspective of knowledge and research 
areas adopted. Many studies in the fields of IC and knowledge management have 
tried to disentangle knowledge from other assets, or codify and restore knowledge 
to make it available across the organization. Alternatively, scholars have also 
suggested intervening in actors’ behavior or the context in which knowledge is 
created and applied. Such methods of managerial intervention have rather 
different effects on knowledge flows. In addition, management control systems 
may also have various indirect effects on organizational knowledge. 
In order to clarify the effects of these types of managerial intervention an 
empirical study is necessary. The following case studies provide more thorough 
picture of the mechanisms in which the IC of the firm is managed. In IC literature 
it has been suggested that researchers focus on empirical research to test the 
existing theoretical assumptions or to “prove that the measurement of IC is really 
worthwhile” (Marr, Gray & Neely, 2003). The present study argues, however, 
that it is instead necessary to study the existing management procedures in 
practice and the ways in which the existing management methods allow managers 
to intervene in the creation of valuable knowledge and capabilities. Therefore, the 
next chapter seeks to clarify which kinds of procedures and decisions can be 
considered to embody knowledge and IC management in practice; where 
managerial attention is directed in terms of the knowledge triangle; and how the 
applied managerial practices affect knowledge flows in building valuable IC of 
the firm.  
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4 CASE STUDIES  
This chapter presents the empirical part of the research. Firstly, the design and 
method of the empirical study are described. Since the methods and processes of 
conducting case studies vary, the processes of interviewing and data analysis are 
carefully introduced.  Secondly, case studies A and B are described to illustrate 
the patterns in which organizational knowledge and capabilities are built. After 
that the paper discusses the case studies, outlining the general focus of 
management, the significant effects of activation triggers in shaping the IC of the 
firm, and the role of management controls in directing the development of IC. 
Thirdly, the study introduces case C with a discussion of how the overload of 
potential capacities of the firm leads to changes in a managerial intervention. 
4.1 Design of the empirical study  
4.1.1 Selection of case studies  
The case studies utilize the experiences of three biotechnology companies in 
Finland to interpret knowledge and IC management in practice. The case firms 
were chosen from the biotechnology sector for two reasons; the first reason was 
the similarity of biotech firms to knowledge-intensive firms; the other reason, 
however, was the difference between these firms. First, biotechnology firms are 
similar to knowledge intensive firms, in the sense that knowledge constitutes a 
critical element of their resources. The usual examples given of knowledge–
intensive firms are accounting, law and consultancy firms, computer engineering 
firms, advertising agencies and research centres (Ditillo, 2004: 401). Knowledge 
is a central resource of these firms (Starbuck, 1992; Ditillo, 2004). Therefore, 
knowledge and knowledge management issues are expected to be important in 
these firms. Second, the differences between biotech and knowledge-intensive 
firms lie in the input-output role of knowledge in these firms. Knowledge-
intensive firms are usually seen as using knowledge as an input, as well as an 
output, since they produce intangible solutions for the customers (Ditillo, 2004). 
In contrast, the ultimate goal of many biotechnology firms is not only to produce 
knowledge from knowledge but transfer knowledge into a tangible output. 
Knowledge represents an important input that is transformed into tangible effects 
in food, health-care,  agriculture and other industries (Bergeron & Chan, 2004). 
From the 140 firms in the Finnish biotechnology sector, 24 firms were contacted 
with a view to finding three case firms for the study. The selection was made 
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based on the size (number of personnel), business activities (excluding firms that 
did not have actual activities in biotechnology) and the firms’ willingness to 
participate in research. With regard to the size of the firms, the case studies were 
selected from among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) similar in terms 
of business activities. The case firms operate in the fields of pharmaceuticals, 
medicine and biomaterials (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. The three case firms in brief 
 
 A B C 
A broad definition of 
an industry 
Pharmaceuticals Medicine Biomaterials 
Size of the firm (no. 
of employees) 
~25 ~25 ~100 
Activities of the firm R&D, no production, 
no sales 
R&D, production, 
sales and marketing 
R&D, production, 
sales and marketing 
Object of sales Drug concepts Diagnostic rapid tests 
for fertility, allergies 
etc. 
Biodegradable 
polymer devices for 
bone healing 
 
From one point of view the case firms may be regarded as fairly homogenous, as 
they all are SMEs and belong to the biotechnology sector in Finland. The 
biotechnology sector has its special characteristics that define the nature of firms’ 
environments and types of risks that they have to cope with. It gives rise to many 
similar features in the nature of knowledge processes and administrative 
structures of the firms. On the other hand, notwithstanding the common features 
that the biotechnology firms share, there are a number of differences and specific 
properties in their business models. Biotechnology has been claimed not to be an 
industrial sector, but a diverse field that comprises “a set of techniques for the 
manipulation of living organisms which comprises several disciplines which 
provide the scientific foundations for such techniques” (Saviotti, 1998: 19).  In a 
broad interpretation, biotechnology can be categorized into six interdependent 
sectors: pharmaceuticals, medicine, agriculture, biomaterials, computing, and 
military applications (Bergeron & Chan, 2004). Therefore, the three cases 
represent a significant variety in terms of business models and the subsectors 
where they operate.  
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4.1.2 Research method 
The case studies both explore and explain IC management in practice. The case 
studies can be considered as heuristic, describing and interpreting the emerging 
patterns in the field (Keating, 1995). The focus of interviews and case analysis 
was not merely on general constructs and replication but to become familiar with 
the rich context and unique patterns of each case (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Dyer & 
Wilkins, 1991).  
Regarding the researcher’s view of management control, the case studies focus on 
formal as well as informal management procedures. Scholars have considered 
management control as including formalized procedures, as well as informal 
practices and routines. Simons (1987a: 358) defines management control as “the 
formalized procedures and systems that use information to maintain or alter 
patterns in organizational activity”, defining management control as containing 
only formalized procedures. Several authors provide a wider definition 
considering the formal as well as the informal processes of the organization. For 
instance, Scapens (1994) indicates management accounting systems that are 
constituted by stable rules and practices. Several scholars have argued that 
informal systems of management are highly valued in practice and formal 
processes may even be inappropriate in various situations (Preston, 1986). The 
following case studies focus on formal as well as informal management 
procedures. Nevertheless, the analysis does not go very deeply into the creation 
and institutionalization of informal types of controls, such as clan and cultural 
controls. Informal procedures of management control are investigated only at 
their general level, identifying the general routines in organizations without 
interpreting the deep social mechanisms and relationships that develop those 
routines.  
The general ideas of actor-network theory (ANT) (Latour, 1987) are applied in 
interpreting the case data. The present study, is not a typical ANT study, however, 
where an actor is followed thorough the whole case study from beginning to end, 
so creating a story of the actor-network (Latour, 2005). In an ANT study 
something should circulate thorough the case description (Brown & Capdevila, 
1999). The present study does not deconstruct actor-networks and follow the 
actors in the way suggested in ANT. It applies the notion of human and non-
human entities on a rather general level in explaining the patterns of management. 
In that sense, the present study is similar to the studies of management accounting 
and control (e.g., McNamara, Baxter & Chua, 2004) which have been inspired by 
ANT but do not apply ANT in the way originally suggested by Latour (1986; 
1987) and his collaborators (Callon, 1999; Law, 1999).  
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4.1.3 Data collection and analysis 
The data were gathered from observations, interviews and internal documents of 
the firms during the period September 2005 to June 2006.  The researcher was 
granted access to confidential data provided under confidentiality agreements. 
The data collection procedures involved interviews and observations as well as 
collecting the documents. The main source of data was interviews (see Table 4). 
Up to 53 interviews with 21 individuals were conducted. This amounted to more 
than 52 hours of discussions, of which more than 43 hours were fully recorded 
and transcribed. The interviews were conducted with managers and specialists at 
different levels of the organizations (see Appendix 8). Some of the field visits 
included a short observation, lunch with the managers or a plant tour during 
which additional insights were gained. 
 
Table 4. The research activities in the field 
 
  Case studies   
  A B C Total 
Number of interviews 12 15 26 53 
Interviews total (h) 15,78 13,73 22,58 52,09 
Tape-recorded interviews (h) 14,16 11,29 18,11 43,55 
Observations (h) 0,58 2,33 3,42 6,33 
 
Before each set of interviews the respondents had an idea of the themes to be 
explored because they had been sent a list of topics and questions in advance. 
Later, during the interviews the flow of topics remained flexible, varying 
according to the emergent issues in the field. The time break between the field 
visits allowed the researcher to seek the interpretation and meaning of the issues. 
The next field visit served to clarify the researcher’s interpretations, update the 
progress made in the field dealing with the issues raised previously and to search 
out new angles of possible interpretation. These actions, taken as a whole, were 
intended to decrease potential observer bias and detect possible false 
interpretations.   
In addition to the interviews, various sources of documentary material, such as 
company reports, internal memos and records, reporting instructions, e-mails and 
a history of electronic correspondence were gathered. The documents are listed in 
Appendix 9.  
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In each case company the researcher had an informant. Informants are highly 
relevant for the case research since they provide the general background and 
details about the company, interviewers and the events in the company that 
researcher would not have any access to otherwise (McKinnon, 1988: 50). The 
informants were very helpful in providing necessary information about the 
backgrounds of the respondents and their availability for interviews. They 
provided additional insights into the ongoing issues in the company, helped to 
find relevant people to address questions that emerged in the course of the study, 
and provided documents necessary to clarify the subject matter. 
In each case study several respondents had held several different positions in the 
firm or had recently changed their position. In case A and B the functions and 
activities of respondents were significantly wider in scope than the original 
description of their position implied. In case C, several managers had recently 
changed, or were in the process of changing, their positions in the firm, by 
starting in a new business unit or at a higher level of management. Consequently, 
these respondents had a good overview of the ongoing issues in the firm and were 
able to sense the different working practices in different parts of the firm. This 
allowed the researcher to better understand various views and management 
practices across the different units of the organization. 
During the ten months of the case studies, the researcher was able to repeatedly 
interview those respondents who possessed the information most relevant to the 
research. Especially in case C, which is a larger firm, the first round of interviews 
and several discussions with informants provided enough feedback to realize that 
reorganizing the mode of data collection would be necessary. To further improve 
data collection the range of interviewees was slightly changed. This allowed an 
improvement in  the “representativeness of concepts, not of persons”, and enabled 
the study to better specify its phenomena from different angles and analyze the 
conditions that gave rise to them (Corbin & Strauss, 1990: 9).  
Any study is always limited by the time period available for interviews and 
observations. Consequently, the researcher cannot observe the historical 
development of the management systems in the field, but relies on the 
respondents’ descriptions. McKinnon (1988: 40) has suggested that “the longer 
the period of interaction, the larger will be the number of events that form the data 
set for analysis”, significantly affecting the validity of the study. The time frame 
of the present case studies gave a reasonably long period of contact that allowed 
the researcher to investigate the ongoing processes in the firms. The researcher 
had an opportunity to discuss several issues from their emergence through to their 
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solution. This allowed the collection of “fresher” data and discussion of the issues 
while they were still “hot”.   
During the case studies several discussions were also held informally without the 
tape recorder running. The researcher had several lunches and casual talks with 
the members of the case firms, covering a range of topics from family and 
educational background of the respondents, through to areas of conflict in the 
firms, which shed light on the ways in which people work in these organizations. 
Also knowing the backgrounds, beliefs and concerns of the respondents increased 
the understanding of the way people work and communicate in the workplace. 
These discussions helped the researcher to better connect with respondents, 
facilitating openness, honesty and spontaneous reactions during the interviews. 
Hence, the issues raised in the interviews were more openly clarified for the 
researcher. 
Data were organized and analyzed along the processes of interviewing. After each 
case visit the interviews were played back and transcribed then printed and 
organized chronologically into the case catalogues. The textual level analysis was 
conducted by coding the segments of chronologically ordered text. The texts in 
the three case catalogues were continuously analyzed in between the interviews to 
prepare for the next visits to the field. The coding was conducted by reading the 
printed text and designating meanings of sentences and paragraphs in relation to 
the theory. Codes were post-defined in the sense that codes were not 
predetermined but they emerged during the data collection and analysis (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994: 61-62). Corbin and Strauss (1990: 12) call it “open coding”. In 
other words, the researcher was open to what was received in the field, and 
constantly extending the coding system and redefining the codes as necessary.  
Regarding the physical tools of data analysis, two phases of the study can be 
distinguished.  The first four to five months of the analysis of the text included a 
high degree of effort invested into hand-written coding and integration of those 
codes. The codes were organized in hand-written maps and MS Excel, in parallel. 
By the end of the fifth month, there were up to 400 pages of text and hundreds of 
codes with memos and linkages between the codes. By this time, the researcher’s 
understanding of the theory and case evidence was significantly deeper. A review 
indicated the need for some changes in theoretical focus, as well as changes to the 
data analysis tools. Thus, in the second stage of the interviews, Atlas.ti software 
(Muhr, 2004) was applied in organizing and analyzing the case data. The change 
in interview focus required recoding and analyzing the data collected previously 
with the Atlas.ti software. Renewed codes were applied which were better suited 
for further analysis. The initial coding method of identifying the meaning of the 
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text by post-defined codes, however, remained the same. Coding was conducted 
by carefully reading and analyzing the meaning of the text. No automatic coding 
was applied. By the end of all case visits, more than 750 single-paragraph pages 
of transcribed text had been collected and coded. The case files encompassed 
1875 quotations with 718 codes. The codes were organized into families and 
networks according to the development of the concepts.  
In parallel to the Atlas.ti files of the text, the printed catalogues of case studies 
were still kept, since documents collected from the case studies were more 
convenient for analysis in a printed format. The documents gathered from the 
field were organized around the topics of the interviews, helping to better 
understand the issues discussed in the interviews, as well as to confirm the 
theoretical patterns found in case studies.  
The ideas emerging through coding were captured with memos, which were 
linked to the codes and quotations of the text. Memos allowed the  formulation 
and revision of the emerging theory over the  entire course of the study (Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990: 10). The observational, methodological and theoretical notes were, 
however, clearly separated. This was to allow the original data to be “as 
uncontaminated by interpretation as possible” and to allow its reuse if necessary 
(McKinnon, 1988: 46). The hypertext analysis of Atlas.ti was used to organize the 
original transcripts around the emerging patterns of the study and support the 
story telling in writing-up procedures. It was also helpful in discovering some 
inconsistencies in the statements of the interviewees. The conceptual maps were 
drawn in Network Editor of Atlas.ti (Muhr, 2004) to analyze the patterns of 
themes and constructs of the study, integrating them into the theory.  
4.1.4 Validity and reliability 
The questions of validity and reliability are of central importance in evaluating 
the legitimacy of research. Validity is generally “concerned with the question of 
whether the researcher is studying the phenomenon she or he purports to be 
studying”, whereas reliability “is concerned with the question of whether the 
researcher is obtaining data on which she or he can rely” (McKinnon, 1988: 36). 
In the present research the issues of validity and reliability were addressed in the 
following ways. 
To meet the test of external validity firms with similar characteristics were 
chosen. The choice of interviewees was based on the function of managers as well 
as their relevance to the constructs in the study. The case studies were analyzed 
based on a common theoretical base. To meet the test of construct validity, the 
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data collection principles suggested by Yin (2003) were followed. Multiple 
sources of evidence are used at each site. The data file generated about each 
company contains the interviews, notes of site visits, and copies of the documents 
gathered. Data triangulation was conducted to build stronger support for the 
constructs in the study (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Nevertheless, the constructs are 
highly dependent on the context and the researcher’s interpretation of the 
evidence. Triangulation is highly dependent on the arguments, and the assessment 
of proper triangulation in a qualitative field study is problematic (Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2006).  
To meet the test of reliability and demonstrate that the operations of the study can 
be repeated with the same results, the field visits and data collection were 
carefully prepared. Similar field procedures were used in each company. The 
interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed instantly after each visit. Interview 
data and the documents from each visit were summarized and analyzed in 
comparing the evidence of interviews with materials found in the documents. All 
data were organized in hard copy catalogues as well as in Atlas.ti software. 
The reasonably long time period of the case studies helped to detect anomalies in 
the data. Sometimes “the subject may consciously seek to mislead or deceive the 
researcher, perhaps reporting events in a manner most flattering or acceptable to 
him/herself” (McKinnon, 1988: 38-39). In addition, people forget things and pay 
attention to the issues via their cognitive maps. These kinds of possible bias were 
diminished by asking probing questions, discussing the same issues from different 
angles, and discussing the same issues with different respondents. Any apparent 
contradictions were marked during the coding and considered in the interpretation 
of the data.  
Since the exact flow of questions was often left open in the interviews, a 
significant portion of the questions was produced during the same interviews. 
Asking situation-specific questions increases the validity and reliability of the 
study (McKinnon, 1988; Yin, 2003). It diminishes the risks of filling the gaps in 
data with the researcher’s own assumptions and false interpretations. In order to 
diminish the observer-caused bias, the emerging patterns in case studies were also 
repeatedly questioned from different angles. 
The results of the case studies are derived using the rhetoric of contextual 
generalization (Lukka & Kasanen, 1995). The results are generalizable to the 
theory (Yin, 2003) whereas the generalizability is achieved through the process of 
abstraction. Corbin and Strauss (1990: 15) suggest that the more abstract the 
concepts, the more likely it is that the propositions of the theory are applicable to 
a wide range of situations. In the present dissertation the levels of abstraction and 
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identification of the conditions of the theoretical concepts are expected to enhance 
the generalizability of the study. 
4.2  Case studies A and B 
4.2.1 Description of case A  
Overview of the firm  
Case firm A is a small pharmaceutical company active in the biopharmaceutical 
sector, focusing on drug discovery and development. The company was founded 
in the mid-1990s and it can be categorized as a small company, having less than 
25 employees. The strategy of the firm is to discover new candidate drugs and 
develop them up to clinical proof of concept with the aim to license them out for 
further clinical development and registration. At the time of interviewing, no sales 
and revenues exist. There is no production in the company, but eight development 
projects and several research activities. The projects contain R&D activities up to 
the stages of clinical trials of a candidate drug. Active commercialization 
activities of these projects are conducted simultaneously aiming to find an 
established pharmaceutical company interested in their candidate drugs.  
In the field of bio-pharmaceuticals task uncertainty is extremely high. The 
business model of firm A comprises high-level risks and uncertain scenarios for 
success. In case of success, the risk-taker will be rewarded with significant 
returns. However, the road to success may be extremely long. The process of drug 
discovery and development can take from 2 to 20 years, or even more to complete 
(Bergeron & Chan, 2004). Many firms have failed to survive the long process of 
clinical trials. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a candidate drug will even 
be allowed to enter clinical trials. The rate of regulatory approval to enter clinical 
trials has been only 0,1 percent of the applications (Bergeron & Chan, 2004). 
Nevertheless, a successful firm with a strong patent could potentially have 
exclusive rights to an entire class of drugs. Since an innovation of a single new 
molecule can mean billions of dollars in revenue for a multinational drug 
company, royalties for the patent holder of a successful drug (i.e. a biotechnology 
firm) can be significant. 
The management of the firm is allocated across four functional departments: 
administration, business development, research, and development. Business 
development is mainly involved in the commercialization activities of the drug 
candidates. The research department encompasses drug discovery including the 
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groups of chemists and pharmacological testing. The development department 
manages eight development projects, where each project is coordinated by a 
project manager. The firm utilizes a strict planning and budgeting system based 
on the organizational structure. Each cost-center has its budget and targets that are 
regularly monitored. The formal management control system, comprising a highly 
structured performance measurement and meeting system, can be considered as 
relatively peculiar among other small new economy firms  (Lukka & Granlund, 
2003).  
Managerial attention to knowledge objects 
In order to make IC manageable several studies have identified stocks of 
knowledge bundles applying the taxonomy of human, structural and relational 
capital (e.g., Habersam & Piber, 2003; Lönnqvist & Kujansivu, 2007). During the 
first interviews the managers of the company contributed their perceptions of the 
important intangible resources, resulting in the table below (see Table 5). The 
structural view of the IC in case A, given in this table, perceives IC as a bunch of 
resources that are possible to acquire, store and exploit. These stocks of IC consist 
of various heterogeneous bundles of knowledge, some of them more tacit in 
nature, such as the ability to collect information from the substances and 
relationships with partners, some of them more explicit in nature, such as product 
concepts, patent families, trademarks etc. 
 
Table 5. Managers’ perception of valuable IC  
Human capital Structural capital  Relational capital 
Trained, skilful, experienced 
and motivated employees 
Expertise and know-how of 
substances and abilities to 
collect information about 
the substances 
 
15 patent families 
8 product concepts  
Knowledge of technology 
platforms 
Project Management system 
Databases and activity-based 
data management system of 
R&D  
Trademarks 
Domain names 
Relationships with 
international pharma and 
biotech companies 
Network of European, Nordic, 
Japanese and U.S. partners. 
Relationships with academic 
collaborator and contract 
researcher organizations. 
Expert panels and network of 
consultants  
Reputation in the field 
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What is interesting about this table is not its content or the way things are 
structured, but the fact that it has not much to do with the way things are 
organized in the company. It just looks nice and interesting for the managers 
visualizing some IC elements of the firm. Notwithstanding the nice look, such 
visualization does not proceed from the reality but stands alone, apart from the 
practice of decision-making and organizational actions. There is no measurement 
and reporting in terms of the categories shown in Table 5 in the firm.  
Nevertheless, the managers claim to be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the organizational potential and realized capacities. Furthermore, they are 
confident that the IC has been constantly built upon and significantly improved 
over the years of the firm’s existence. It is claimed that the IC, aligned with the 
firm’s strategies, has been built albeit without deliberate focus and evaluation for 
that matter. Given this, the question can be raised, where is the main focus of 
management and how does it contribute to building and strengthening the IC of 
the firm?  
In reality, the main managerial attention is not on these knowledge bundles 
presented above (see Table 5), but on eight knowledge objects and the activities 
related to them. In the center of activities there are specific substances – 
compounds (i.e. molecules). The elements of IC presented in the previous table 
are developed and exploited in relation to the specific substances. There are eight 
compounds at the center of the firm’s activities, and the firm has specified various 
biological, technical and commercial milestones for each compound. People from 
the disciplines of molecular biology, computational drug design, medicinal and 
parallel chemistry are all working on the progress of these compounds. Every 
individual or group of experts (human capital)17 contributes with his/her skills and 
know-how of working with a compound. The networks of partners and colleagues 
in academia (relational capital) help to perform a specific task of purification of 
the cells, for instance, and acquire new knowledge about the possible application 
areas of the compound. The specific tools in the laboratory (physical assets) with 
the skills of combinatorial chemistry (human capital) are utilized to synthesize a 
number of compounds for further analysis in electronic tools and databases 
(structural capital).  
In terms of actor-network theory (ANT) (Latour, 1987), the particular compound 
is an actor that attracts various people and partners to itself, building an actor-
                                                 
 
17
 The dimensions of human, structural and relational capital are used here as metaphors to better 
illustrate how the theoretically acknowledged elements of IC are actually organized around the 
focal objects of the firm.   
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network. The activities of people are directed to these compounds and they do 
things because of the pre-defined goals related to the compounds. Most of the 
things that happen in the firm are directly or indirectly related to the progress of 
these compounds. No part of the IC is developed for its own purpose, but because 
of the strategic objectives for the eight compounds.  
There are three major areas in the firm through which the activities of each 
compound expand. These are: (1) research, (2) development, and (3) 
commercialization activities. In each of these areas, the firm has defined the 
annual goals for the compounds. Each compound attracts to itself a network of 
individuals, objects and artifacts along its journey thorough these three phases.  
The following case description tracks the progress of a specific compound 
through the above-mentioned three areas. It shows how a single molecule induces 
and engages the people to act and discuss the issues; how IC is created and 
employed in the actor-network; and how the outcome control plays its role in 
directing the actor-network of that molecule. Let us label it as compound F1 while 
omitting any detailed description of its confidential properties18.  
At the very beginning of the path, in the stage of research, there is not yet actually 
an F1 compound; neither is there a product concept nor a product, but various 
kinds of ideas, experiences and knowledge of the chemists, who make educated 
guesses about the experiments that could lead them to the desired molecule. There 
are people with previous experience and personal contacts in several therapeutic 
fields, such as neurotical and psychiatric diseases amongst others. More 
importantly, they have an idea about the molecule that they may be able to 
produce. The idea is to identify a lead compound – a clinical drug candidate. The 
outcome is defined as a set of properties that a molecule should have in order to 
potentially become the basis of a candidate drug for a given biological target. The 
definition of an outcome is not a desired quantity, because it does not matter how 
many molecules the laboratory is able to make – the result should be a master 
compound that meets certain criteria. It has to meet certain criteria in order to be 
valuable and acceptable for further development – it must have a desirable effect 
in laboratory conditions.  
Despite the vague definition of the outcome, the scientists are highly motivated to 
work towards it and try to make a compound that meets certain kinds of 
requirements. The groups of chemists are asked to synthesize a compound and 
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 The following case description does not, however, decompose the actor-network of the F1 in a 
way suggested in actor-network theory (Latour, 2005). While the research question of the present 
study is rather broad, the study looks for more general patterns in building the IC of the firm. 
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pharmacologists to set up a testing system to test their compounds. They apply 
their experience and skills with the aim of achieving the desired outcome. The 
effect of their knowledge emerges in various activities, in either conducting the 
skill of medicinal chemistry in the laboratory, or comparing the individual 
compounds in an electronic database. In addition to the physical treatment of the 
compound, discussions, e-mails or phone calls are made to drive the activities 
towards the outcome. Information searches from external databases and 
publications in the field are conducted to get new insights about the properties of 
a compound and its biological targets19. 
A large uncertainty and the group-level definition of the desired outcome induces 
people to communicate with each other to make sense of each situation, interpret 
new information and choose the best possible actions to move towards the desired 
results. People search necessary information, discuss chemical and 
pharmacological matters, synthesize the compound, organize tests, and evaluate 
the results. After evaluation of the results, they discuss again, search additional 
information, change some test conditions and start the cycle again, for as long as 
it takes to achieve the lead compound. Each more-promising molecule will 
encourage people to sit down and discuss it in a wider forum to  present the new 
situation to others and gather different opinions – to analyze whether a compound 
they generated is within necessary parameters or not. For as long as the lead 
compound has not been generated, all that knowledge that has been built up does 
not have any significant effect which could be considered valuable in the market.  
The evolving actor-network of compound F1 
After a number of experiments and struggles in drug discovery to identify 
compounds which would have had a high enough affinity to the receptor, they 
find one – a lead compound is created.  Now, it is something, which can be 
labeled with the name, F1, a “thing”, which has substance – a compound that acts 
properly in the test tube in cell-lines. This is the desired object. The important 
thing is that knowledge that is created along the journey towards the existence of 
this object has become a valuable asset for the firm. Their skills and experiences 
as well as all the information about the production of F1 that is saved in internal 
databases, laboratory books and meeting minutes, have become a valuable part of 
the compound, a valuable asset for the firm. Knowledge that has been created 
(potential capacity) and the activities in which that knowledge has been exploited 
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 The high level of motivation towards the outcome can be explained by the scientific curiosity of 
the employees, monetary rewards of the valuable invention, and the fact that the desired outcome 
is collectively defined by the same people who are working for it. 
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build up a highly valuable set of capabilities in which the compound F1 can be 
repeatedly produced (realized capacities).  
However, the next activities cannot be initiated before clarifying the potential 
candidate drug – what is the new outcome that we are going to achieve with F1. 
The firm now has the master compound and a wide array of opportunities is 
suddenly open, as there are many possible therapeutic fields and treatments in 
which the compound might be applied. Thus, the managers and scientists sit down 
and write down hypotheses about what could be achieved with the molecules. The 
questions of potential markets, partners, and developments in the political and 
social environments become relevant. They have to choose the particular 
therapeutic area for the candidate drug so that compound F1 can be further 
developed. 
This is the point where managerial attention is directed towards the existing IC of 
the firm as well as the potential IC which may become relevant for the future 
success of F1. As suggested by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and scholars of the 
RBV (e.g., Penrose, 1959), the choice between the opportunities is largely path-
dependent, depending on the existing potential capacities of the firm. The CEO 
describes the decision-making, as “very opportunistic. […] It depends on who we 
know, what their focus is, what their interest is.” It depends on knowledge and 
experience in the firm (human capital), as well as existing partners and their 
competence (relational capital). Existing IC is analyzed in relation to F1. No 
potential or realized capacity of the firm is analyzed per se, but is related to the 
possible future scenarios for F1. The managers direct their attention to the 
existing capabilities of the firm in conducting further studies with F1. Similarly, 
they analyze the existing relationships with partners and consultants related to 
their possible contribution to F1. In addition, they try to widen their overview of 
the existing IC by acquiring and assimilating new information from the external 
environment. They conduct interviews with opinion leaders about the treatment of 
specific diseases, and investigate the legal and competitive situation in the field.  
After the clarification of the existing knowledge and capabilities of the firm, as 
well as opportunities for IC growth related to F1, new definitions of the desired 
outcome for F1 with its related therapeutic area are set. They start to develop F1 
to form a basis for the drug candidate for a specific disease of an ageing 
population. The definition of the new goal defines the scientific disciplines that 
the compound F1 will start relating to itself. Now in acquiring new knowledge 
from the field a piece of information is considered valuable if it can possibly 
contribute to the specific chemical, biological or technical matters of the 
compound F1, or widen the knowledge about the particular ageing disease. The 
78      Acta Wasaensia 
definition of a new target also determines the patent and trademark activities 
(structural capital).  
From this point, the value of the each new piece of information about the legal 
matters and environment, as well as the value of contacts and partnerships 
(relational capital) depend on whether and how they contribute to screening 
processes, lead development, and preclinical trials of the drug candidate F1. For 
the lead development and preclinical trials of F1 to be successful, it is necessary 
to cooperate with partners (relational capital) who have specific skills and the 
experience to demonstrate the bioactivity and safety of the candidate drug. After 
F1 has shown the desired effects in the laboratory, the most useful partners are 
those who have knowledge of the preclinical trials to be conducted on mice, 
rabbits, or other subjects. In this way, the new IC that is being built is largely 
determined by the goals that the firm wants to reach with F1. 
Many partners play only a temporary role in some phase of the realization of F1. 
They finish their task of producing a particular type of cell, and leave the actor-
network, whereas the result of their work (the cells that they produced) is left to 
the firm for further development of F1, building the structural capital of the firm. 
At the same time, relationships and trust that have been built along these 
collaborations (relational capital) can be used in other ongoing or future projects. 
In this way each participant in the actor-network of F1 leaves its mark on the 
structural and relational capital of the firm. 
The more progress F1 makes, the more concrete will be the definition of the 
outcome and the more strict will become the performance evaluation of F1. 
Regularly written plans and reports become more structured and definite, as the 
tasks become more clear and time schedules become critical. Through the stages 
of development the compound F1 has 256 tasks noted on a Gantt chart, some of 
them already completed, some of them to be completed in 2010. The individuals 
responsible for the tasks have to apply their skills and experience from the field in 
a relatively short time period, because the schedule of 256 tasks is tight. Each new 
piece of information received from the field or knowledge generated internally 
must be applied quickly in new actions. 
The development of F1 may, however, not proceed along a linear path. The 
certainty of the path may be a mere illusion because the list of necessary tasks 
defines only the outcomes of what has to be done, providing no particular details 
of how these results are to be reached. In addition, unexpected scenarios in the 
external environment may occur that force changes to be made to the plans for 
F1.  
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The role of activation triggers in shaping the IC of the firm 
The definition of the ultimate target and the list of tasks along the way provide the 
direction in which the actor-network of F1 is expected to go. The expected path of 
F1 would be predictable and smooth if there were no events or forces that could 
destroy the whole actor-network. The truth is that the managers can never be fully 
confident that the project will proceed along a linear predefined path. Anything 
might happen internally, or emerge from the external environment, that could 
force the firm to reconsider the existing status and value of F1, and choose 
another set of actions to implement.  The internal and/or external triggers that 
occur may show that the achievements with F1 have been mere illusions and the 
project has to take several steps backwards, or even show that an alternative road 
must be taken. This may lead to significant changes in IC, having an effect on the 
potential and realized capacities of the firm. 
There are numerous activation triggers that are continuously reacted to, 
consequently shaping the IC of the firm. These triggers occur almost daily, 
forcing the protagonists to stop and evaluate the current state of knowledge and 
relationships related to F1. For instance, one of the issues related to F1 led to the 
decision to employ external resources, which slightly changed the relational 
capital of the firm. The case company discovered it had problems in cloning a 
human receptor with a satisfactory expression level. Therefore, the management 
decided to find the subtype from the field in cooperation with a partner. As a 
result, external capacities were exploited instead of internally available 
knowledge. In another situation, staff responsible for molecular biology learned 
from pharmacologists that outsourced cell-lines were not satisfactory, thus, they 
had to clone the cell-lines themselves. The existing skills and know-how of 
human capital had to be applied to produce these cell-lines, increasing the 
exploitation of existing potential capacities.  These activation triggers do not seem 
significant in the first instance, but gradually shape the potential and realized 
capacities of the firm. Step by step new ways of doing things are generated or 
new relationships started in the field, simply because of the emergence of 
activation triggers which did not seem significant at first. 
Usually, after the emergence of a more powerful activation trigger, the staff will 
try to re-stabilize the situation. A new set of activities must be chosen to 
overcome the trigger. As long as it is possible, a solution to the trigger will be 
chosen that keeps F1 moving towards the initially defined objectives. As the CEO 
explains: 
“The objectives should remain the same but a new path has to be found. 
[…] First, the project manager makes actions to correct the situation. They 
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inform and ask guidance from the management team. We might allocate 
more money and allow an overspend just to get information on whether the 
issue is solvable.” 
As long as it is possible and beneficial for the firm, the progress of F1 will be 
directed back towards its defined objectives. Sometimes however, it is necessary 
to totally change direction, as happened with another project, in which an external 
activation trigger emerged. The CEO describes it: 
 “We started it [the SF compound project] based on inventions. Suddenly 
we realized that the markets seemed to disappear and it is still true, it is 
disappearing because of another type of invention that came and took away 
the market. So, we started to look for other therapeutic uses, and changed 
course.” 
Because of this external trigger, they abandoned the existing path of SF and 
looked for alternatives. Luckily they were able to find another hit molecule that 
expanded their opportunities again. With the new therapeutic area, new goals and 
sets of actions were initiated. Existing competences and partnerships were applied 
to different purposes and new contacts created. The new direction captured new 
functional areas of interest resulting in a growth and development of the firm’s IC 
in fields previously unfamiliar.   
Some triggers may, however, be fatal to the progress of a compound. That was 
the case with compound M that the firm had been working on for almost four 
years. The Vice President of Science describes the situation where an internal 
trigger emerged from the compound itself: 
“In that project, we were very excited about how the compounds behaved in 
animal testing, it was very promising. And then we learned of a very serious 
toxicity problem and it seemed to be in every tested compound within the 
glass [test tube]. So, it was the so called “class effect” [related to a feature 
shared among the class of compounds]. Those are technical issues, which 
meant that we have to go back, not to square one but square two, and restart 
the project, go with a different chemical, and find a different chemistry area 
to work within.” 
The difficulty of the trigger (i.e. its potential impact on the initially defined 
outcome) determines how much effort is put into knowledge exploration activities 
to find relevant information and make decisions to solve the situation. If the 
trigger is likely to jeopardize the achievement of the existing objectives, the 
discussions and analysis of the situation take place immediately after the problem 
has emerged. It is necessary to interpret the situation quickly, to understand what 
is happening, what the problem is and what the possible actions are. The 
difficulty of the toxicity problem with the compound M implied that there was a 
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general lack of knowledge about certain parameters of the compound and that 
much more information was required than the company had at the time. 
Immediate phone calls to partners were made, e-mails with attachments detailing 
experiments were sent and face-to-face conversations were initiated in order to 
clarify the extent and severity of the problem, gather opinions about the possible 
solutions and take quick action. Thus, the emerging activation trigger forced the 
firm to recognize its lack of knowledge and initiate knowledge exploration 
activities to fill this void. People are forced to admit their lack of knowledge, to 
look outside their present realms of knowledge and to find the missing pieces that 
remedy the shortcomings.  
After the identification of an activation trigger, there is nearly always a discussion 
held to analyze the lack of knowledge that the trigger is pointing at and to choose 
the proper activities to adopt. In the case of a critical internal problem and 
identification of a “bad” situation, it is necessary to discuss how bad it really is 
and what it means to the firm. “Then we have to understand, what to do with it. 
Do we just accept it or do something”, reports the CEO. It is not enough to merely 
determine the absence of knowledge. It is necessary to analyze how desperate is 
the need to redress this absence. Thus, the parties to the issue discuss their 
options, complementing each others’ views by additional information and 
opinions to, firstly, reach a common understanding whether this is an important 
trigger, and then, if it is an important trigger, how critical is the gap in their 
existing capabilities and then, how large is the threat to the organization’s 
performance objectives? Is there a need to discuss the issue at a higher level of 
the organization? Depending on the threat that the trigger represents to the 
organization’s performance objectives, a wider group may have to be invited to 
contribute to the discussion and subsequent decision-making. Secondly, analysis 
and discussion will be necessary to decide what kinds of existing activities should 
be changed, and thirdly, to clarify whether additional information searches or 
expertise from partners is necessary before the firm can proceed with a new set of 
activities.  
After extensive knowledge exploration activities and stabilization of the situation, 
the knowledge and capabilities of the firm will have grown, since the firm will be 
better capable of conducting certain processes with the compound and handling 
these things in the future. The tasks related to F1 in which the problem emerged 
can be executed in a better fashion next time. As the CEO says in relation to one 
activation trigger:  
“We can build this information into planning next time, we will already 
know that problem with the substance and that there is no way to deal with 
it. Then the next experiment done with that substance will be easier and 
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completed within the time calculated. There might be many big challenges 
which are faults and then they are taken into account in planning the next 
trials. And in those trials it is not really an issue any more.” 
Thus, there will be only a fraction of the time and expense involved in performing 
the same action next time, because the potential capacity and realized capacity 
related to the particular set of tasks have grown significantly.  
These activation triggers make the path taken by F1 very challenging but also 
very unique, which makes the actor-network of F1 almost certainly inimitable by 
competitors. To protect that knowledge a patent family is built along the path of 
F1. However, patenting means that much of the information about the technology 
of producing F1 becomes available to the competitors. Therefore, in order to 
protect this knowledge from competitors, the patenting approach applied with F1 
has been rather veiled in the sense that many technologies relating to the 
compound have deliberately not been filed. 
In parallel with the development tasks, objectives are also set for the department 
of Business Administration. The definitions of their targets accord with the 
various steps in the commercialization of F1, culminating in attracting a pharma 
company. The aim is to sell knowledge related to F1, and to license F1 out for 
further clinical trials. The object of sales is not F1 as a compound or in terms of 
patents related to its production, but the entire F1 business unit. Since F1 is not a 
product that is ready for the market, but something that needs to be tested and 
developed further, the skills and experiences of people in the sphere of F1 are 
highly valuable in the market. Thus, a complicated and time-consuming process 
of commercialization is conducted in parallel with the clinical trials. If Business 
Administration fails to achieve its objectives in one commercial dialogue, the 
possible mistakes and weaknesses of the product concept will be considered 
before future collaborations, so constantly improving the capabilities tied to F1.   
Managerial intervention in context 
Much managerial attention has been on building an encouraging environment that 
would, on the one hand, facilitate communication and information sharing and, on 
the other hand, support the outcome controls along the path of F1. Various formal 
routines and communication structures have been created to facilitate knowledge 
integration that further enables the control of the progress of F1. By the term 
formal the present study refers to the institutionalized communication structures 
in the form of regular meetings (see Appendix 10). Managers insist that the 
comprehensive meeting system is specially built to guarantee that people with 
different experiences and skills are brought together to discuss a common matter. 
Although there is a group-level definition of a desired outcome, the knowledge 
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and experience of the people involved are different and, therefore, barriers to 
knowledge exist. Therefore, regular meetings are held in every project and 
department of the firm as well as for specific groups of chemists and 
pharmacologists.  
At the research stage the role of management was merely to create an encouraging 
and motivating environment and feedback mechanisms. People in the laboratory 
were working in an obscure means-to-an-end reality, exploring information in the 
field and choosing their actions according to their beliefs about the desired 
compound. Managers could not intervene much in their choices of which type of 
information should be acquired from the field. It was not possible to intervene in 
types of knowledge that the firm should have to increase in order to be successful. 
In the research stages the managers could only provide the necessary equipment, 
databases and software to analyze the chemical formulae, and institute a system 
of regular meetings to evaluate results and discuss and brainstorm ideas for 
further activities. Thus, in processes in which the desired outcome is vague, it is 
not possible to do much except to provide good working conditions for the human 
actors. 
The combination of the two elements, group-level targets for F1 (focus on 
knowledge object) and the system of meetings (managerial intervention in 
context), motivate people to act and to complement each other’s knowledge, 
generally enhancing knowledge acquisition and assimilation processes in the firm. 
Firstly, the structured meetings encourage the groups to deliver and present their 
results. The chemists and biologists assimilate the available information much 
more carefully because they are well aware that they have to present the key 
points in the meeting. It makes them more thoughtful and careful in using the best 
possible information to hand. Secondly, the clear definition of outcome and the 
strategically relevant areas allow increasing the awareness of the issues that are 
important for the firm and the kinds of information that must be shared with a 
wider audience in the organization.  
In addition to the system of meetings, the managerial role in building the context 
includes (1), implementing electronic tools to keep track of the matters relevant to 
F1, and (2) databases to store information. The electronic file about the matters 
relevant to F1 is combined with the quarterly meetings. The file consists of 
statements and definitions of the topics relevant to reaching the desired outcomes. 
Clarification of the desired outcome in terms of relevant therapeutic areas as well 
as markets and customers makes people more aware of the relevant matters. The 
Vice President of Business Development, who is also
84      Acta Wasaensia 
mindset of employees before the implementation of the meeting and reporting 
system:  
“In a project management meeting, they really talked pretty much hardcore 
science – receptors and compounds and those kinds of things. It is the step 
[implementation of that system] to make sure that what is agreed in here [at 
management level], is really then put into practice in our operations. It is 
very easy for experts to start to live their own lives – they do what is 
interesting and nice and where you might receive good results. […] But it 
does not necessarily serve the purpose of the company’s existence.”  
In particular after the implementation of special folder with the definitions of 
outcomes and the critical fields of interest, the people started to recognize 
relevant information in the field. Now when they participate in international 
meetings and conferences, they pick up the relevant information not only about 
the scientific and technical aspects related to F1 but also information about 
potential competitors and trends in the market. The Vice President of Business 
development tells happily,  
“… there is a little bit more discussion now about competitors, the future, 
what all kinds of new products are entering the market etc. People are 
discussing these kinds of things …”  
In effect, the people start to analyze the opportunities and risks related to F1 and 
communicate these issues to each other raising awareness of the status of F1 in a 
wider competitive environment. Good news for the managers was that not only 
formal meetings, but also informal discussions started to be enriched by these 
topics.  
The system of formal meetings has not only proved to be important in directing 
the progress of compound F1 but has also enabled to detect important activation 
triggers. Often a manager would say “Ok, that is enough, I do not want to hear it 
now, let’s have it in a management meeting, they will want to hear it too”. Then 
the issue is discussed with more people integrating a wider set of opinions before 
decision-making. This guarantees that the information about the situation is fully 
understood before making decisions. In other words, it guarantees thorough 
knowledge integration and assimilation processes before making action choices 
(before turning potential capacities into realized capacities). In many cases after 
the discovery of a compound, the results of the experiments may seem very good 
at first; the scientists’ emotions run high. However, taking the results into the 
meeting for presentation and objective evaluation, the weaknesses and problems 
become more evident and the performance of F1 may not seem so good any more. 
As the CEO says:  
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“You meet these guys [scientists] in the corridor, they are so proud that ‘we 
made a good experiment yesterday, we got cells and they are alive, now 
they have been cultured and soon they will be tested and it is progressing 
really well’. But when you get the people to put the data together in the 
meeting, then they realize that, well, it does not look so good.” 
Then the neutral environment of the meeting enables the group of scientists and 
managers to ask themselves whether they are happy with the results. Without the 
discussion, it is not possible to interpret the results. There are just too many 
factors and qualifications about F1 that make it perform either well or badly. 
Wider discussion allows to analyze are these cells worth proceeding with.  These 
kinds of decisions are difficult to make in the corridor and benefit from wider 
discussion. Neither is it sufficient to express these things only in written report. 
The CEO explains:  
“The communication is much richer with nuances and details. In decision 
making it is important to read between the lines. You have lots of messages 
in your informal presentation and you reduce lot of those when you make a 
formal presentation in written reports. Managing these activities it is very 
important that you hear all the noise and you pick up all the signals amongst 
the noise.”  
These signals represent possible activation triggers. In addition, the same meeting 
allows them to discuss the next actions and resolve the possible activation triggers 
that have hindered the success of the compound. The opinion and ideas of 
specialists with different backgrounds, education and experience are necessary in 
order to be able to draw conclusions and choose the next path to proceed. 
Still, the heads of the departments complained that their views did not become 
visible enough in these meetings. Thus, in order to effectively detect and solve the 
activation triggers, it was not enough just to gather specialists together. For this 
reason, top managers implemented special meetings to investigate the same issues 
from different angles. These were special meetings in which the emphasis of the 
issues was switched and different people empowered to discuss the matters 
concerning F1. For instance, regular project meetings were held in which the 
general performance of F1 and the issues related to the biological targets were 
discussed. Then an operative-technical meeting was held right after the project 
meeting, but the floor was given to the heads of cost-centres (departments) who 
see the issues in totally different lights, often revealing the activation triggers that 
may not have been visible in previous meetings (see also Appendix 10). These 
meetings showed that various new issues came up that would not have been 
noticed otherwise and various new ideas emerged that would have gone 
unnoticed, not to mention that the heads of the departments were happy that their 
opinion and expertise was valued in the organization. 
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In addition to the internally built structures of communication a panel of external 
experts is set up. At the stage where F1 becomes a more concrete subject as a 
basis for a potential drug, it is possible to start acquiring knowledge from external 
experts in the field. Therefore, the expert panel, a group of the world’s leading 
scientists, is gathered together. It is this panel that provides the firm with a neutral 
opinion about the progress and value of F1. They are also a source of information 
about the ongoing developments and emergent issues in the field, pointing out 
possible threats and opportunities. The external panel of experts recognizes the 
activation triggers in the market and, thus, increases the value of F1 and its related 
capabilities in the larger environmental context. 
Summary of the case study 
The case study shows that capabilities can be built without the measurement and 
reporting of IC. The managerial role is to define the desired outcomes and build 
up formal structures of the context in which knowledge is created and exploited. 
The case study illustrates how the desired outcome of the firm directs growth of 
knowledge, while managerial attention to the context evolves, structuring the 
processes that build up organizational capabilities. The managerial attention to the 
context involves building the procedures of communication that enhance the 
processes of knowledge acquisition and assimilation before the decision-making 
points in the firm. 
In the beginning, when the molecule F1 came into existence, it was a single spot, 
a single molecule that represented a diverse set of opportunities for the firm. After 
the clarification of the desired outcome, a wide array of activities was launched 
related to research, development and commercialization. People started to work 
with the biological and technical elements of F1, exploring and exploiting such 
knowledge that they expected to lead to the desired outcomes. People recognized 
the relevant matters in the external environment related to the progress of F1, 
constantly increasing the knowledge base of the firm. From the birth of F1 to 
stage II of the clinical trials numerous activities are conducted with F1, 
simultaneously building the IC of the firm. All this growth has been directed by 
the management’s concept of the desired candidate drug. 
At the same time the emerging internal and external activation triggers point the 
attention to any shortcomings in existing capabilities. The processes of reacting to 
these triggers shaped the physical parameters of F1 as well as the organizational 
knowledge and capabilities related to it. The external activation triggers have 
shown the incompatibility of F1 with the external environment, forcing the 
developers to adapt their organizational knowledge and capabilities to align the 
progress of F1 with the environmental circumstances. The internal activation 
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triggers have shown the incompatibility of F1 with the first planned outcome, 
forcing the firm to face up to the lack of knowledge and explore new possibilities. 
In this way knowledge and capabilities related to F1 are constantly shaped and 
improved, making the final product concept more valuable in the market.  
Finally, the knowledge and capabilities, built around F1, become the object of 
commercialization. The firm is not selling the compound of F1 as a product, but 
sells the whole F1 “package” – the knowledge about its behavioral properties and 
production that has been collected and developed over the last four years. In the 
beginning, it was almost nothing; just a loose association of ideas but now it is a 
bundle of highly specific and unique knowledge and capabilities that can 
potentially be applied to creating a drug for the treatment of a particular ageing 
disease.  
4.2.2 Description of case B 
Overview of the company 
Case company B is a Finnish biotechnology company established in 1986. 
Employing about 25 employees, it operates in the medical biotech industry. The 
medical biotech sector in general includes the fields of genomic cancer therapy, 
tissue cloning, genomic diagnostic tools, infectious disease therapies, gene 
therapy, and xenotransplantation (Bergeron & Chan, 2004). Firm B is active 
mainly in genomic diagnostic tools, but also partly in other sectors related to 
diagnostic tools. The firm develops, manufactures, and sells diagnostic tests that 
are applicable to fertility, veterinary, food hygiene, and various infectious 
diseases. The tests are based on three technology platforms for which the firm has 
several patent applications worldwide.   
Differently from firm A, firm B has its own production facilities and actively sells 
products in the market. The firm uses specialized distributors of diagnostic and 
pharmaceutical companies, which organize sales in their countries for hospitals, 
laboratories, and home-users. The main markets are in Finland, the Netherlands, 
Germany, the Baltic states, and China. The largest customers are based in Asia 
and Europe, but lately, steps have been taken toward the U.S. market.  
The company has a flat management structure, with few administrative layers. 
The functions of the company are organized into six departments: R&D, 
production, quality control, equipment and facilities, marketing, and finance. As 
the dominant functions of the firm, the R&D and production departments are the 
largest, whereas quality control, equipment, and facilities account for much less 
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of the work force, serving the needs of the R&D and production departments. 
Marketing activities are conducted in the marketing department as well as the 
R&D department. 
Managerial attention to knowledge objects 
While case A had the molecules (i.e., compounds) at the center of managerial 
attention, the core of managerial attention in this case B is placed on two types of 
knowledge objects: (1) diagnostic tests that are in the development stage and (2) 
diagnostic tests that are continuously produced and distributed in the market. 
Comparing the business models of firms A and B, the important difference lies in 
the substance of what they sell. In firm A, the object of commercialization is the 
whole “package” – knowledge and capabilities of producing a compound and 
knowledge of how this compound acts in a living organism. In case B, knowledge 
about the technology and its production is not usually revealed; only the physical 
piece of the product with its application instructions is sold to the customers. 
Knowledge about the technology stays in the firm, but the result of the 
exploitation of this knowledge is a marketing and sales object. In other words, 
firm A sells knowledge about the focal object, which is grown along the path of 
the actor-network, whereas firm B sells those objects. 
Management of the diagnostic tests that are in the development stage is similar to 
case A. The outcome control is applied in directing the progress of these tests. 
The knowledge of the individuals and groups of individuals is applied in specific 
activities to achieve the desired target with each test, whether it is the skill of 
setting up machinery, purifying a raw material, packaging, checking the quality of 
the patch, or introducing these rapid tests in international exhibition. Knowledge 
and capabilities are built according to the definitions of the desired diagnostic test 
– a rapid test for an infectious disease. At the same time, the equipment and 
facilities department sets up the production tools.  
During the development of the “package”, knowledge and capabilities grow, 
increasingly accumulating various skills, experiences, and relationships while the 
test becomes ready for the market. The desired outcome as a definition of the end 
product (a rapid test for a particular infectious disease) directs the growth of 
knowledge, determining what kind of information and actions are more valuable. 
After the rapid test is developed, it is similar to a “package” with a complete set 
of knowledge about the product’s development, production, and quality. Various 
marketing activities, collaborations with distributors, exhibitions, and direct 
contacts with customers are initiated to sell the outcomes of this “package.” 
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Often the time pressure of issues that need to be solved in the production, 
marketing, or equipment and facilities department, as well as the time pressure of 
finishing R&D projects, narrows the managerial focus down on a shorter time 
period. Focusing on a short-term outcome, however, no longer serves the growth 
of potential capacities. The short-term tasks and ongoing problems with existing 
diagnostic tests start representing a hindrance for knowledge growth in other 
development projects, reducing the number of actions that would have increased 
the potential capacity related to other diagnostic tests of the firm. For instance, 
one morning managers a and b had an argument about visiting a small research 
center in northern Finland. The research center had shown interest in starting 
cooperation for the development of new rapid tests. The proposal for the 
application of the novel tests involved analyzing athletes’ specific health 
parameters. The meeting with the research center was clearly future oriented to 
discuss the idea for the new test. Manager a saw new opportunities and 
relationships in a possibly growing field, whereas manager b wanted to emphasize 
current resources – directing the activities of human resources toward the current 
packaging question in production. Manager b questioned the time that would be 
spent driving to another city and sitting in a meeting compared to the uncertain 
benefits that these meetings may bring to the firm.  
In this situation, the managers had to make a choice between two options: (1) the 
growth of potential capacity in a new therapeutic field or (2) applying the existing 
knowledge to ongoing activities of the firm, i.e., solving the packaging problem. 
If growth of potential capacities is chosen, the short-term results with the 
important knowledge object of the firm may suffer. If ongoing activities are 
chosen, the emphasis is put on exploiting existing potential capacities while 
limiting the growth of capacities in other areas. This time, the choice was made to 
participate in the meeting for the benefit of possible new knowledge.    
To sum up, the managerial focus on diagnostic tests (central knowledge objects) 
can be implemented via short-term and long-term outcome definitions. Therefore, 
there is always tension between the creation of new potential capacities and the 
exploitation of existing capacities. In terms of IC, the growth of new potential 
capacities in the above situation means new partnership opportunities (new 
relational capital), which widens the activities of the firm to the new area. The 
new project would lead to structural capital changes in the form of technologies 
and product concepts, and finally to new elements in relational capital in the form 
of new distribution channels and customers. However, this decision may be costly 
for the ongoing affairs in the firm. Hence, there is a constant tension between 
investing in new capacities and exploiting the present capacities of the firm. 
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Managerial intervention in actors’ behavior 
After the R&D stage, the production department will materialize knowledge of 
each “package” into the firm’s products. In managing the diagnostic tests that are 
ready for the market, the management control is not directed at the end products 
but the activities in which the diagnostic tests are produced. People in the 
production department have to follow the comprehensive instructions that were 
produced in the R&D and quality departments. These instructions are part of the 
previously-mentioned “package” and represent explicit descriptions of how each 
batch of diagnostic tests must be produced. Thus, the focus of management 
control is not placed on these tests (knowledge objects) any more but the actors’ 
behavior in producing the tests.  
The purpose of the production department is not to widen the knowledge base of 
the firm. The goal is not to generate new knowledge and IC for the firm but to 
apply existing knowledge that has earlier been generated by R&D activities. The 
production department represents the function of the firm in which most of the 
knowledge and capabilities are documented in an explicit set of instructions and 
records. Special job descriptions, highly formalized quality standards for each 
operation, clearly established rules, and routines in performing each task 
guarantee the necessary quality and sequence of events from material handling to 
production and packaging. The actors’ behavior is pre-determined by written 
instructions and standards that do not allow the actors to show much creativity. 
The main objective is to transfer existing potential capacities into realized 
capacities of the firm. 
At the same time, the objectives of the marketing department are defined via the 
number of products sold (i.e., via the desired number of central knowledge 
objects). People engaged in marketing could choose ways to search for 
information in the field and initiate new contacts and relationships with the aim of 
reaching the desired objectives. The annual objective to sell 80 000 rapid tests 
requires the firm to extend its relational capital by finding new distribution 
channels and big customers. In other words, the actors are free to choose their 
activities and acquire new information from the field, as long as their activities 
serve the desired outcome. If the target is challenging enough, the desired 
outcome forces people in the marketing department to extend the capacities of the 
firm, whereas the particular type of rapid tests (type of knowledge object) 
determines which kinds of partners and customers (relational capital) may be 
potentially beneficial to the firm’s objectives. 
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The role of activation triggers in shaping the IC of the firm 
In company B, no specific plans are made to build particular IC elements of the 
firm, but IC is constantly built and extended by reacting to internal and external 
activation triggers. Even the “packages” of knowledge in the production 
department are not completely closed sets of organizational knowledge, since the 
changing competition forces the firm to constantly improve its products. The 
R&D manager claims: 
“There are always some important things, which are coming just from 
somewhere, and we have to solve these problems or we have to do 
something for production, which we have to do immediately.” 
These events often occur as problems and obstacles in the R&D laboratory or 
production, or appear as particular quality issues, i.e., complaints, that are pointed 
out by the quality department. The operating managers put in lots of effort to, and 
a good deal of focus on these activation triggers. Triggers are continuously 
monitored, as the firm tests new raw materials and options for alternative 
production technologies. Performance measurement is also related to the triggers. 
Annual performance measures are usually set for each department, whereas 
operative performance measures are largely evaluated as the existence of internal 
activation triggers. The triggers form the real basis of the performance evaluation 
of each department. Wherever the discussion takes place, the performance is 
evaluated by the existence of the triggers. As one of the managers explains,  
“The success … I can only see if this is working by asking my subordinates 
whether there are some difficulties.” 
If there are no difficulties that drive the performance of the department away from 
the desired path, things go on in the previously planned manner, and there is 
nothing to discuss further. Whenever problems or risks are detected, additional 
information searches will be initiated, and people will go into the field, look at the 
samples, and analyze the situation. The emerging obstacles show knowledge 
gaps, which destabilize the current processes of the firm and initiate searches for 
new knowledge. When an activation trigger emerges that is related to the 
diagnostic test in the production department, then the old set of production 
processes may be changed to update the product. The “package” will be opened 
again and improved by the new knowledge. When a problem, for instance, 
emerges in the R&D or marketing department, a whole array of information 
searches and discussions are held to stabilize the movement toward the desired 
outcome again. Or, alternatively, a whole new product family will be initiated, 
and a new set of knowledge “packages” developed.  
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Sometimes, in the case of negative triggers, if the problem does not have a 
significant effect on the outcome, the problem might remain unsolved for some 
time. In those cases when a problem occurs in products that are already in the 
firm’s product list and actively sold in the market, it is known internally as a 
burning issue, and everything will be done to stabilize the situation.  If the sales 
of the firm are threatened, much more effort is taken to find a solution. 
Especially, when some test shows false negative or positive results, then 
immediate action is taken. On the other hand, when the solution is not found in 
the necessary period of time (and the problem does not affect sales and no R&D 
partnership is at risk), then the problem is kept on the list of secondary issues, 
waiting for a solution to come. In some cases, however, the problem is so severe 
that no kind of externally acquired information would have any effect on the 
existence of a solution.  
In general, the effects of the activation triggers in shaping the IC of the firm have 
the patterns already described in case A. The emerging triggers can also be more 
positive in nature; nevertheless, either way most of the triggers change the 
existing knowledge and activities of the firm. However, in order to illustrate case 
B, an example of an activation trigger is provided in the subsequent discussion. 
The following discussion describes the situation in which the activation trigger 
induces a variety of actions that lead to changes in the capabilities of the firm.  
One morning, a Laboratory Assistant came to the R&D Manager and Quality 
Manager referring to a problem that she wanted to discuss with both managers. 
She had discovered a quality problem with the test C1. As she was fully aware of 
the possible threat that the quality problem may create for the organizational 
performance, she immediately notified these two managers to start a wider search 
for a solution to the problem. As always, an ad hoc meeting was initiated. The 
Quality Manager briefly describes the meeting that they held with R&D Manager 
and production people: 
 “We discussed the problem with C1. […] We recognized that there is a 
difference in quality. We discussed what we could do with that. It is 
difficult if you have to adjust the sensitivity level with each batch.” 
The first discussion did not lead to the solution, however, because the real essence 
of the problem was not yet clear. In most occurring problems, it is difficult to 
trace the cause of the problem. The R&D Manager explains,  
“We could see that something weird was happening in our test, but we did 
not know why.”  
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They know that several factors could affect the results of the test C1, but none of 
these factors seem to be more likely than the others. Therefore, the managers 
gathered additional information about the situation and tested various factors to 
clarify which one is the reason for the emergent problem. The R&D Manager 
adds,  
“Of course, we can make some educated guesses, so that we can think that 
this can be … this might be the reason. It could be even the result of some 
different small things that alone do not make a difference, but if there are 
many small things, they can together cause some problems. And then it is 
really complicated.” 
Therefore, knowledge exploration activities have been started to, first, specify the 
problem and, second, to make some educated guesses about the possible solution.  
Since customers are waiting, the time pressure forces the managers to speed up 
their discussions and information searches (i.e. knowledge exploration activities). 
The test C1 is quite new in the market, but several important agreements with big 
customers have already been signed. Therefore, the problem cannot wait for long. 
Additional information is actively gathered, and ideas are generated. The 
brainstorming sessions, information inquiries from the field, and meetings are 
quite intense due to the short time period that they planned to finish the product 
C1. 
After a few days, they figure out that the basis of the problem in the test C1 is due 
to a raw material, an antigen that causes differences in the quality level of the 
produced tests. It is a serious problem because it is the only suitable raw material 
in the market. Since they still do not completely understand the reactions with that 
material, the possible solutions vary. They conduct additional data searches and 
experiments. Finally, they have an idea. The R&D Manager explains:  
“I expect that there is a problem within the first and last rolls, because it 
seems that the first and last rolls are different from the rest of the material. 
At least I hope so, because we have just changed from the first to the second 
one, and we just noticed that [the problem with rolls]. … At least it is 
something which we should test now.” 
By testing the idea and discussing the results, they finally develop a slightly 
different method of handling these rolls. The cultivation and purifying processes 
of the cells remain the same, but the firm manages to change the material 
handling, to extract the material in a different way, which results in generating a 
better product. Hence, as a result of the emergence of this antigen problem and 
the stabilizing actions that the managers perform, the test C1 starts to perform 
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better than it did before the occurrence of the problem. The R&D Manager says 
happily: “The final test started to work much better than the original one.”  
Hence, the quality problem (i.e. activation trigger) forced the managers to 
improve the material-handling processes. The trigger showed that the existing 
processes were not satisfactory. Something had to be changed. In order to find the 
thing that had to be changed and the way it had to be changed, it was necessary to 
search for new information, activate more communication between the 
organizational members and partners, test their ideas, analyze the situation, etc. 
Thus, to change the processes, the firm had to learn the content of the problem 
and learn about new ways of doing things. All these knowledge exploration 
activities were initiated because of the trigger, which showed that the existing 
ways of doing things were not enough and something must be changed in the 
organizational capacities. With the help of knowledge exploration activities, the 
firm was able to develop a new set of activities, which finally led to a better-
performing product – growth of the firm’s capacities. 
The Quality Manager of the firm is particularly responsible for recording these 
kinds of triggers in the production department and keeping an eye on the ongoing 
activities. Corrective actions are also recorded in the quality system. If activation 
triggers force a change in production processes, the changes will be recorded in 
documents and instructions. As a result of the activation trigger cited above, 
documentation and instructions for the production department were updated with 
the new material-handling techniques. In other words, the knowledge “package” 
of the product C1 was improved.  
Usually, there are numerous issues in different departments of the firm awaiting a 
solution. In other words, there are gaps in organizational knowledge that are 
waiting to be filled. These gaps largely determine what kinds of externally 
emerging new information and knowledge are recognized, acquired, and 
exploited in the firm. A solution may come from the field or even from other 
biotechnology sectors. The firm is constantly alert to the types of information that 
would fill the gap in existing capacities. The firm is also alert internally; 
whenever somebody has good results with some product, the results may also 
work in another product. Whenever new information occurs that can be helpful to 
resolve the outstanding issue, the information will quickly be discussed, and the 
necessary actions taken.  
Individual and collective memory has a large role in associating new information 
with these unsolved issues of the firm. The possible fit of any new information 
and existing problems is continuously examined in their minds. If asked how 
often people check on the outstanding problems, the R&D Manager says, “In my 
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mind, every night.” Basically, there are several people in the firm alert to the kind 
of information that they think would help the firm. They intuitively relate the 
potential benefits of new information to the existing issues of the firm, and are 
able to continuously interpret and analyze new knowledge in the context of 
ongoing issues in the firm. The emerging opportunities are usually mentioned and 
discussed via phone calls or face-to-face meetings with the partners, or a contact 
met at some exhibition, for instance. Several managers in the firm (especially the 
R&D Manager, CEO, and Marketing Manager) hold the “lines open” with many 
players in the field, just in case interesting ideas and technologies emerge, or the 
firm needs help to solve some internal activation trigger. As one of the managers 
says, “…they are somebody I want to keep in touch [with] and have a line open, 
in case I really need something.” Thus, the contacts are kept active, even without 
ongoing co-activities with the partners. In doing this, the firm is holding and 
nurturing its potential capacity – in case some opportunity or problem emerges, 
the potential capacity will be turned into actions, that is, realized capacity of the 
firm. 
Managerial intervention in the context 
Since the quality system provides the framework for detecting possible internal 
activation triggers, people have a lot of freedom in choosing the ways and tools to 
communicate and choose their best ways to react to these triggers. Managers 
imply that the quality control system provides the only rules in the firm to detect 
activation triggers. The system of internal and external complaints enables the 
discovery of critical problems and later records the solutions of these problems in 
documents and instructions. However, the formal structures in the quality system 
represent only a fragment of the overall communication and decision-making in 
the firm. The system enables the detection of some internal problems, and 
sometimes some external risks, related to the products, but has still low 
significance compared to the overall information flow of the firm. The way 
people possibly detect activation triggers depends on what they read, what they 
notice, who they talk to, etc. Differently from case A, formal (regular and 
structured) meetings are kept to a minimum.  
In most departments the way internal and external triggers are noticed depends 
largely on people’s working habits and information sources. The highly informal 
context (in terms of the knowledge triangle) largely evolved based on informal 
relationships and communication. Managers like to do things informally, and not 
overload departments with meetings and formal types of controls. They do not 
like long meetings, suggesting they waste valuable time. The CEO is convinced 
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that all kinds of reporting and a system of formal meetings are justified only in 
theory. He states: 
“Theoretically, of course we can do that, but it is extra work, does it help, 
can we follow better? How does it help us? […] We can load ourselves full 
of [these kinds] of different counting and work, without giving real value. If 
there are systems, which are out of our hands, which we cannot control, 
then we must look and count them. But [if] they are under our control, then 
the most important thing is that we do not waste time [on] this kind of 
things, we are wasting time for real things, which are driving further our 
business.” 
Since there is no system of regular meetings in place, the meeting is not the tool 
for discovering an activation trigger, but the other way around: the emerging 
activation triggers tend to induce ad hoc meetings. Many managers often explain 
calling a meeting as: “The meeting was held, because there was a problem.” The 
R&D Manager says:   
“If there are good results, they [people working in the laboratory] definitely 
come and [talk about] it. If there are bad results, they also come and ask me 
to see those results.” 
Good and bad news are the main triggers that induce all kind of communication 
and actions in the firm.  
Since formal structures are kept to a minimum, the knowledge integration 
methods largely evolved along their own path. Even in ad hoc meetings, the list of 
participants does not often depend on the formal hierarchy of the firm but the 
patterns of the relationships and the methods employees have used to discuss 
things. Often the issues are discussed with people whose job descriptions would 
not suggest their involvement. Individuals’ prior knowledge, personal 
preferences, and even the arrangement of working desks have influenced the 
evolution of communication lines. For instance, it is very common for the R&D 
Manager and Quality Manager to discuss production issues and, furthermore, 
largely affect production decisions, even if the issue is not directly connected to 
quality or R&D concerns.  
Habitual communication patterns and informal relationships have also shaped the 
decision-making of the firm and the ways it reacts to emerging activation triggers. 
Every middle-level manager has developed his/her way of communication in the 
firm, following his/her routines of informing the others. For instance, one 
manager particularly dislikes big meetings and prefers to communicate things to 
each and every person individually, explaining it as follows: 
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“I am not good at telling something in meeting. That is not my way to do it. 
If I have to discuss something, I would tell it several times to every person 
individually, maybe in a [slightly] different way to each person. … If I [say 
something] to marketing people, I have some way of doing it. If I tell it to 
some other people, then I use some other way.” 
Most discussions and decision-making in the firm take place via face-to-face 
discussions either in the office or corridor, or even outside the office. As two 
managers carpool, numerous issues are discussed during the long drive out of the 
city, and important decisions may also be taken during these conversations.  
The ways the communication patterns are built influence the knowledge 
integration of different functions of the firm, creating internal blocks of 
knowledge flows, which further influence the way activation triggers are reacted 
to. As one of the managers describes communication with another department:  
“I do not talk with manager b or actually I talk with every person in that 
department [b], but they do not talk with me. So, usually I do not get 
information from department b, or I get the information [because] 
somebody in department b happens to speak to manager c.” 
Normally, manager a gets information about the issues of department b via the 
manager of department c, and if manager b wants to disseminate information to 
manager a, manager b does it via manager c. After information about the 
emerging activation triggers has reached manager a, department a can contribute 
to the solution of the problem. Nevertheless, department a’s advice about possible 
solutions is often communicated to department b via manager c. These 
communication peculiarities involve not only managers a, b, and c but also other 
departments and their managers. 
On the one hand, people in the organization have developed a collective 
understanding of these patterns of communication. They know who speaks to 
whom, and the peculiar communication methods are taken as a natural feature of 
the firm. People implicitly know who needs to be informed, from whom to ask 
advice, and who has to be invited to the ad hoc meetings. When some problem or 
question emerges in production, for instance, then the production people 
immediately know who should be involved, whether they need to discuss it with 
either the Marketing Manager, Quality Manager, or R&D Manager and when the 
issue should be brought to the attention of the Managing Director. When a 
particular activation trigger emerges, they intuitively know who to discuss it with. 
The patterns of knowledge integration have evolved over the years and been 
embedded in people’s behavior in such a way that things are not questioned but 
implicitly acted upon. Everybody intuitively knows who has the necessary 
knowledge and skills, and, also, who is the easiest to communicate with.  
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On the other hand, people claim that the informal and ad hoc nature of 
communications hinders knowledge integration, blocking information flows 
between the different functions of the firm. This has led to mutual blaming and 
defensive reactions. This has sometimes made the internal knowledge integration 
processes slightly difficult. People complain that these peculiarities in 
communication have led to a lack of acceptance in decision-making, which makes 
the processes that solve the emerging activation triggers sometimes problematic. 
Lots of bargaining is necessary to reach a common decision. Important decisions 
are frequently made by only a couple of people during a conversation in 
someone’s office, in the corridor, or over lunch. This increases the flexibility of 
the firm but also increases irritation and lack of acceptance by other managers and 
specialists of the firm. Later, the decisions are sometimes changed after other 
people have provided their opinions and additional information about the issue.  
However, when the emerging activation triggers are more critical to 
organizational performance, then the institutionalized communication patterns 
have less impact on knowledge integration. People tend to overcome the 
difficulties in their communication, talking directly to each other and involving a 
wider audience in the discussion. Hence, in critical cases people concentrate their 
attention on the issue at hand, and overcome the difficulties in communication.  
Summary of the case study  
In the present firm, two types of knowledge objects have been at the center of 
managerial attention: diagnostic tests in R&D and diagnostic tests that are already 
distributed in the market. Differently from case A, the aim is not to 
commercialize the whole “package,” only the effect of this knowledge. The 
definition of the desired outcome determines the direction in which the activities 
with the diagnostic tests (focal objects) tend to evolve in R&D, marketing, and 
the equipment and facilities department. The role of the production department is 
to turn potential capacities into realized capacities in which the organizational 
knowledge and capabilities are materialized in the diagnostic tests. Hence, the 
behavioral controls in the production department can intervene in the activities in 
which the existing knowledge and capabilities are exploited. 
Similarly to case A, the external and internal activation triggers have a large role 
in shaping the organizational knowledge and capabilities of the firm. Emerging 
problems highlight the points where existing processes are not fully aligned with 
organizational objectives, and force the firm to improve its processes (i.e. existing 
realized capacities). Organizational members are forced to analyze the existing 
situation and acquire new knowledge to become able to change the existing way 
of doing things. As a result, the trigger leads to an increase of the potential and 
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realized capacities of the firm (or at least changes in the exploitation of existing 
capacities). 
The formal and informal structures of performance evaluation and 
communication enable detection of and reaction to these activation triggers. The 
formal structures in the quality system enable monitoring of the activities in the 
R&D and production department to detect possible problems and risks with these 
focal objects. The formal system, however, builds only a narrow part of the 
overall context in which the activation triggers are detected and solved. 
The context in which organizational members detect activation triggers, explore 
knowledge, make decisions, and act largely evolved without significant 
managerial intervention. Consequently, the patterns of knowledge integration do 
not follow the functional hierarchy of the organization but are largely based on 
other individual and organizational factors. This consequently has an effect on the 
effectiveness of the firm in reacting to the activation triggers. The processes of 
knowledge exploration and exploitation sometimes are not as smooth as the 
managers want the processes to be, since often there are blocks in information 
sharing and decision-making caused by too much bargaining among the 
organizational members. As a result, this determines how effectively the firm is 
able to adjust its IC (potential and realized capacities) to the internal and external 
threats and opportunities.  
4.2.3 Discussion 
Management as an implicit endeavor 
The two case studies show how IC is constantly built and extended without 
measuring and reporting the elements of human, structural, and relational capital. 
In literature it is suggested that in order to make knowledge and IC valuable for 
the firm it “must be made explicit or “structuralized” to be owned and then 
profited on by a firm” (Johnson, 2002: 416). Managers are often advised to 
identify knowledge and make it explicit and accessible for managerial 
intervention (see e.g., Heng, 2001). The case studies show that IC management is 
rather an implicit endeavor, in which knowledge is not visualized and measured 
but managerial attention is directed to the actor’s behavior, knowledge objects, 
and the context in which knowledge is created (see Figure 13). The present study 
applies the term implicit knowledge management when referring to the modes of 
managerial intervention in which knowledge and IC is not objectified but 
managerial focus is on other organizational phenomena, consequently affecting 
organizational knowledge and capabilities. The managerial focus on knowledge 
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objects, actors’ behavior, and the context can have a significant effect on the IC of 
the firm.  
 
 
Figure 13. The focus of managerial intervention20 
 
In the firms, there are number of things that people know about and act upon. 
These are knowledge objects, things and artifacts of the real world, that are 
available for direct managerial manipulation. Knowledge, which is invisible, is 
highly entangled with these more visible kinds of objects. In both case studies, 
particular objects stand in the center of other objects – the focal objects that 
attract other things and relationships with them. In case A, these objects were 
compounds (molecules) that attract people and things (material resources, 
chemical substances, for instance) to themselves, forming an actor-network 
around each compound. In case B, there were two types of focal objects: products 
in the development stage and products already distributed in the market. These 
objects stand in the center of organizational activities, attracting people, other 
objects, and relationships with themselves. Each new partner, new material, or 
new piece of technology brings new knowledge to the actor-network of the 
knowledge object, widening the range of activities around the object. In this way, 
capacities are built by a multilayered structure of various types of knowledge 
(Kasunoki, Nonaka & Nagata, 1998; Sanchez, 2001b). 
                                                 
 
20
 In Figure 13, the spheres of managerial interest are drawn as overlapping because there are no 
clear boundaries between them. It should also be noted that for managerial purposes the meaning 
of the context here is rather narrow compared to the wider meaning of the context in the 
sociology of knowledge.  
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Despite slight differences in the business models of these firms, the patterns of 
knowledge and IC management are similar. By focusing managerial attention on 
the focal objects of these firms, the IC is implicitly built in the areas relevant for 
the firm. In the literature, it has been suggested that to create valuable firm IC 
human capital should be transformed into structural capital and customer capital 
of the firm (see e.g., Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Stewart, 1997). In the above 
case studies, the focal objects attracted individuals, groups (human capital), and 
external partners (relational capital) to develop product concepts (structural 
capital). There, product concepts were further developed to attract customers 
(customer capital). These processes did not happen, however, due to explicit 
management and reporting procedures of IC, but the capabilities were implicitly 
created by directing managerial attention to more visible phenomena of the firm:  
the knowledge objects, human actors and the context in which the organizational 
capabilities were built. 
The role of outcome controls  
The managers’ role is to direct the activities with the focal objects toward the 
desired outcome. Not all kinds of knowledge and relationships add value to the 
important focal objects of the firm. Not every piece of technology is beneficial to 
learn; not every relationship is necessarily valuable for the firm. Without care and 
attention, the knowledge and capabilities of the firm can grow in a wide variety of 
directions with no significant value for the firm. The firm could have a portfolio 
of IC spreading in different disciplines and functional areas, knowing a little 
about everything – and ending up with nothing but a waste of resources. 
Therefore, control is needed to direct the decision-making in such a way that IC 
would grow in directions valuable for the firm.  
The goals and strategies of the firm define the direction in which the focal object 
is expected to evolve. The definition of the desired outcome determines the fields 
of activities and knowledge along the way toward this outcome. Clearly defined 
outcomes determine the diversity of knowledge generated and exploited in the 
firm. To achieve the objectives, the firm has to perform various kinds of tasks that 
have to be completed with the focal object. Employees with the necessary skills 
and experience are engaged in activities that contribute to the progress of the 
focal object. The desired outcome determines which information and contacts are 
more relevant to consider, which information needs to be saved for the future, and 
which is useless for the firm. 
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Focal object 
Medicinal chemists
Pharmacologists
Molecular biologists
Knowledge bundle’
Knowledge bundle’’
Knowledge bundle’’’
What are the results that 
we want?
1)
What kinds of activities we 
choose in order to achieve 
the desired results?
2)
What are we able to achieve? 
Which activities we actually are or 
become able to perform?
Focal object:
Knowledge:
Human actors:
 
Figure 14. Decision-making in creating the actor-network21 
 
Knowledge has various roles in the actor-network. Figure 14 illustrates the 
reasoning of the outcome control commonly applied in every R&D project in 
cases A and B. The figure presents the role of knowledge and the main questions 
related to the focal object, knowledge, and human actors. First, the goal-setting is 
conducted in the way suggested in the literature that considers the existing 
resources of the firm (e.g., Penrose, 1959; Itami & Roehl, 1987; Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). The initial experiences and skills, on the one hand, and 
managers’ perception of the environment, on the other hand, provide the grounds 
for establishing the goals with the focal object. Nevertheless, the target is defined 
as the status of the knowledge object, not knowledge as a desirable asset. The 
targets are set considering the existing competences, the potential to learn, and the 
external contacts, but they are not about knowledge. The targets are about visible 
and more definable objects of the firm. For instance, in case A, the desired 
outcome was determined as a desirable compound F1 with technical and 
biological requirements. In case B, the marketing department had a sales target 
(80 000 rapid tests). These outcome definitions are defined via central knowledge 
objects of the firm (i.e. focal objects) – something that the firm wants to achieve 
with these objects.  
Second, the existing knowledge and capabilities define the set of activities that 
the firm is capable of rendering. The targets, however, tend to denote a challenge 
                                                 
 
21
 The correct term for the human actor in the actor-network is actant, and the focal object is an 
actor (Latour, 1987, 2005). Nevertheless, the present study applies the term human actors and 
knowledge object (or focal object) throughout the study to maintain terminological coherence 
with the initially introduced elements of the knowledge triangle (in Figure 3, chapter 2.2.1). 
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to the existing organizational capacities, encouraging human actors to learn and 
engage new knowledge in the actor-network. Formulating seemingly impossible 
goals is a way of “resource leverage” to overcome the constraints that existing 
resources represent for the firm (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). The actor-network 
functions on the edge of its constraints, constantly aiming a bit more than the 
existing capacities would suggest. To reach the goals, the firm has to widen the 
edge of its constraints by continuously acquiring and assimilating new 
information, taking risks, and trying different sets of activities. The activities are 
conducted under conditions of scarce resources and incomplete knowledge about 
the ways the goals can be achieved. The greater the challenge for the existing 
knowledge base, the more new knowledge must be acquired and assimilated into 
the firm. Knowledge exploration activities, such as data searches, new 
interorganizational contacts, experiments in laboratory, and brainstorming 
sessions, can widen the existing knowledge base to reach the desired outcome.  
The present study argues that by defining the outcome of the focal object the 
outcome controls has an effect on diversity of knowledge. Turner and Makhija 
(2006: 199) have suggested that the diversity of knowledge means that knowledge 
is related to the distinct disciplines and functional areas of information. In the 
present study, the question of diversity can be explained via a three-dimensional 
framework of knowledge. It was discussed in chapter 2.3 that it is important to 
align the disciplines and functional areas of knowledge and capabilities with the 
firm’s strategies. The value of organizational knowledge and capabilities relies on 
whether the diversity of knowledge in the firm is aligned with its business 
strategies, in other words, whether the firm has knowledge and capabilities in the 
areas of its strategic interests. The present case studies show that the outcome 
controls with the outcome definition via focal objects allow the firm to build its 
capabilities in the disciplines and functional areas necessary for the firm. 
Organizational goals define which kind of knowledge is necessary and more 
valuable for the firm. The definition of the desired outcome plays a large role in 
influencing choices in knowledge exploration, favoring new knowledge from 
certain disciplines, and ignoring others, consequently shaping the diversity of 
knowledge and capabilities of the firm. To be more precise, there is a step called 
“recognizing the value” before the process of knowledge acquisition (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Todorova & Durisin, 2007). With this step, important 
information will be recognized. The present study argues that the definition of the 
desired outcome largely determines that value. External information is recognized 
as valuable if it is expected to contribute to the desired outcomes. In this way, the 
defined output induces the growth of knowledge that is valuable for the present 
strategies of the firm. Todorova and Durisin (2007) proposed that power 
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relationships have a moderating effect on recognizing the value and exploitation 
of new knowledge. In this light, outcome control can be seen as part of internal 
power relationships directing the choices of the knowledge acquisition, 
assimilation, and exploitation processes. 
The outcome definition usually includes a time period in which the outcome is 
expected to be achieved. In this light, the outcome controls affect not only the 
diversity of knowledge but may also affect the speed with which knowledge is 
acquired and turned into realized capacities. The time period to reach the targets 
puts pressure on the people accountable and forces them to speed up knowledge 
exploration activities around the focal object. Kim (1998) has suggested that the 
higher the speed and intensity of the efforts in gathering knowledge the more 
quickly the firm will build its capabilities. Nevertheless, the speed and intensity 
are worthless if the direction of the knowledge acquisition is not congruent with 
organizational strategies, i.e. if the knowledge does not contribute to the desired 
outcome. Thus, it is necessary to have both speed and diversity to maintain the 
desirable development of the organizational capabilities. 
The speed of knowledge growth and diversity of knowledge have, however, 
different meanings in the management of research activities. In research, it is 
possible to define only some qualifications of the focal object, which would be 
valuable for the firm. Leitner and Warden (2004) have suggested that in research 
the goals are interpreted more as “corridors,” defining the direction with enough 
room for evolution. The diversity of knowledge as necessary disciplines and 
functional areas of organizational interest can be defined only in a rather broad 
sense. Neither is there a specific definition of the deadline in which the desired 
result must be achieved. Managers cannot use time pressure to make inventions 
come more quickly. The time limit has no influence on how fast the outcome will 
be achieved. At this stage, the potential capacities of the firm will be significantly 
increased, but no one can determine exactly how fast the new valuable piece of 
knowledge should be created. The main managerial role here is to create an 
encouraging context for the human actors – a motivating environment that allows 
the human actors to choose their own ways of learning and doing things. 
In development activities, and in marketing and sales departments, speed becomes 
highly important, since the definitions of the desired outcome become more 
concrete and manageable. The speed and direction of knowledge growth become 
more controllable. At the same time, the growth of potential capacities would 
slightly decrease. The efforts are directed at establishing solid ground for turning 
the generated potential capacities (i.e. new product technology) into realized 
capacities (that is, to transfer the technology to the production department and 
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commercialization processes). The basis of the new knowledge becomes more 
and more solid and ready to be engaged in productive actions. The managerial 
focus on the focal object considerably increases with clearer targets and 
deadlines. The diagnostic types of controls become relevant, whereas the extent 
of interactive control decreases (Simons, 1995). Particularly during the last phases 
of development, the speed and targets become very critical, directing the 
managerial focus clearly onto the focal objects, and less onto the context of 
knowledge creation (see case A). 
The extreme pressure of time and outcome would, however, increase only the 
kinds of knowledge that are quickly turned into realized capacities, raising the 
risk of losing organizational flexibility. This strengthens the path dependency of 
existing organizational capacities (Levinthal & March, 1993; Weiping, 2006), not 
leaving time and motivation for tentative studies and learning in areas potentially 
beneficial in the future. The extreme pressure on a short-term outcome would 
force the employees to direct the knowledge search only toward the domains 
where immediate actions are needed. For instance, in an extreme application of 
diagnostic controls (Simons, 1995), knowledge acquisition would help only the 
existing tasks and outcomes leading the firm into the competency trap described 
by Weiping (2006). In this situation, the creation of the potential capacity follows 
the existing needs but ignores the long-term threats and opportunities in the 
business environment. It is especially risky in a highly changing environment, 
where the firm is not capable of reacting to changes in the competition (Weiping, 
2006). 
In addition to the speed of knowledge growth and diversity of knowledge in 
building organizational capabilities, the group-level definition of the outcome 
would affect knowledge flows from the individual to the organizational level. 
Especially, a high level of uncertainty in choosing the activities toward the 
desired outcome forces people to integrate their knowledge that consequently 
increases knowledge flows from individual- to organizational-level knowledge. 
The outcome controls include the output measures (focusing on the focal object), 
as well as the procedures for evaluating the output and discussing further actions 
(providing the context). In cases A and B, the outcomes are defined for entire 
projects, departments, or a particular manager who leads the group of individuals. 
One individual is rarely responsible for the success of the focal object. Instead, 
people are part of larger actor-networks, since individual knowledge remains 
incomplete for the desired organizational goals. Turner and Makhija (2006: 199) 
define the completeness of knowledge as the “degree to which the knowledge for 
making decisions or completing tasks is entirely sufficient and available for the 
decision maker’s use.” Knowledge is usually incomplete in high task-uncertainty, 
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forcing people to conduct more complicated information searches. People search 
for additional knowledge to make their knowledge more complete for the tasks 
they have to accomplish. For that reason, the outcome is achievable only through 
lots of common effort and collaboration, aggregating the knowledge and activities 
of many individuals. Consequently, individual knowledge from various 
disciplines and functions becomes integrated into organizational capabilities. 
In the R&D, marketing, and sales departments (in cases A and B), the managerial 
attention was placed on focal objects. In the production department, however, 
people were instructed and controlled by behavioral controls. To apply behavioral 
controls, there has to be a “package” of knowledge ready for exploitation. Such a 
“package” includes explicit instructions and rules of behavior. Production people 
must turn this “package” into the firm’s realized capacities without adding their 
own ideas and interpretations to it. Thus, the behavioral control is primarily 
directed toward turning existing potential capacities into realized capacities. The 
growth of potential capacities appears only after the emergence of some 
activation trigger. 
Activation triggers shaping IC of the firm 
There are external and internal events that may induce the firm to extend its 
potential and realized capacities, adjusting the IC to organizational strategies and 
the external environment. These events represent activation triggers that may 
emerge in the form of new knowledge or some problem that forces managers to 
reevaluate the existing progress and status of the focal object. According to 
Levinthal and March (1993), failure is the main mechanism that leads the firm to 
excessive exploration of knowledge. The activation triggers can be in the form of 
negative events inside the firm or rapid changes in the external environment that 
force the firm to redefine its strategy and acquire new knowledge. The activation 
triggers found in case studies A and B are summarized in the following categories 
(see Figure 15). 
The activation triggers may have a significant effect on the current situation, 
destabilizing the whole actor-network of some products. The existing 
organizational goals determine whether a trigger represents an opportunity or a 
threat. In the case of a trigger that represents an opportunity, the firm faces new 
knowledge that either encourages the achievement of present goals or creates 
opportunities for new ones. New knowledge may create an opportunity to define 
new goals and strategies for either improving existing products or starting new 
projects. Various information processing procedures and meetings (knowledge 
integration mechanisms) will be initiated to analyze the opportunities and gather 
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additional knowledge. Thereafter, the activities are chosen to pursue the 
opportunities and build up new capabilities of the firm. 
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Figure 15. Types of activation triggers in the case studies 
 
A trigger that may jeopardize organizational performance is categorized as a 
threat. An internally emerging threat tends to show that the organizational 
knowledge and capabilities are not congruent with the existing strategies of the 
firm. The triggers show the gaps in existing knowledge and encourage the firm to 
more actively acquire and interpret knowledge, increasingly raising the firm’s 
potential capacity (Levitt & March, 1988; Zahra & George, 2002). It shows that 
the existing capabilities of the firm may be incomplete for the desired outcomes. 
In other words, the activation trigger generates a situation in which people feel the 
absence of knowledge. Spender (2006) has suggested that people generally feel 
the absence of knowledge rather than its presence, and managers react most 
strongly to knowledge absence. The present study suggests that triggers can show 
the lack of knowledge that needs to be fulfilled. Individuals of the organizations 
are forced to conduct a whole array of actions to fill the gaps in knowledge and 
stabilize the situation to move it back towards the initially planned output (see 
Figure 16).  
The trigger points to the lack of knowledge in some areas, showing that the things 
that the firm does and the way the firm does these things are not enough for the 
desired outcomes. Usually, a lack of knowledge is identifiable as incomplete 
knowledge about some thing or a process that the trigger points at – quality 
problems with some focal object or a lack of ability to perform some task, for 
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instance. Consequently, information searches and learning would be particularly 
directed to the areas where the trigger shows the lack. People are forced to acquire 
new knowledge or exploit existing unused capacities to fulfill this specific lack of 
knowledge. Knowledge exploration activities lead to the increase of potential 
capacities that enable organizational members to respond to the trigger, adjusting 
the realized capacities to fulfill the specific lack. The existing knowledge and 
partnerships are applied for different purposes, or some skills and know-how are 
exploited whose existence had not been recognized before.  
 
 
 
Figure 16. The directing force of outcome control 
 
Zahra and George (2002) have suggested the characteristic of intensity to further 
describe an activation trigger. In light of the present discussion, the intensity of 
the trigger can be defined as the degree to which the trigger jeopardizes 
organizational performance. When there is a high risk that the trigger jeopardizes 
the achievement of the organizational objectives, the information searches and 
actions to stabilize the situation are conducted as quickly as possible, speeding up 
the whole array of processes. For instance, the toxicology problem described in 
case A could be defined as being very intense and representing a large threat to 
the organizational performance. Similarly, in case B, the quality problem with the 
test C1 was critical, since the customers were waiting. Acquisition of new 
knowledge and necessary actions were conducted as quickly as possible to 
normalize the situation again. The analysis of the circumstances and new 
decisions were completed within days. In many other situations in the case 
studies, the triggers were not as critical to the organizational performance. 
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Consequently, less time and effort were invested in knowledge exploration 
activities to react to those triggers.  
The intensity of the activation trigger also defines the level of knowledge 
integration. Problem-solving and knowledge integration are highly related. 
Knowledge integration induces problem-solving and learning, especially when 
people share cooperative goals within the groups (Tjosvold, Yu & Hui, 2004). As 
a problem can be discussed and solved at various levels of the firm, such as at the 
individual, group, or organizational level (Lang, Dittrich & White, 1978), the 
intensity of the problem influences the level at which knowledge integration takes 
place. For instance, after the emergence of the toxicology problem in case A, 
meetings were initiated that gathered the people on the project, as well as the 
firm-level management. Finally, the matter had to be discussed at the level of the 
board of directors. The exact level of discussions is also affected by the 
communication and management control systems’ organizational routines. In case 
A, the range of relevant people was defined by the organizational structure and 
formal meeting structures. In case B, people developed their own personal ways 
of communicating and reacting to activation triggers. 
The triggers emerge almost every day, shaping the IC of the firm and making the 
development of organizational knowledge and capabilities unique and firm-
specific. Numerous activation triggers that emerge and are being solved over time 
leave a trail to the organizational capabilities. The outcome controls and formal 
structures of communication and decision-making, on the other hand, shape the 
ways the firm reacts to those activation triggers. Barney (1991: 107-108) has 
argued that inimitability of a resource can be achieved when a resource is 
obtained along a unique historical path of the firm. The present study suggests 
that internal and external activation triggers influence the historical path of the 
firm, making the organizational capacities difficult to imitate or substitute by 
competitors.  
If the firm is able to adequately react to emerging activation triggers, then the IC 
of the firm also becomes more valuable in terms of Barney’s resource attributes 
(Barney, 1991). Chapter 2.3 of the present study discusses that in addition to the 
inimitability and non-substitutability, organizational knowledge and capabilities 
should also be valuable in the market. The present study suggests that an 
externally emerging activation trigger represents a sign that the existing 
strategies, as well as organizational knowledge and capabilities, may not be 
congruent with the external environment. Therefore, the firm is forced to stop and 
analyze the situation, search for more information about the emerging activation 
trigger, and find ways to adapt the existing capacities to the environmental 
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circumstances. Consequently, the IC of the firm becomes more valuable by being 
better aligned with the environmental circumstances.  
Managerial intervention in the context 
Whereas the definition of the desired outcome provides the direction in which the 
IC starts to evolve, the formal and informal communication, information-sharing, 
and decision-making structures facilitate the processes through which the IC 
evolves. These structures build up the context in which knowledge and 
capabilities are developed. Organizational hierarchy and procedures of 
communication represent formal structures, whereas organizational culture, 
personal relationships, and social ties build up informal structures for the creation 
and application of knowledge. It is possible to managerially intervene in the 
development of organizational knowledge and capabilities by building the firm’s 
formal structures. A general outline of the managerial role and the processes in 
which an activation trigger shapes the potential and realized capacities of the firm 
is illustrated in Figure 17. The opportunities for managerial intervention in 
creating a suitable context are elaborated in the left column. The organizational 
learning processes are drawn in the right column. The definition of organizational 
goals would lead the general direction of these processes, whereas the formal 
performance evaluation, communication, and decision-making structures would 
affect the smoothness of these processes.  
The processes start with performance evaluation procedures in which reports are 
presented in a monthly meeting or ongoing issues are simply analyzed during 
managers’ informal discussions. Usually the outcome measures are defined for a 
longer time period, such as a quarter or a year. Nevertheless, in the short run, the 
real performance indicators are the existence and intensity of an activation trigger. 
In many departments, operational performance is evaluated mainly based on the 
scope and intensity of the activation triggers. Hence, one of the roles of the 
reports and discussions is to discover these triggers. The narrative form of 
reporting, either in a combination of reports and structured meetings (in case A) 
or only in the form of ad hoc meetings (in case B), allow the detection of internal 
and external activation triggers. So, if there are no problems and unreasoned risks, 
the processes will continue according to the plans. Conversely, if there are 
obstacles and problems, then the second step is to initiate discussions and 
information searches to find a possible solution for the trigger.  
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Figure 17. The managerial role in building IC of the firm 
 
As a result of the trigger, the existing knowledge suddenly becomes incomplete 
(Turner & Makhija, 2006). It creates an impulse to re-evaluate the existing 
processes of the firm and search for additional information to fill the gap in 
existing knowledge. If the activation trigger is intense in terms of high risk to 
organizational performance, active knowledge exploration activities will take 
place. People who are accountable for the particular focal object initiate 
immediate searches of internal and external knowledge to address the trigger. At 
the same time, the desired outcome and the scope of the trigger would determine 
the kind of information that they will recognize as more valuable in addressing 
that trigger. If the activation trigger does not represent a high risk to 
organizational performance compared to other ongoing affairs, a passive 
knowledge exploration takes place. In the passive mode, people are not actively 
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engaged in resolving the situation. They merely stay alert to possible solutions. 
Thus, passive knowledge exploration means that the issue is “left on hold” until 
suitable knowledge emerges in the industry or during other activities of the firm. 
To enhance the processes of knowledge exploration, managers can intervene in 
the context in which the organizational learning processes take place. The firm 
can build formal structures for communication and decision-making. 
Organizational structure affects the efficiency of problem-solving (Becker & 
Baloff, 1969). In case A, a comprehensive system of meetings was built to 
enhance the knowledge acquisition and assimilation processes in the firm. In case 
B, the lack of formal systems created a significant role for informal structures in 
communication and decision-making. Sometimes, however, the activation triggers 
are so intense that the influence of the formal and informal structures of the firm 
is lower than the effect that comes from the trigger. The decision-specific 
characteristics, including the threat/crisis component, may have a larger influence 
on the process than the organizational and managerial context (Papadakis, 
Lioukas & Chambers, 1998).   
The third step is decision-making, that is, the choice between the possible actions. 
After knowledge exploration activities, the information base is wider, and it is 
possible to make a choice between a set of actions. Here, the definition of the 
outcome plays a significant role in directing the choice between the actions. The 
definition of organizational objectives and scarce resources plays a large role in 
choosing the possible actions, i.e., influencing the types of potential capacities 
that are going to be turned into realized capacities. Usually, the choice is made in 
favor of these kinds of actions that would maintain the initial journey toward the 
organizational goals. This is because of the stickiness and path dependency of 
organizational learning (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Levinthal & March, 1993). Overly rigid organizational goals would increase the 
path dependency even more.  
The fourth step is conducting the actions that would solve the situation and 
improve the firm’s existing capabilities. As a result of these processes, 
capabilities are extended in two primary ways (see also Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Grant, 1996b; Zahra & George, 2002). First, the existing capacities are exploited 
in new ways, or unused capacities are recognized and exploited. Second, new 
knowledge is acquired and assimilated in the firm to exploit the knowledge in 
new activities (i.e. new potential capacities are built and turned into realized 
capacities). Similar paths can also be detected in Appendix 6. In the first path, the 
potential capacity is recognized inside the organization, and in the second path, 
potential capacities are extended by externally acquired or internally generated 
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new knowledge. Both paths lead to the extension of organizational capabilities, 
that is, realized capacities of the firm. Some parallels can be drawn with single-
loop and double-loop learning (Argyris, 1978). In single-loop learning, 
capabilities can be extended without the extension of potential capacities. In 
double-loop learning, significant changes in potential capacities are conducted.  
The fifth step of the above-given processes (Figure 17) is necessary to 
institutionalize new (or usually modified) ways of doing things. It happens 
through establishing new technological practices, forming written instructions 
how to perform certain tasks, making changes in partnerships, or creating new 
rules of organizational behavior. In terms of IC categories, these kinds of changes 
would most commonly affect the structural and relational capital of the firm. 
The role of the present study is not to describe the processes of organizational 
learning but to outline the means of managerial intervention, however. First, the 
outcome controls affects the direction in which these processes would usually 
evolve, determining the strategically important domains of knowledge for the 
firm. Second, the managerial role is building a suitable context that shapes the 
procedures in which the activation triggers are detected, discussed, and acted 
upon (in the left column in Figure 17). The reporting and meetings procedures 
enable the discovery of activation triggers on time. The structures of the context 
that support interorganizational communication and decision-making also enable 
the firm to react to these triggers, facilitating the organizational learning 
processes. In addition, tools and procedures for recording and formalizing the 
changes enable the institutionalization of new capabilities of the firm. It was seen 
in case A that a comprehensive system of meetings was built to support outcome 
controls and induce knowledge integration mechanisms. In case B, the context 
evolved by itself, shaped by personal relationships and conventional lines of 
communication. As a result, people built their own structures of communication, 
creating peculiar ways of information sharing and decision-making, which 
consequently affected the organizational learning processes.   
To sum up the two case studies, it can be concluded that the development of 
organizationally valuable knowledge and capabilities is not a deliberate 
managerial agenda with a clear plan and acts of execution. It is rather an implicit 
endeavor, influenced by several means in which more visible kinds of phenomena 
are managed in the organization. Bijker and Law (1992: 7-8) have studied 
technologies and argued that technologies are not purely technological. They are 
highly heterogeneous and affected by social, political, economic, and professional 
skills and boundaries. Similarly, in the present case studies, the products that are 
developed and produced are not purely technological constructs. They are shaped 
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by numerous circumstances and activation triggers. The experiences and skills 
that are bundled with the activities around these products are shaped in a similar 
way. In this way, organizational knowledge and capabilities evolve along their 
firm-specific path, shaped by the internally and externally emerging activation 
triggers. Taken to another organization, for instance, similar knowledge and 
capabilities may start to take completely different forms and shapes as a response 
to new circumstances. 
The role of activation triggers is, however, not merely to affect the creation of IC 
in arbitrary ways but to show the absence of knowledge in the existing 
capabilities of the firm. Internally emerging triggers have the potential to show 
the inconsistency between the existing capabilities and organizational goals, 
whereas externally emerging activation triggers may show that the organizational 
capabilities are not aligned with the environmental circumstances. Reacting to 
these activation triggers makes organizational capabilities more valuable and 
dynamic in terms of the RBV. Despite the implicit nature of management, the 
interventionist power of management control determines the intensity of the 
activation triggers, affects the choices in reacting to these triggers, and allows the 
enhancement of the organizational learning processes. Hence, a combination of 
management systems and emerging triggers makes the path of the developing 
organizational capabilities highly firm-specific and unique. Consequently, these 
kinds of capabilities are most likely valuable, inimitable, and non-substitutable by 
competitors (Barney, 1991; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). 
4.3 Case study C 
4.3.1 Description of case C 
Overview of the firm 
Case company C was founded in the late 1990s. The company is significantly 
larger than the firms cited in the previous case studies, employing about 100 
employees and having several business units worldwide. The firm operates in the 
biomaterials’ sector, in a very fast-growing segment of the global orthopedics 
market (Bergeron & Chan, 2004), developing and producing biodegradable 
medical implants, such as biodegradable plates, screws, pins and membranes. 
This field and the other fields of pharmaceutical, agricultural, and medical biotech 
industries are very interdependent. The activities of the company are closely 
linked to the medical biotech industry in that the company produces enabling 
technologies that surgeons and other physicians can use in their practices.  
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The main difference from the other case firms is the rapid growth and 
multinational nature of the firm.  In addition to Finland, the company has 
corporate offices in the United States and Central Europe, and also several 
research centres and sales forces in other countries around the world. The firm has 
developed and launched 10 different product lines in over 40 countries in the 
fields of surgery, sports medicine and orthopedic traumas. It has more than 
doubled its sales in few years (2004-2007) as a result of new product releases and 
an increasing demand for its products.  
In this case firm, the general patterns of knowledge management are similar to 
those in cases A and B. The IC management is rather implicit, as there are no 
particular tools for identifying and measuring IC (patents being the only 
exception). Similarly to the previous case studies, there is no IC measurement and 
reporting in the firm in the way suggested in the literature. Most managerial 
attention is placed on three types of focal objects in the firm: (1) biodegradable 
materials and technologies at a stage of research, (2) products and technologies in 
development, and (2) the products that are already distributed in the market.  
The actions and general logic of organizational learning in addressing the 
activation triggers are similar to the previously discussed cases. As in cases A and 
B, case company C also uses an outcome control in most of its functional areas. 
The general role of outcome controls in building the IC of the firm is the same. 
The outcome definitions determine the disciplines and functional areas of 
knowledge that are beneficial in reaching the desired end. The actions and general 
logic employed in addressing the activation triggers are also similar to the 
previous case studies. The main difference lies in the scale of these processes, 
crossing multinational boundaries of the firm. 
There are some differences and additional evidence, however, which emerged in 
case study C. The case study shows how the formal and informal structures of the 
context affect the creation of the potential and realized capacities of the firm, 
generating the circumstances in which the firm suddenly realizes that there is too 
much knowledge in the firm. In the following sections the formal and informal 
structures of the context are described along with the effects on the potential and 
realized capacities of the firm. During the field visits for case study C, issues of 
excess knowledge exploration emerged that eventually forced the top managers to 
rebuild the context in which knowledge was created and applied in the firm. Thus, 
the case study shows the circumstances that finally led to the firm changing its 
forms of managerial intervention, and paying more attention to the potential 
capacity of the firm. The study shows the circumstances that led the firm towards 
a more explicit kind of knowledge and IC management. 
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Formal structures of the context 
Compared to the previous case firms, the present firm is significantly larger in its 
scale and representative structures. The comprehensive formal structures are built 
to manage organizational actions according to the restrictions that are represented 
by three competing discourses – the economic, legal and regulatory.  In order to 
effectively manage organizational actions in considering these discourses, various 
formal structures are built covering the areas from R&D, manufacturing processes 
to distribution and marketing.  
To cope with the economic discourse, a comprehensive system of strategic and 
operating planning has been built with budgeting and outcome indicators. The 
accounting department with several accountants and controllers manages a 
thorough system of budgetary control in which the budgets of business units and 
organizational departments are monitored on a quarterly basis. The information 
flows via accountants and controllers, however, include hardly any non-financial 
data that could refer to IC. The accounting department produces reports that 
contain only numbers. The controller states: “Headcount is the only one, which is 
not monetary, but a number anyway”. The real story about the results of each 
department is not handled by the accounting department but represented in a set 
of monthly indicators and short narratives by each department manager. These 
reports are collected and presented via other channels to senior management. In 
that way, the control of the processes and results of the firm is highly supported 
by reports other than those contributed by accountants.   
Legal and regulatory discourses force the firm to adapt its activities to a number 
of regulatory restrictions. It is important to combine technological and scientific 
knowledge with the knowledge of quality systems and approval procedures of 
regulatory affairs. Therefore, the comprehensive quality system provides a 
significant part of the formal structures that determine the rules of action in most 
of the departments, especially in the production and R&D departments. The 
comprehensive and strict design control has proved to be effective in gathering 
professional knowledge and analysis of issues from different fields, such as 
biology, engineering, marketing and production. It has allowed the firm to bring 
products to market (including the regulatory clearances) in an efficient manner.  
At the time of the first half of the field visits in the winter of 2005/2006, the 
company had a flat functional management structure. The seven departments of 
the company were organized around the main functions of the firm, such as R&D, 
operations, new business development, finance and administration, marketing and 
sales, and quality. The top management got the information about the 
performance of each function of the firm based on monthly reports from the 
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senior managers. Since the results of each department were often dependent on 
the activities of other departments, it required lots of communication and 
coordination of activities across different functions of the firm.  
The decentralized structure had been combined with a strict system of 
documentation, storing information about each decision and activity in special 
databases. Databases have been built in order to create an institutional memory 
and share information across the whole organization. All the documents are 
signed and shared in electronic form. In addition, in some functional areas, 
product development for instance, there are approvals systems the directors have 
to validate for each completed task. For instance, the director of product 
development has to approve the deliverables in the system. When his subordinates 
have completed a particular task, they send him a draft of the written document 
about the results of the task. The Director of Product Development gets it via an 
electronic system, reviews it, and signs it electronically, or sends it back with 
comments appended.   
The quality system and outcome controls include numerous structured meetings. 
Since the desired outcome is often defined for the team not for a single person, 
people are forced to communicate having an additional number of unstructured ad 
hoc meetings. Group level responsibilities and the development of products that 
span the organizational units force the firm to maintain a large number of 
meetings to integrate relevant knowledge. To facilitate all that communication 
and to store important information, special electronic team-rooms have been 
developed. Team-rooms are integrated groupware environments for electronic 
communication and information-sharing. These enable the firm to gather and 
share specific kinds of knowledge related to focal objects and processes of the 
firm.  
Thus, an important role of managers has been to develop a suitable context in the 
form of information sharing tools and databases. The documentation and signing 
procedures are in electronic form. The web-based team-rooms are used to store a 
considerable amount of formal and informal information. All kinds of plans and 
reports, full accounts of discussions and arguments occurring during decision-
making are all saved in the files of the team-room system. Since managers cannot 
always be physically around due to the geographical location of the headquarters 
team-rooms become more and more valuable for communication. The opening of 
clinical centres in Europe and North America (16-17 centres altogether) has 
increased the significance of team-rooms in sharing relevant information and 
coordinating activities.  
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Team-rooms are also used for the kind of decision-making that requires a large 
amount of information and acceptance from many managers and specialists in the 
firm. During the discussions, different specialists add their opinion and relevant 
information to the topic in the form of additional text and attached files. The 
electronic discussion is open as long as everybody has agreed and approved the 
documents. In this way, the team-room enables the firm to gather necessary 
information and knowledge from people to build a package of knowledge about a 
specific topic. Moreover, the topic that is usually discussed is closely related to 
some focal object of the firm and its activation triggers along the path to the 
desired outcome. 
The structure and exploitation of these team-rooms is flexible, however. Each 
department has created its own ways of communicating and restoring the 
discussions. Top managers have left the middle managers to run the team-rooms 
in the way that is most convenient for them. Therefore, in some departments the 
relevance of team-rooms is more significant than in others. The most 
comprehensive team-rooms are related to R&D, intellectual property rights (IPR), 
quality assurance and control, and the general management of the firm. There are 
also team-rooms specifically related to the external activation triggers that come 
from the changing environment. The IPR manager continuously monitors the 
activities of about 50 competitors which is reflected by providing short overviews 
of critical activation triggers into a specific team-room.  
Informal structures of the context 
Despite the comprehensive formal structures, organizational members have a 
large degree of autonomy in choosing their ways of doing things. People even feel 
that the majority of communication and activities are organized in rather informal 
ways. Above the formal structures of the organization there is a significant 
amount of self-regulation and informal lines of communication and action. 
Managers grant high degrees of autonomy to the employees of research, 
development, marketing, legal affairs and other departments (the production 
department being an exception). The clear definition of the targets provides a lot 
of freedom for people to choose the most appropriate actions. In relation to 
performance, then top and middle level managers ask their subordinates to only 
notify them about emerging problems. There is a high level of trust and 
confidence in employees. The director of development, for instance, does not 
require any written overview of the triggers between the different stages of the 
project. The information flows smoothly by e-mails, meetings and phone calls. He 
claims:  
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“The question is…within the phases, why would you like to know all the 
details within the phase. If you have a group of lets say ten people working 
on it, people you trust and people that have delivered what they promised 
for years before, why would you stick your nose in there saying “I need to 
know about this, I need to know about that” This is … micromanagement. 
The project is a project and they are fully responsible for what they are 
doing.” 
Managers explain the autonomy by the need to maintain a motivational 
environment. As one division managers says, “My philosophy has always been – 
if I do not hear anything, then it is running OK!”  If there is a problem, then 
middle level managers do not usually load their subordinates with written reports 
about these bottlenecks, but encourage them to present their problems in a 
meeting or notify them by e-mail. So, in spite of the formal reporting system the 
ongoing information about the emerging activation triggers is disseminated 
informally mainly via phone-call, e-mail or face-to-face discussion. The Director 
of R&D explains: 
“The company is still small enough that you can manage it by walking 
around and it does not take that much time per day to understand. A half an 
hour just walking and try to keep the finger on the pulse of what is 
happening.”  
The senior managers are confident that they are always informed about the critical 
issues. As the director of R&D says:  “… they [indicating his subordinates] will 
come to me, if there is anything that needs to be resolved”. Only middle level 
managers report these bottlenecks further to the level of top managers in a more 
formal fashion. Moreover, in meetings, only the kinds of bottlenecks that cannot 
be solved by the project manager himself are discussed.  
High levels of autonomy and self-control are combined with encouraging 
leadership from the top managers. Top managers pay special attention to creating 
an encouraging and motivational environment. There is a highly informal 
information flow across all managerial levels of the organization. A “human 
touch” is visible in the form of continuous reflection and feedback that top 
managers provide to the organizational members at all levels. There is an open 
dialogue through the different levels of management and across the functions of 
the organization. The CEO reveals: 
“People know very well what has been done in the organization and by the 
top-managers. That is the signal towards the employees that there is a 
culture of trust and a culture of belief.” 
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Interviewees enthusiastically tell how important are the CEO’s and other top-level 
managers’ comments and advice that they receive face-to-face in brief 
discussions, through e-mail or just in the form of a short comment in some team-
room. For instance, such short comments as “Great!” and “Good job!” provided 
by the CEO give organizational members the motivation and confidence to make 
their own decisions. 
The combination of a high degree of autonomy, encouraging leadership and clear 
definitions of desired outcomes plays a significant role in building enthusiasm 
and motivation among staff. A significant goal of management has been to 
nourish an organizational culture of innovation. It can be seen at all levels of 
management and in the different functions of the organization that people are very 
proud of the innovative products of the firm, and happy to provide their skills and 
capabilities for the success of the firm. People like their organization very much 
and everybody wants to make a contribution. They are highly inspired and proud 
of their work, constantly aiming for better outcomes and improvements to 
organizational processes. Every member of the organization is eager to find new 
ways of doing things and communicating ideas to the others. Many interviewees 
excitedly tell how they have provided new ideas and solutions for the firm and 
how the motivational environment and good leadership has encouraged them to 
do so.  
The organization has a strong culture of communication and knowledge sharing. 
There are many meetings on a wide array of topics and involving participants 
with varied backgrounds. In addition to the structured meetings, ad hoc meetings 
are very common in everyday practice. Each activation trigger will be discussed 
with others and often a meeting scheduled for wider discussion. In addition, in 
order to nourish the innovativeness of the firm, there are also meetings that do not 
aim to solve concrete triggers but which may “create” new ones. One project 
manager describes the meetings thus: 
“So, necessarily we do not make any big decisions in that kind of meeting, 
but rather … it is kind of brainstorming environment when we get new 
questions more than answers, I would say. And all the people might throw 
in some new ideas and then you need to start solving those problems.”  
Thus, in addition to discussing the existing activation triggers they find more 
activation triggers in these brainstorming sessions. Thus, there are a number of 
informal meetings every week and lots of discussions via e-mail and phone calls. 
Often weekly calendars of organizational members are full of all kinds of 
meetings to conduct numerous discussions within or across different departments 
of the firm.   
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The effects of the context 
At a point in time, however, people started to feel that the growing level of 
collaboration in the organization starts to hinder the progress of the firm. During 
the period of the interviews, the firm was growing rapidly, new people were 
continuously being hired and new projects started. At the same time the 
management of the company was still based on a flat organizational structure, and 
having a culture of sharing and open communication. It seemed that the 
organization reached a point of having too much knowledge exploration 
activities, especially activities of knowledge integration that generated enormous 
amounts of potential capacities at lower management levels. For the general 
overview of the situation, see also figure 18. 
People recognized that there are limits to knowledge integration.  There is a limit 
to the amount of communication in team-rooms, e-mails and meetings that one is 
able to read and respond to. Most of the interviewees described at least three 
formal meetings that they regularly attended in addition to the large number of ad 
hoc meetings that filled their diaries. The number of meetings eventually reached 
a maximum, taking a lot of management time. At that point many managers 
started to feel that they needed fewer meetings but with better focus. As 
Divisional Manager reports: 
“I try to stay away from meetings that are not clearly focused on something 
that needs to be clearly resolved. Because there is a meeting mania in this 
building!” 
Managers began to suggest that instead of scheduling meetings, five-minute talks 
over a coffee might be preferable, since the number of meetings was starting to 
take people away from their real productive activities; the activities through 
which the things that had been discussed in the meetings should finally be turned 
into actions.  
In parallel, electronic team-rooms started to become overwhelmed with 
information. At one point, managers started to claim that there was too much 
information and knowledge everywhere. As one of the managers said: 
“… databases, team-rooms, there is so much information that I do not think 
anybody knows in the company, all that is stored there. It is a very safe 
statement to say that ‘it is in a quality system or it is in a database’, because 
it is most probably there, but whether you can find it, is a different story.” 
Thus, much of information existed in the system but its potential remained unused 
in building the capacities of the firm. People started to have difficulties finding 
necessary information. 
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Figure 18. Changes in managerial intervention 
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People who used to be close to decision-making and had usually provided their 
opinion suddenly realized that they were not able to follow any more. Many 
people admitted that they did not understand the ongoing issues any more, since 
there was too much to read and discuss all the time.  One of the managers says: 
“I used to be very close to the R&D and know exactly what was going on 
there but I would say that now I would not be able to keep up anymore.” 
An overload of written information in team-rooms (often semi-structured) and 
databases created a need to have even more  face-to-face communication, because 
it was easier to ask the right person than do the information search on your own 
from the team-rooms. People increased the direct communication by asking for all 
kinds of technical, as well as sales and marketing information, directly from 
people who held such information. So the amount of short informal discussions 
and e-mails increased even more. Often it became difficult to reach people since 
they were already very busy communicating with other colleagues. 
Consequently, people were busy with knowledge exploration activities in the 
firm. A large amount of data, information, thoughts and ideas was created at 
lower levels of the organization. For all kinds of matters in the firm, there was 
lots of information and knowledge that people could not assimilate anymore. It 
became more and more time-consuming to filter valuable knowledge and transfer 
it into the realized capacities of the firm. At the same time new strategies of the 
firm were developed at higher levels of the organization, to enhance 
organizational growth and to extend the organizational capabilities to new 
therapeutic fields and markets. However, top-level managers started to realize that 
new business strategies could not be executed while retaining the existing 
structures of the firm. They recognized that there was too much knowledge to 
handle at lower levels of management. Thus, they realized that in order to manage 
the growth of the firm and develop organizational capabilities, they needed to 
change something in the organization.  
Changes in managerial intervention 
Firstly, the top managers restructured the organization, building a more 
hierarchical management structure for the firm. Large amounts of information 
about internal and external problems, as well as the numerous ideas from staff, 
were difficult to handle in a highly decentralized structure. The CEO explains the 
necessary changes in the structure: 
 “We have had quite a bit of discussion about these things now. There is a 
limit to how much an organization can swallow at any particular time. […] 
We cannot afford to keep everybody informed in the organization as we 
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used to in the early days. Otherwise we would be all sitting in meetings, just 
hearing what somebody else is doing. We cannot share all the information 
and knowledge any more. So, you have to focus on your area, remain 
informed about that and trust that other people are competent at doing what 
they are supposed to be doing.” 
The idea of restructuring was to make business units more independent of each 
other, being able to lead the processes of focal objects without constantly having 
face-to-face meetings with other functions of the firm. Some interaction was left 
but was no longer on a daily basis. The Director of R&D explains:  
“There are different geographical units that generate their own systems. I 
mean, it is similar, it is parallel, but there is less and less interaction. As I 
see it, there would perhaps in the future be a third and perhaps a fourth 
group and the internal groups here would be divided into smaller sub-
groups. We will have a number of parallel systems.” 
Secondly, managers started to improve the electronic team-rooms, structuring the 
topics of the discussions and file systems. More careful planning of the general 
structure of the team-room system and access of the team-rooms was conducted. 
In addition, managers found that training of the employees is necessary to make 
the application of the team-rooms more consistent across the organization. 
Thirdly, in addition to these changes managerial attention was directed to 
knowledge – individual and organizational level potential capacities, in particular. 
During the rapid growth of the firm a significant amount of individual or group 
level potential capacities had been generated in the form of new ideas. A large 
number of ideas, however, made the firm unable to effectively select those ideas 
that were worth further consideration. Too many ideas compared to the limited 
resources, required more careful analysis before a decision could be made. The 
Technical Director of Marketing explains: 
 “When we were a smaller company, it was easier to communicate and 
information was floating around everywhere and everybody was aware of 
what was going on and decision-making was much easier. Now, we are a 
bigger company, not very big yet, just a hundred people, but we are present 
in different places, the UK, the United Arab Emirates, the USA, the Far 
East and Finland. Communication has become more difficult. We realized 
that we need to have a more structured way to handle these ideas. We saw 
that decision-making is difficult. Even, if we wanted to make some new 
products to get the idea evaluated and make a decision to start this process it 
was sometimes difficult and took a very long time.” 
These difficulties were caused by a large number of ideas and too much 
unstructured information and knowledge about these ideas. In addition, necessary 
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knowledge was sometimes located in geographically distinct places. Therefore, a 
central system to screen and select ideas became necessary. The idea evaluation 
system was built to systematically select the ideas that the firm would invest in – 
to engage people and finances in building new realized capacities for the firm.  
Challenges in focusing on knowledge 
The purpose of the idea evaluation system was to efficiently gather, process and 
prioritize existing data related to particular focal objects. It was necessary to 
analyze the opportunities presented by single idea against the organizational 
resources and strategies, analyze its suitability for existing products and 
processes, as well as the possible allocation of financial resources. Further, it was 
necessary to organize the soft issues related to each idea to have a more structured 
overview of what the organization actually knows about each idea. Therefore, the 
information about markets, customers, competitors, technologies and legislation 
had to be systematized in order to get the whole picture of each idea.   
The purpose of the whole process was to filter valuable potential capacities that 
would be beneficial in building new organizational capabilities. The system was 
expected to ensure a more structured search of data and analysis before decision-
making. The collected data was expected to represent a comprehensive set of 
information about each idea. Necessary documents were analyzed and stored in 
the specific team-room for idea evaluation. Collected information was further 
discussed in a discussion forum composed of internal and external experts to 
analyze the idea and the existing capabilities of the firm. In order to choose the 
best ideas, the managers agreed that “an idea needs to be made explicit”. Making 
the idea explicit meant that all the existing knowledge and information related to 
a particular idea had to be expressed in an easily readable format, a format that 
would help managers to compare and select the best ideas. All the existing 
knowledge relating to a particular idea was to be summarized in shorter reports, 
such as idea screening sheets and idea evaluation sheets. A shorter format was 
expected to provide a better summary of the idea and to lead to decision-making 
in which valuable ideas could be turned into actions (i.e. realized capacities).  
As managers started to gather ideas into the new system and evaluate them, 
several challenges emerged. They found that much of the data they wished to 
gather resided in people’s heads or in too wide an array of other sources 
(documents, e-mails, oral communications etc). They realized that gut feelings 
and visions were mixed with the facts and that it was very difficult to gather and 
structure such a mixture in an objective way. People felt that they knew much 
more than the idea evaluation reports were showing them, and so questioned the 
validity of the content of the reports. It was difficult to reduce the rich context of 
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each situation into charts and tables. Consequently, the decision-making choices 
of the best ideas, was still largely based on knowledge residing in people’s heads 
rather than in idea evaluation sheets. 
Still, the idea evaluation system was not a failure. It was useful for structuring 
different kinds of information. People were quite happy that the system helped 
them to organize information related to the ideas, since it allowed them to see the 
general picture and show the relevant matters related to each idea. The structure 
of the idea evaluation system and its related databases helped in identifying 
matters based on quantitative data; nevertheless, the real value of each idea still 
emerged through informal discussions relying on personal experience and beliefs. 
Sometimes the information from the idea evaluation system was used to gain 
some confidence and justification for beliefs. Thus, in general, the system 
represented a good way to structure and retrieve information, but did not replace 
knowledge. People still persisted with informal ways of analyzing matters, 
sometimes without even using the idea evaluation system. The actual decision-
making was often based on something invisible, not based on written evaluation 
matrices.  
To sum up, the overwhelming amount of potential capacities forced managers to 
change the organizational structure, improve the database and team-room 
infrastructure and direct managerial attention towards knowledge. The 
representation of information in spreadsheets and reports did not, however, enable 
management to represent knowledge or fully account for decision-making. The 
basis of actual decision-making often included something else not present in the 
idea evaluation reports. People knew more than it was possible to show in these 
spreadsheets. Nevertheless, they found the system useful in structuring important 
matters about each idea. When asked about any further plans for IC measurement 
and reporting, managers were quite determined: “No, I do not think so, at the 
moment. We are pretty much happy with what we have.”  
4.3.2 Discussion 
The effects of the context  
Case C demonstrates that the context in which knowledge is created and exploited 
(in terms of the knowledge triangle) has a significant impact on knowledge 
integration in the firm. The formal and informal structures of the firm, as well as 
technological tools, influence the ways in which potential capacities are created in 
the firm. A highly decentralized management system with a low level of 
bureaucracy enabled rich communication in the organization. People were used to 
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sharing their ideas and information with other staff members. Literature has also 
shown that less bureaucratic organizational structures facilitate better knowledge 
integration (Serenko, Bontis & Hardie, 2007). Flat and decentralized management 
structures especially support knowledge integration mechanisms (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995). Serenko, Bontis and Hardie (2007) suggest that internal 
compensation structures and rewards are necessary to motivate people to 
communicate and share their knowledge.  In case C, however, knowledge sharing 
was motivated without particular rewards for such behavior, but induced by 
facilitating formal structures, an organizational culture of innovation, sharing and 
open communication, as well as the high level of autonomy of the employees.   
It is possible, however, that formal and informal structures of the organization 
encourage too much sharing and knowledge integration at lower levels of the 
organization. Consequently, the staff becomes entirely occupied with knowledge 
exploration activities. In this way a firm builds potential capacities but risks 
lacking the time necessary for productive action. This leads to a risk of inhibiting 
the development of realized capacities, or constraining the smooth development 
of organizational capabilities. Especially when the number of personnel is 
growing, potential capacities start to rapidly increase at lower levels of the 
organization. It becomes difficult to filter these potential capacities and make 
them available to people in other departments who could turn the capacities into 
productive action (i.e. realized capacities).  
A parallel can be drawn with the tension in balancing knowledge exploration and 
exploitation activities (March, 1991). Weiping (2006: 149) suggests that it is 
necessary to balance knowledge exploration and exploitation in order not to lead 
the firm into competency traps. There are two types of competency traps that may 
occur. Competency trap I occurs in the case of excessive engagement in 
exploitation of knowledge, whereas competency trap II occurs in the case of 
excessive exploration of knowledge, which means the main focus is on 
exploration of knowledge without its application in productive activities 
(Weiping, 2006, p. 149). Excess knowledge exploration may hinder 
organizational learning, since organizational learning requires not only an 
increase of knowledge but the transfer of knowledge into action (Argyris, 1978). 
Without changes in management structure and information processing, case firm 
C would have finally fallen into competency trap II – the increase of potential 
capacities without an increase in the firm’s overall performance. Weiping (2006) 
connects knowledge exploration with an excessive acquisition of external 
knowledge. This case study shows, however, that excessive knowledge 
exploration may also happen internally.  
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Thus, in order to avoid the possible competency trap, changes in organizational 
structure became necessary to cope with the increased scale of knowledge. The 
basis for larger scale of knowledge becomes difficult to integrate into the firm's 
capabilities, requiring a better infrastructure and more structured information 
sharing. Therefore, the organizational chart of the firm was restructured from the 
previously flat structure to more hierarchical lines of reporting and 
communication. With the increase of formal structures and hierarchies, intra-
organizational knowledge integration can be reduced (Serenko, Bontis & Hardie, 
2007). In a more hierarchical management structure knowledge integration 
mainly takes place along the vertical lines of the organization, and less along its 
horizontal lines. Consequently capabilities become integrated at higher levels of 
the organization (Grant, 1996a).  
Explicit knowledge management  
The case study shows the circumstances in which managers may be forced to turn 
their attention to knowledge (potential capacities in particular), trying to measure 
and report IC – the ideas and knowledge which relate to these ideas. Since the 
firm had an overload of potential capacities, it was necessary to filter more 
valuable capacities for further action. The large amount of potential capacities 
showed that measures might be necessary to diminish information overload and 
make the selection process of valuable potential capacities easier for those who 
have to make decisions. 
The system played a role in attracting the attention of staff, and directing it 
towards the important factors which make a piece of knowledge relevant for the 
firm. The case study shows, however, that the evaluation reports helped to 
structure information but did not reflect the actual knowledge that the idea was 
related to. Structured information about markets, customers, competitors, 
technologies and legislation did not reflect the overall knowledge, but only some 
identifiable part of it. People still believed that they knew more than could be 
expressed in short evaluation charts. They felt that knowledge reduced to a form 
of structured information did not reflect its real value, nor was the information 
represented in idea evaluation reports as trusted as knowledge that resided in the 
minds of colleagues. Similarly, Habersam and Piber  (2003) conducted case 
studies in two hospitals and found that IC metrics were generally seen as useful, 
but reflecting only “a narrow detail of the complex whole”. Their case studies 
showed that there is much in IC that cannot be explained in written reports; 
nonetheless, this role of IC is very powerful in decision-making. For the same 
reasons the decision-making in case study C was still based on something 
invisible rather than information in idea evaluation charts. Beliefs, intuition and 
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hunches are still an important part of decision-making, sometimes being even 
more important than information in spreadsheets.  
To sum up, the main role of the above case study was to show the circumstances 
in which managers may be forced to make changes in their means of managerial 
intervention in building organizational capabilities. The case study showed how 
strongly encouraging formal and informal structures of the context can lead to 
excessive knowledge exploration, which may hinder the creation of 
organizational capabilities. The increase in knowledge exploration activities 
creates lots of potential capacities, which consequently force managers to change 
the structures of the context and direct their attention to the information and 
knowledge held by the firm (i.e. a part of the potential capacities).   
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5 THE THEORY OF IMPLICIT KNOWLEDGE 
MANAGEMENT 
This chapter serves to align the previous chapters with the theory that explains 
how the creation and application of organizationally valuable knowledge can be 
affected by managerial intervention. The chapter draws on the knowledge triangle 
introduced earlier, the framework of knowledge flows and the types of managerial 
intervention along with the results of the case studies. It provides theoretical 
propositions about the mechanisms and the effects of implicit knowledge 
management on building valuable IC of the firm. The first section of this chapter 
outlines the premises behind and the definitions of the theory. The second section 
introduces the theoretical propositions about the types of managerial intervention 
and their effect on knowledge flows.  The final section outlines the theoretical and 
practical value of the theory.  
5.1 Premises and definitions associated with the theory 
Scholars claim that the literature of the RBV has not been able to provide 
satisfactory suggestions as to how to manage the most valuable resources the firm 
has (Spender & Grant, 1996; Williamson, 1999; Priem & Butler, 2001). 
Williamson (1999: 1093-1094) has argued that the knowledge-based and 
competence-based views result in instructions that are too wide and do not 
provide a satisfactory explanation for managers to act upon. Quite similarly, it has 
been claimed that knowledge and IC literature has had difficulty in developing 
and testing management methods that would satisfy the needs of managers (Marr, 
Gray & Neely, 2003; Kaufmann & Schneider, 2004). Scholars claim that there is 
a high level of diffusion in the purposes and issues that knowledge and IC 
management methods address (Scarbrough & Swan, 2001; Andriessen, 2006). 
Wilson (2002) has reviewed knowledge management literature and suggests that 
none of the knowledge management activities cited are actually concerned with 
the management of knowledge. Styhre (2003: 79) has suggested that knowledge 
management is: “best thought of as a loosely coupled patchwork of activities and 
ideas.” Hence, knowledge management consists of rather tentative and pluralistic 
practices (McNamara, Baxter & Chua, 2004), including almost everything but 
nothing particularly concrete that can be termed knowledge management.  
The present study argues that such confusion emerges due to an insufficient 
understanding of what is actually managed and what are the effects of 
management. Obviously it is not possible to define a complete toolbox of 
knowledge and IC management, but we can improve our understanding about the 
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general mechanisms in which knowledge is affected by different types of 
managerial intervention. To achieve this, the present study outlines the theoretical 
propositions about the objects and effects of management.  
There are several requirements for a good theoretical framework. A theoretical 
framework should identify the phenomenon of interest, provide the key premises 
(Bacharach, 1989), and explain the relationships among the elements in the 
framework (Whetten, 1989; Sutton & Staw, 1995; Weick, 1995). In short, a 
theory must answer the question of what, how and why (Whetten, 1989). The 
present section identifies the phenomena of interest (i.e. the question of what) and 
provides the three key premises of the framework. The main elements of the 
theory (the question of what) were already introduced and discussed in earlier 
chapters, however. The general basis of the theory is the knowledge triangle, 
which was introduced in chapter 2.2. The creation of organizational knowledge 
and capabilities with knowledge flows were explained in chapters 2.2 and 2.3.  
Further, the types of managerial intervention and implicit knowledge management 
were discussed in chapters 3 and 4, showing the implicit kinds of knowledge 
management also in the three case studies. Therefore, it should only be necessary 
in this section to furnish a brief reminder of these elements. The next section will 
provide theoretical propositions about the relationships between these elements, 
in other words, it will concentrate on the questions of how and why. 
The main phenomenon of interest is implicit knowledge management. To clarify 
the terminology: the present study applies the term implicit knowledge 
management when referring to the modes of managerial intervention in which 
knowledge and IC is not objectified but managerial focus is on other 
organizational phenomena, consequently affecting organizational knowledge and 
capabilities22. Knowledge is bundled with various objects, processes and 
relationships in the organization (Latour, 1987; Mouritsen and Larsen, 2005: 
373). In implicit knowledge management, managerial intervention is directed at 
various visible objects that are bundled with knowledge. On the other hand, 
knowledge management is considered to be explicit when managerial attention is 
on knowledge – managers take (or are advised to take) purposeful actions to 
                                                 
 
22
 The terms explicit and implicit management are also used in the fields of computer technology 
and information systems (Sen, 2004). The term explicit management refers to a case where an 
operator is responsible for the initiation of operations actively choosing the managerial action. 
The term implicit management, applied as the opposite of explicit management, referring to a 
case where a direct operator’s intervention is not needed, since the functions are performed 
automatically.  
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identify and report the valuable knowledge of an organization, concentrating on 
its development, leverage and efficient application in the organization.  
The feasibility and the effects of explicit knowledge management have already 
been extensively debated in the relevant literature (see e.g., Spender, 1996; 
Pfeffer & Sutton, 1999; Johnson, 2002; Chaharbaghi & Sandy, 2006). The role of 
the present study is to show the relevance of implicit knowledge management. 
Hence, the focus of the following discussion is implicit knowledge management. 
Three types of managerial intervention are considered to constitute implicit 
knowledge management:  
1. Managerial intervention in the context in which knowledge is developed and 
exploited,  
2. Managerial intervention in the behavior of human actor(s), 
3. Managerial intervention that is directed at knowledge object(s). 
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Figure 19. The elements of the theoretical framework 
 
The three types of managerial intervention have their particular effects on 
knowledge flows of the firm. Figure 19 summarizes the types of managerial 
intervention and knowledge flows. Knowledge flows and their underlying 
processes of organizational learning were introduced in chapter 2.2.3. In general, 
the firm increases its capacities starting with knowledge exploration activities. 
Knowledge is acquired in the form of data or information from the external 
environment, and further transformed into the other forms and dimensions of 
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knowledge. In short, knowledge flows and transforms between the following 
dimensions in the firm:   
1. Individual and organizational level knowledge, 
2. Potential and realized capacities of the firm, 
3. Incongruent and congruent types of capacities in terms of their alignment with 
the strategies and environmental circumstances of the firm. 
In regarding these dimensions of knowledge, two assumptions are made (see also 
chapter 2.3). First, managers are expected to choose the strategies according to 
their perception of a firm’s existing resources and environmental circumstances. 
Second, managers constantly adapt the definition of a strategy to environmental 
circumstances, but changes in organizational knowledge and capabilities take 
time. This means that there is often a gap between the chosen strategies and 
existing capabilities of the firm. Hence, one of the managerial roles is to diminish 
this gap by building knowledge and capabilities which are more congruent with 
the organizational strategies and external environment. In terms of the RBV’s 
resource attributes, this makes organizational knowledge and capabilities more 
valuable in achieving competitive advantage. 
This section recalled the main elements in the theoretical framework. Now it is 
necessary to detail the relationships between these elements to explain the effects 
of implicit knowledge management. Therefore, the next section provides 
theoretical propositions about the relationships between the types of managerial 
intervention and knowledge flows. 
5.2 Theoretical propositions 
The following discussion outlines the essential elements of the theory, addressing 
the question of how and why (Whetten, 1989). It provides the theoretical 
propositions about the main ways in which organizational knowledge and 
capabilities can be implicitly affected. These propositions are further related to 
Barney’s (1991) resource attributes, namely the value, inimitability and non-
substitutability of a resource23. The terms potential and realized capacity (Zahra & 
George, 2002) are applied in the subsequent propositions.  
                                                 
 
23
 Rareness of a resource is not considered here, since rareness does not merely depend on the 
intrinsic characteristics of a resource and managerial methods, but also depends on its 
uniqueness in the market.  
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The opportunities available to management and the effects they may occasion 
depend on the nature of the processes that generate knowledge flows. The 
processes of organizational learning, such as knowledge acquisition, assimilation 
(or transformation) and exploitation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 
2002), also known as knowledge exploration and exploitation (March, 1991), 
were introduced in chapter 2.2.3. The effects of implicit knowledge management 
depend on how observable and predictable these processes are for the managers 
of the firm and where the effects of knowledge emerge. March (1999) has 
suggested that processes of organizational learning differ in their predictability 
and determination. Processes of knowledge exploration are barely observable and 
are difficult to predict. There are no visible or explicitly definable returns before 
knowledge exploitation takes place. Processes of knowledge acquisition and 
assimilation may generate only knowledge about some thing, about some 
knowledge object, but have no influence on the physical properties of that object. 
These processes may evolve pure knowledge without affecting the properties of 
knowledge objects, because learning can take place without manipulation of the 
object that one learns about24. The process of knowledge exploitation is more 
predictable and visible for the managers, embodying immediate returns of action 
and, thus, having a direct effect on knowledge objects (March, 1999).  
It is easier to direct managerial intervention to the items and activities where the 
effect of knowledge becomes visible. It is significantly easier to affect the 
behavior of organizational members than to affect the creation of individual and 
collective abilities which their behavior is based on. Knowledge acquisition and 
assimilation (including knowledge integration) processes are not manageable by 
behavioral instructions due to the equifinality of the capabilities. Equifinality 
means that capability can be developed from many starting points and along 
different paths, but the final outcome will be generally the same (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000). Due to the equifinality of the capabilities it is not possible to 
construct the complete lines of actions that lead to the desired potential capacity 
of the firm.  This is especially true since the processes of knowledge acquisition 
and assimilation vary to a great extent. In principle, the timing and the types of 
knowledge, as well as specific strategies for knowledge acquisition cannot be pre-
determined. The strategies for knowledge acquisition vary according to the 
context and specifics of knowledge, including open-ended search activities, trial 
and error, risk taking, experimentation and discovery with a high degree of 
                                                 
 
24
 Of course, the processes of knowledge exploration and exploitation can also take place 
simultaneously (i.e., learning-by-doing) without any time lag between these processes (Zahra & 
George, 2002). In this case the effect of knowledge emerges immediately.  
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subjectivity (Nonaka, 1994; March, 1999). Therefore, Alvesson (2001) argues 
that behavioral instructions are not applicable in building organizational 
knowledge and capabilities. 
The present argument is that managerial intervention in context influences the 
environment in which the processes of knowledge exploration take place, 
consequently encouraging the kind of learning processes that do not have directly 
visible returns. There are many individual and organizational factors that may 
either hinder or encourage the processes of knowledge acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation and integration (see Appendix 7). Managers have various 
opportunities (such as creating organizational structures and communication 
procedures) to influence these organizational factors. By influencing the context it 
is possible to increase the potential capacities of the firm and affect the flows 
from individual to organizational level knowledge and capabilities (see also Table 
6). 
Proposition 1: Managerial intervention in the context enables an increase in 
potential capacities and generates knowledge flows from the individual 
level to organizational level knowledge. 
Several scholars suggest that a suitable working environment nurtures knowledge 
integration and communicative actions in the organization (e.g., Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 1996a; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; O’Donnell, O’Regan 
& Coates, 2000). The case studies cited here also show that managerial 
intervention in the context may encourage or hinder knowledge exploration, 
consequently affecting the potential capacities of the firm. Case C in particular 
showed how the context influenced the creation of potential capacities and 
knowledge integration mechanisms of the firm. In terms of Barney’s (1991) 
resource attributes, managerial intervention in the context  encourages the 
creation of inimitable and non-substitutable knowledge, but the firm has less 
control over the value of such knowledge in terms of its usefulness in a particular 
market situation. Of course, by encouraging a positive working environment and 
interactive communication of the organization’s goals, people can be motivated to 
learn things and behave in ways that contribute to organizational goals. 
Nevertheless, the managerial power of these methods is rather limited and it is 
often difficult to guarantee that learning is congruent with the organizational 
strategies and environmental conditions.  
The second proposition is related to the behavior of human actors. Managerial 
intervention in the behavior of human actors includes the specification of the 
tasks that individuals are accountable for and controlling these tasks through 
personal surveillance or restrictions of the actions. The argument is that by 
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instructing the behavior of human actors, it is possible to affect the processes in 
which the effect of knowledge is more predictable and visible for the managers – 
the processes in which knowledge is exploited. Yet, behavioral instructions for 
human actors can influence only the exploitation of such knowledge that already 
exists in the organization. In other words, in pre-determined activities of the 
employees the existing potential capacities are usually exploited.   
Proposition 2. Managerial intervention in an actors’ behavior generates the 
knowledge flows from potential to realized capacities of the firm and 
increases the congruence of realized capacities with the organizational 
strategies. 
Managerial methods that prescribe actors’ behavior are rarely applicable to the 
activities of knowledge acquisition and interpretation but are applicable to 
activities where the effect of knowledge emerges, that is, where, knowledge is 
turned into actions. In implementing behavioral controls the focus is placed 
mainly on aligning realized capacities with organizational strategies. Since the 
focus of behavioral instructions is mainly on realized capacities, managers do not 
have the tools for a direct intervention in potential capacities. Managers can 
implicitly affect the exploitation of all kinds of knowledge (as well as inimitable 
and non-substitutable knowledge) in the firm but are limited in the degree to 
which they can encourage the creation of such knowledge. Rather, these kinds of 
methods allow only the exploitation of existing individual and organizational 
capacities.  Therefore, behavioral controls affect the flows of knowledge from 
potential to realized capacities and increase the congruence of the realized 
capacities with the organizational strategies. 
Managerial focus on actors’ behavior can be maintained in various ways, 
however. The activities of human actors can also be approached by focusing on 
the collective actions i.e. the processes that a firm is capable of rendering from its 
IC (e.g., Larsen, Bukh & Mouritsen, 1999; Mouritsen, Larsen & Bukh, 2001). 
Mouritsen et al. (2002) suggest building a narrative about the activities that the 
firm is able to maintain from its IC, directing the attention of organizational 
members to the activities and effects of knowledge that are relevant for the firm. 
By drawing the attention of the organization to these activities, organizational 
capabilities are shaped to be more congruent and aligned with the organizational 
goals. The process of conducting such an IC narrative has an effect on knowledge 
integration, increasing the collective knowledge about the things that matter for 
the organization. 
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The third proposition is related to the knowledge objects. The performance 
measurement systems can be built to measure and monitor the ways people are 
doing something (measuring processes, actors’ behavior) or the qualifications of 
the outcome that is desired (measuring focal object). Managerial intervention in 
knowledge objects includes the definition (i.e. outcome measure) of the “thing” 
(focal object) which is desirable for the firm. In implicit knowledge management 
the target is not defined as being the desired state of IC or stock of knowledge, 
but the target is the object that the productive actions of the firm are directed 
towards. The object can be a desired amount of goods sold (goods being the 
knowledge objects) or a new product launched (a new product being the 
knowledge object). The application of the outcome controls directs managerial 
focus onto the knowledge exploitation. It directs the focus to the object in which 
the effect of knowledge becomes visible.  
In moving towards the target, it is impossible to predict what the employees have 
to learn and how they need to behave in order to reach the target. No one can 
predetermine their knowledge exploration activities and the types of knowledge 
they particularly need, since such knowledge does not exist before their act of 
learning. Thus, nobody knows ex ante what this knowledge is that has to be 
acquired by learning.  By focusing the attention on the knowledge object, a thing, 
in which an effect of knowledge should manifest itself, it is possible to direct 
learning to the areas most valuable for the firm. The outcome control represents a 
definition of a target that the exploitation of knowledge should finally produce. 
The desired outcome (a certain type of product to be developed for instance) is 
expected to direct the attention of the human actors to the matters that will lead to 
achieving this target. The definition of the desired knowledge object functions as 
a target towards which the individuals adjust their knowledge processes, so 
building up their capability to achieve the predefined target. The goal to develop a 
certain type of product, for instance, encourages data and information searches for 
the necessary tasks that presumably lead to the desired outcome. Thus, in order to 
intervene in organizational learning, managers must know the desired effect of 
that learning. They have to know what is it that they expect to come into existence 
as an effect of the new knowledge. Without having a clue what the final effect of 
learning is, an organization can almost literally learn anything about everything.  
Proposition 3. Managerial intervention that is directed at knowledge objects 
generates knowledge flows from the existing potential to the realized 
capacities of the firm,  increases new potential capacities of the firm, and 
enhances the congruence of the capacities with the firm’s strategies.  
There are many ways of drawing management attention to knowledge objects, 
however. Outcome controls can be implemented with short-term or long-term, 
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individual or group level targets. Long-term targets that represent a challenge to 
employees tend to have a larger effect on potential capacities, since the definition 
of a long-term target would provide a greater freedom for creativity and learning. 
Especially, formulating challenging goals would leverage existing knowledge and 
capabilities of the firm (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Challenging goals enhance 
knowledge exploration activities, since the existing knowledge is not sufficient 
for the desired outcome. People search for additional knowledge to make their 
knowledge more complete for the tasks they have to accomplish.  
The definition of a short-term outcome may, however, lead the employees to 
exploit only the existing potential capacities. Consequently, the effects of short-
term measures may be somewhat similar to the effects of behavioral controls, 
although the outcome control provides slightly more freedom to learn and 
increase the potential capacities of the firm. Extreme pressure for short-term 
outcomes would increase only the kinds of knowledge that are quickly turned into 
realized capacities. It increases the path-dependency of existing organizational 
capacities (Levinthal & March, 1993; Weiping, 2006) creating risks for 
organizational flexibility in changing environments (Weiping, 2006).  
The significant value of outcome control relies in its ability to affect the diversity 
of knowledge without objectification of such knowledge. Knowledge is allowed 
to remain tacit and hidden, since managers define only the desired effects of 
knowledge. Hence, knowledge that is created is possibly very unique and difficult 
to substitute or imitate. This knowledge is also valuable for the firm’s competitive 
advantage, since outcome control would direct learning processes towards the 
domains that are more congruent with organizational strategies and environmental 
circumstances. In chapter 4, the case studies showed that outcome control also 
determines how the emerging activation triggers are perceived and the absence of 
knowledge realized in the firm. In reacting to the triggers the desired outcome 
directs the learning processes towards the disciplines and functions more valuable 
for the desired outcome. Taking all these together,  the outcome control directed 
to the knowledge objects, would enhance the value, inimitability and non-
substitutability of knowledge and capabilities of the firm – making these 
capabilities relevant in terms of achieving competitive advantage in the market. 
Management methods and tools are usually implemented in combination (Long, 
Burton & Cardinal, 2002). Thus, a desirable effect on organizational knowledge 
and capabilities is usually generated by a combination of different types of 
managerial intervention.  For instance, it is usually a combination of outcome, 
clan and behavioral controls (Ouchi, 1979; Long, Burton & Cardinal, 2002; 
Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003) or diagnostic and interactive types of 
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management control in firms (Simons, 1987b, 1995). Similarly, in knowledge and 
IC management techniques, Mouritsen, Larsen and Bukh (2001) show in their 
case studies a combination of IC measurement, identification of activities and 
managerial focus on nurturing the context. Johanson, Mårtensson and Skoog, 
(2001) demonstrate in their study that the management of IC is a combination of 
performance measurement and different management control routines. Supporting 
management control routines were related to attention, motivation and 
commitment of organizational members. Thus, different types of managerial 
intervention (explicit as well as implicit) were combined. The case studies (in 
chapter 4) illustrate a combination of outcome control and the management of the 
context. The outcome control directed learning processes towards the necessary 
disciplines of knowledge, whereas the managerial intervention in context enabled 
to enhance the organizational learning processes.  
The combinations of managerial methods can, however, also create a certain 
tension between these types of managerial intervention. Like a tension between 
the interactive and diagnostic types of management controls (see e.g., Henri, 
2006), there is also a tension between the choice of nurturing the context by 
encouraging conditions for creativity and opportunity seeking or implementing 
strict instructions of behavior. These are two opposites that cannot be 
simultaneously implemented for the same functional processes in the 
organization. The managers should choose to facilitate some knowledge flows 
and inhibit others. Hence, the combinations of different types of managerial 
intervention should be carefully considered in the firm. 
To sum up, the three types of managerial intervention significantly differ in their 
effects on organizational knowledge and capabilities. Managerial intervention 
which is directed at knowledge objects has a significant role in building valuable, 
inimitable and non-substitutable knowledge and capabilities in the firm, and thus 
is a very important tool to achieve competitive advantage for the firm. The two 
types of managerial intervention – outcome controls and management of the 
context – complement each other and create significant opportunities to increase 
the competitiveness of the firm.  
5.3 Value for research and practice   
A good theory makes a contribution to both the scientific community and practice 
(Van de Ven, 1989). The theory of implicit knowledge management has an 
explanatory and predictive power in explaining various approaches of 
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management in building valuable IC of the firm. It provides several contributions 
to theory and practice.  
First, the theory of implicit knowledge management adds a new explanation to the 
construct that has been looking for a solution for a long time. By suggesting a 
new angle of knowledge management the theory overcomes the practical 
problems that usually arise with knowledge operationalization. The theory of 
implicit knowledge management suggests the means of managing 
organizationally valuable knowledge without sacrificing its valuable 
characteristics – the tacitness and bundled nature – which make such knowledge 
valuable to competitive advantage. It provides the solution to the problem of 
knowledge management without trying to operationalise something that it is not 
possible to operationalise.  
Second, the theory of implicit knowledge management highlights the importance 
of knowledge objects to managerial intervention. Up to now, scholars have 
searched the options for knowledge management without considering the role of 
knowledge objects. The relationship between knowledge and the knowledge 
object has rarely been taken into account. A few studies have considered the 
existence of knowledge objects (e.g., Mouritsen, Larsen & Bukh, 2001; Gherardi 
& Nicolini, 2003), nevertheless, they do not propose the ways in which 
knowledge objects can be important in the context of management. When we 
consider the role of knowledge objects several new opportunities for knowledge 
management become available.  
Third, the theory of implicit knowledge management is “immune” to the 
theoretical problem of the RBV (see Appendix 1). The RBV causality statements 
(Barney, 1991) suggest that if the link between a resource and firm’s competitive 
advantage is poorly understood, then the resource is imperfectly imitable and 
consequently has a better chance to be a source of competitive advantage (Powell, 
2001; Priem & Butler, 2001; Schultze & Stabell, 2004). This leads to the 
theoretical paradox in which the explicit management of organizational 
knowledge and capabilities undermines the sustainable competitive advantage of 
the firm. The theory of implicit knowledge management provides an explanation 
for managing the most valuable resources without falling victim to this paradox. 
The theory does not suggest managers identify organizational knowledge and 
capabilities in a way that makes these resources imitable for competitors. Instead, 
it encourages the firm to nurture its knowledge and capabilities with their intrinsic 
and unobservable processes. Since valuable knowledge and capabilities are not 
made explicit, their mechanisms do not become visible to competitors. 
142      Acta Wasaensia 
Fourth, the theory of implicit knowledge management relates disciplines and 
concepts of management that are often considered distinct. It connects different 
managerial disciplines showing the importance of management methods that had 
not been considered to be relevant in knowledge and IC literature. Few studies 
have discussed the role of management controls in IC and knowledge 
management (e.g., Kloot, 1997; Johanson, Mårtensson & Skoog, 2001; Ditillo, 
2004; Mouritsen & Larsen, 2005; Turner & Makhija, 2006). The theory of 
implicit knowledge management encourages the scientific community to pay 
more attention to the many existing management methods that may affect the 
creation and application of organizational knowledge.  
For practitioners, the theory is valuable in at least two respects. First, the theory 
suggests that before directing significant effort into projects of knowledge and IC 
measurement, it is reasonable to carefully consider the existing management 
practices and their effects on knowledge. The wise choice of existing managerial 
mechanisms may sometimes serve the interests of the firm better than attempts to 
measure the IC of the firm. Second, by explaining the ways in which various 
managerial methods affect organizational knowledge, managers can combine 
managerial methods that best suit their expectations of organizational flexibility, 
innovation or stability. Simons (1987b) has shown that managers can select the 
parts of a control system to use on the basis of being more interactive or more 
diagnostic. It is possible to encourage a freedom of thought and action in some 
areas, while maintaining control in other areas. Similarly, managers can combine 
their implicit management mechanisms in a way that exploitation of existing 
knowledge is maintained in some areas of business, whereas new potential 
capacities are encouraged in other areas.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
6.1 Theoretical, methodological, and empirical 
contributions 
6.1.1 Theoretical contributions 
The present dissertation is valuable in several respects. Up to now, understanding 
about the means of managerial intervention has been limited and, therefore, the 
management of the most valuable resources of the firm has been problematic. The 
present dissertation sheds new light onto the existing concept of knowledge 
management, elaborating on the effects of managerial intervention. It suggests the 
theory of implicit knowledge management, clarifying the possibilities of 
managerial intervention in organizational knowledge and capabilities. The 
dissertation argues that the managerial function of managing knowledge and 
knowledge-related resources does not necessarily include the identification of 
knowledge, but should include being aware of the effects that management of 
various organizational phenomena may have on knowledge. By suggesting 
implicit knowledge management, the present study is aligned with Alvesson and 
Kärreman (2001), who argue that knowledge management practice is not about 
management of knowledge but of people and information in the firm. This study 
adds to their argument by outlining more elements, such as the knowledge objects 
and the context, that managerial attention is directed towards, and particularly 
underlines the role of knowledge objects in management practices. 
The dissertation provides propositions on managerial intervention that overcome 
the theoretical paradox of the RBV. The theoretical paradox implies that the 
explicit management of organizational knowledge and capabilities undermines the 
sustainable competitive advantage of the firm (Powell, 2001; Priem & Butler, 
2001; Schultze & Stabell, 2004). The theory of implicit knowledge management 
provides the explanation of managing the most valuable resources without falling 
victim to this paradox. The dissertation explains how the combination of a 
managerial system and emerging activation triggers shape organizational 
knowledge and capabilities in the way that these capabilities are most likely to be 
valuable in achieving a competitive advantage for the firm. Through implicit 
knowledge management it is possible to nurture and direct the creation of 
organizational knowledge and capabilities through their intrinsic and 
unobservable processes. In this way valuable knowledge and capabilities are not 
made explicit and their mechanisms do not become visible to competitors.  
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The dissertation contributes to the literature explaining the role of management 
controls in building valuable IC of the firm. To date many studies have 
investigated the effect of knowledge on management controls, but have not 
considered the effects of management controls on knowledge (see e.g., Ouchi & 
Maguire, 1975; Ouchi, 1977; Eisenhardt, 1985; Snell, 1992; Merchant & Van der 
Stede, 2003; Turner & Makhija, 2006). This dissertation suggests that 
management controls induce knowledge flows between: (1) individual and 
organizational level knowledge, (2) potential and realized capacities, and (3) 
incongruent and congruent capacities and effects of knowledge. In managing 
activation triggers management controls help to reveal activation triggers, provide 
supporting procedures to react to triggers, and instigate certain directions in 
developing the knowledge and capabilities of the firm. In particular, outcome 
control determines the ways in which emerging activation triggers are perceived 
and show up the absence of knowledge realized in the firm. The desired 
organizational outcome determines the intensity of the trigger, whereas the 
intensity of the trigger determines the ways the firm reacts to the absence of 
knowledge through the processes of organizational learning. At the same time 
managerial intervention in the context allows managers to enhance the processes 
of organizational learning. The context may, however, also lead to excessive 
knowledge creation, hindering productive action and the development of 
organizational capabilities.  
The present dissertation is expected to widen the debate on knowledge 
management to involve multiple fields of research. Up to now, the literature of 
management control, IC and knowledge management have relied  heavily on the 
studies of their own areas for their research (Bontis, 2001; Hesford, Lee, Van Der 
Stede & Young, 2007). The links between knowledge management and 
management controls have remained relatively unexplored in the literature. 
Similarly, the relationships between the RBV and IC concepts have got little 
attention in the relevant literature. Scholars have cross-referenced the fields of IC 
and the RBV without taking the next step to consider existing contributions to the 
further development of the theory (e.g., Bounfour, 2003b; Bounfour, 2003a; 
Nilsson & Ford, 2004; Marr & Roos, 2005).  The present study fills this gap by 
drawing on a wider set of concepts and theories across these disciplines, and 
through its findings, contributing to several streams of management literature. 
6.1.2 Methodological contributions  
In knowledge and IC management research theoretical studies largely prevail 
(e.g., Grant, 1996a; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997; O’Donnell, O’Regan & 
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Coates, 2000; Andriessen, 2004a; Schultze & Stabell, 2004; Spender, 2006). 
There are some case studies of action research (e.g., Mettänen, 2005; Bornemann 
& Alwert, 2007; Lönnqvist & Kujansivu, 2007), but only a few studies that would 
help to interpret working practices in organizations (e.g., Kloot, 1997; Johanson, 
Mårtensson & Skoog, 2001; McNamara, Baxter & Chua, 2004). Therefore there 
have been calls made for more case study research in this area (see e.g., Marr, 
Gray & Neely, 2003). The case studies presented here take a deeper look at the 
processes and internal dynamics of knowledge and IC management. Differing 
from the prevailing knowledge and IC research, the present dissertation does not 
suggest a normative model of explicit knowledge management, but interprets the 
reality in practice. The study investigates the management methods in practice 
providing an explanation for the mechanisms that make these methods relevant in 
terms of knowledge and IC management. Therefore, the research method of the 
present study is relevant to the wide terrain of IC and knowledge management 
research. 
6.1.3 Practical implications 
The theory of implicit knowledge management is primarily of use in guiding 
future research. However, it is also expected to be useful for practitioners. 
Managers can benefit from understanding the effects of different types of 
management methods. They can better choose and combine their management 
methods in exploiting existing knowledge in some areas of the business and 
building new capacities in others. Rather than engaging lots of resources and 
effort in new knowledge and IC management projects, the present dissertation 
recommends more careful consideration of existing well-known management 
practices. Management control methods that have been applied in practice can 
have a significant effect on organizational knowledge and capabilities. The wise 
combination of existing methods may serve the interests of the firm better than 
newly developed IC measurement instruments.  
6.2 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
Every study has its limitations. Therefore, the findings of the present study should 
be considered carefully. Firstly, findings of any study are subject to the 
limitations of the method. Conducting field research cannot be considered as an 
entirely independent and objective act of investigation. A researcher must always 
be aware of the risk associated with selective perception in collecting and 
analyzing the data. Researcher bias can be especially significant in studies 
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conducted by an individual researcher. The researcher’s background and prior 
experience influence the process of data collection, documentation and 
interpretation. Possible researcher bias can, however, be carefully considered 
during the research process. Therefore, in this study, the data collection, 
documentation and analysis were carefully conducted and several methods 
applied to deal with possible biases (see chapter 4.1.4). Nevertheless, the problem 
of observer bias cannot be entirely eliminated since an individual researcher can 
never be separated from his or her background, philosophical views and 
experiences (McKinnon, 1988: 38).  
Secondly, one of the limitations is the researcher’s limited time to make the field 
visits. Consequently in this case, the researcher could not observe the historical 
development of the management systems in the field, but had to rely on the 
respondents’ descriptions. However, most of the events described in the case 
studies took place during the period covered by the field visits, so reducing the 
risk of bias in interpreting the case evidence. Especially in case study C, the 
researcher was able to follow the evolving situation of the field in which 
overwhelming knowledge exploration led to the changes in the form of 
managerial intervention. In relation to case study C, however, there might be a 
risk that difficulties experienced with the explicit form of managerial intervention 
were caused by the fact that the idea evaluation system was at an early stage of 
implementation. A longer period available for the field visits would have 
diminished this risk. 
Thirdly, the study identified the ways in which knowledge and IC can be 
implicitly affected; nevertheless, the level of discussion was rather general and 
did not provide a detailed analysis of the proposed relationships. The study 
preferred to focus attention on general types of managerial intervention without 
giving many details about the conditions that governed the effects of these forms 
of managerial intervention. In addition, due to confidentiality agreements several 
technological details of the processes and decisions of the firms were omitted 
from the case descriptions.  
Fourthly, case studies A and B would have benefited from the application of the 
original ideas of actor-network theory (ANT) (Latour, 1987). Usually in ANT 
studies an actor is followed through the whole case study from the beginning to 
end – creating a story of the actor-network (Latour, 1987; Brown & Capdevila, 
1999; Latour, 2005). The present study applied the ANT on a rather broad level, 
in explaining the patterns of management. More thorough analysis of the human 
and non-human actors in their interactions would have provided better 
explanations of the roles of knowledge objects and activation triggers in building 
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the IC of the firm. However, the general level approach of the present study 
permitted a broader view of the types of managerial intervention witnessed. 
Fifthly, one weakness of the study could be the general simplification of the 
constructs. The study was looking for a purely functional management technology 
for a phenomenon which is socially complex and context-specific. Styhre (2003: 
157) has argued critically that knowledge management theorists tend to detach 
themselves from the true idea of knowledge with its complex nature. 
Furthermore, not only is knowledge a complex phenomenon, but management 
methods can also be more than just management technologies. For instance,  
Vaivio (1999: 413) showed that non-financial measures are not only functional 
management technology, but represent “an active element that restructures 
organizational reality”. Thus, the simplified view used by the researcher to 
interpret the means of managerial intervention may have alienated the constructs 
of the study from the true nature of the phenomena. On the other hand, theorizing 
in the midst of socially complex phenomena involves the process of abstraction 
and generating a system of categories that may dissect and simplify the basic 
properties of the phenomena, but simultaneously allow more insights into their 
dynamics. It was necessary to simplify the constructs in the study to make the 
resulting theory more supple and generalizable, that is, applicable in a wider 
range of situations. 
It should be said that the conclusions of the study do not provide propositions 
about the relationships between resources and competitive advantage. Neither 
does the study provide instructions for attaining competitive advantage. The study 
only explains the means of managerial intervention available for developing 
resources that are possibly inimitable, non-substitutable and valuable. These are 
three of the resource attributes that Barney (1991) has suggested are related to the 
pursuit of competitive advantage for the firm. Thus, the theory of implicit 
management explains the ways in which creation of these kinds of resources may 
be affected by management action, but it does not provide the roadmap towards 
competitive advantage. Ex ante insights into the link between a firm’s resources 
and competitive advantage are limited for any manager (Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993: 33-34) or researcher. 
The results of the study and its limitations also indicate several challenges and 
new opportunities for future research. Here three avenues for future research are 
suggested. The first is to further study implicit knowledge management in 
practice. The managerial mechanisms focusing on focal objects, individuals or the 
context of knowledge should be tested in relation to the suggested flows of 
knowledge. In particular, the role of knowledge objects requires further study. In 
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existing literature the role of management in affecting the behavior of human 
actors and the context has been acknowledged, but existing studies of managerial 
implications do not take into account the knowledge-object relationships. The 
focal object is barely considered as providing implications for management, and 
thus is not elaborated upon due to its self-evident existence. In bringing the 
objects to the forefront, various implications for knowledge management emerge. 
There are numerous ways to direct managerial intervention towards knowledge 
objects. A firm can have different strategies for its focal objects. In addition, an 
outcome control may include different measures of one and the same knowledge 
object. All these possibilities need scientific investigation to clarify the ways in 
which they affect the development of valuable IC of the firm.  
A second avenue would involve studying the possible tension between the 
managerial focus on context, the actor and the knowledge object. For instance, it 
is suggested that there is a tension between diagnostic and interactive types of 
management controls in a firm (see e.g., Henri, 2006). Since diagnostic controls 
place managerial focus on knowledge objects and the instruction of human actors, 
whereas interactive types of controls nurture the context, tension may arise 
between these approaches. How that tension arises and its consequences for 
organizational knowledge and capabilities, is an area ripe for investigation. 
A third avenue for future research would be to study the combination of explicit 
and implicit knowledge management in the firm. The models of IC reporting 
facilitate the recognition of several knowledge-based resources of the firm and 
their evaluation alongside the strategies of the firm (e.g., Marr, Schiuma & Neely, 
2004; Mouritsen, Bukh & Marr, 2004; Marr & Roos, 2005). The mechanisms of 
implicit knowledge management, on the other hand, support the influencing of 
such knowledge and knowledge-related resources that are not identifiable through 
explicit management approaches. Johnson (2002) has suggested the codification 
and reporting of those IC elements that can be made explicit and the treatment of 
other more tacit kinds of knowledge as processes. Explicit and implicit 
knowledge management can be so combined. However, the effects of such a 
combination are not yet clear, and more investigation is needed of just how the 
more explicit and implicit kinds of management methods can be combined in a 
firm.    
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6.3 Conclusion 
It is suggested that we live in a knowledge economy (Drucker, 1993), which 
forces us to make better use of our skills, experiences and know-how. In order to 
cope with ever-growing information and communication flows, turbulent and 
uncertain environments and pervasive globalization, various new managerial 
methods are being implemented which place greater emphasis on non-financial 
measures (Kaplan & Norton, 1992; Ittner & Larcker, 1998) and on abandoning 
those traditional methods that mainly acknowledged the primacy of financial 
information about tangible resources and labor. Living in a knowledge economy 
the concepts of knowledge management and intellectual capital management also 
seem very appealing. Hence, scholars aim to find the forms of managerial 
intervention that allow an explicit and systematic manipulation of the knowledge 
and IC encapsulated in the firm.  
The present dissertation shows, however, that knowledge management is not an 
explicit endeavor. Management of valuable IC – organizational knowledge and 
capabilities – is far more complex than management of tangible resources. Firstly, 
knowledge is a very context-specific and inherently unobservable phenomenon, 
which makes the management of organizational knowledge and capabilities very 
complicated. Secondly, the IC of the firm does not evolve along a linear path but 
is shaped by many internally and externally emerging circumstances. Various 
positive or negative events (activation triggers) emerge that force the firm to 
adapt its current capacities and learn new ways of doing things, making the 
management of IC development very difficult. Objective prediction of these 
activation triggers is an imprecise art for any organization. In addition, the 
complexity of the learning processes involved in reacting to these triggers makes 
the management of those processes highly problematic. At the same time, these 
activation triggers make the development of organizational knowledge and 
capabilities very unique, increasing the value of the IC in terms of the possible 
competitive advantage to be gained by the firm. Along the historical path taken by 
the firm, numerous activation triggers shape the organizational knowledge and 
capabilities, making organizational capabilities hard for competitors to imitate 
and substitute. 
In building organizational knowledge and capabilities, knowledge management is 
rather an implicit endeavor, in which knowledge as the object of management is 
not directly visible to the managers. Managers place their attention on other more 
visible and easily manageable objects in the organization. Thus, in building 
organizational knowledge and capabilities managerial focus is placed on 
knowledge objects, human actors and the context in which knowledge is created 
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and applied. By directing managerial attention to these elements different kinds of 
knowledge flows can be nurtured in the organization. By concentrating 
managerial attention on the knowledge objects of the firm, it is possible to direct 
the processes of organizational learning towards the domains of knowledge which 
are more congruent with organizational strategies and environmental 
circumstances. At the same time, managerial intervention in context enables 
managers to affect the ways in which the firm recognizes activation triggers and 
responds to them with smooth knowledge exploration and integration processes. 
Management intervention in an actor’s behavior allows it to increase the 
congruence of existing capabilities with the strategies of the firm. The role of 
managers is to combine the available types of managerial intervention according 
to the business strategies and environmental circumstances. Consequently the 
combination of management systems and emerging activation triggers also makes 
the path of developing organizational knowledge and capabilities highly specific 
and unique to the firm, which means these capabilities are most likely valuable, 
inimitable and non-substitutable by competitors.   
In implicit knowledge management, various managerial methods, often not 
considered to belong to the instruments of knowledge and IC management, 
become relevant in developing the IC of the firm. Management controls play an 
important part in implicit knowledge management. Outcome control allows for 
direct managerial intervention in the knowledge objects. A behavioral control 
directs the focus onto the behavior of human actors, whereas various decision and 
communication procedures shape the context in which the IC is built. 
Management controls are not, however, the only possible tools of managerial 
intervention that do not initially belong to the field of knowledge and IC 
management (see e.g., Kujansivu, 2008). There are many other managerial 
methods that may implicitly, but still quite significantly, have an effect on the 
development of IC. It is necessary to investigate these methods in future research. 
The theory of implicit knowledge management will shed new light on the existing 
problems of knowledge management, so initiating new debates and raising 
opportunities for future research. In order to improve our understanding of 
implicit knowledge management, deeper insights into the underlying mechanisms 
of management accounting and control in relation to organizational knowledge 
and capabilities are necessary. The links between the field of knowledge and IC 
management and the field of management controls have remained relatively 
unexplored in the literature. By directing attention to the role and methods of 
management controls, the present study intends to increase the level and quality 
of communication between the abovementioned research areas. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1  Theoretical paradox in managing organizational knowledge 
 
Causality 
statement of the 
RBV  
Rare, valuable and inimitable resources can produce sustainable 
competitive advantage for the firm (Barney, 1991). Especially 
resources that are non-transferable can produce sustainable competitive 
advantage (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). 
  
 Tacit knowledge is the kind of resource that is barely imitable and 
transferable from one person to another (Polanyi, 1958).  
 However, individual level tacit knowledge is considered tradable (Daft 
& Weick, 1984; Barney, 1991; Alvesson, 2000). Therefore, only 
organizationally embedded tacit knowledge can be a source of 
sustainable competitive advantage. 
 
 
 
Need of 
management 
To ensure competitiveness, a firm must manage its resources (Barney, 
1994).  
 
 
 
Existing 
assumptions of 
management 
In order to manage knowledge, it is necessary to make tacit knowledge 
explicit i.e. make it available for managerial intervention (Heng, 2001). 
 
 
Explicit knowledge 
becomes vulnerable 
for imitation 
According to the RBV, a resource can be a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage as long as it is not identified, since explicit 
knowledge becomes more easily imitable by competitors (Barney, 
1991; Powell, 2001; Priem & Butler, 2001; Schultze & Stabell, 2004).  
 
In this way, management of organizationally embedded knowledge 
may weaken a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage. 
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Appendix 2  Terms and definitions applied in the study 
 
Term Definition 
Resources  All possible tangible and intangible inputs of the firm that are owned 
or controlled by the firm (Barney, 1991: 101-102). 
Knowledge “That which is known” (Grant, 1996b: 110). 
Capabilities A firm’s specific abilities to deploy its resources (Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993: 35).  
In a capability various kinds of knowledge and other resources are 
exploited in repeatable patterns of action (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; 
Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997; Kasunoki, Nonaka & Nagata, 1998; 
Sanchez, 2004). 
Organizational 
competence 
A set of capabilities oriented towards organizational goals (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990; Sanchez, 2004). 
Intellectual capital An interrelated set of individual and organizational level knowledge 
and capabilities – potential and realized capacities – that are tightly 
bundled with other organizational resources.  
In the literature IC is conceptualized through the metaphorical 
dimensions of human, structural and relational capital of the firm.  
Valuable intellectual 
capital 
Theoretically most valuable knowledge and knowledge-related 
resources i.e. organizational level knowledge and capabilities, which 
are aligned with organizational strategies and environmental 
circumstances. 
Intangibles Non-physical assets of the firm.  
In literature, the terms intellectual capital and intangible assets are 
often used interchangeably.  
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Appendix 3  Example of the classifications used in the IC literature 
 
Terminology and classifications of IC Authors 
Intellectual capital:  
Market assets 
Human-centered assets 
Infrastructure assets 
Intellectual property assets 
Brooking (1996) 
Intellectual capital: 
Human capital 
Structural capital 
Customer capital 
Organizational capital 
Edvisson and Malone (1997) 
Intangible assets: 
Employee competence 
Internal structure 
External structure 
Sveiby (1997)  
Intellectual capital: 
Human capital 
Structural capital 
Relational capital 
Stewart (1997) 
Intellectual capital: 
Human capital 
Competence 
Attitude 
Intellectual agility 
Structural capital 
Relationships 
Organizational capital 
              Renewal and development 
Roos et al. (1997)  
Intellectual capital:  
Human capital 
Intellectual assets 
Sullivan (1998) 
Intellectual capital: 
Human capital 
Organizational capital 
Relational capital 
M’Pherson and Pike  (2001) 
 
Intellectual capital: 
Human capital 
Structural capital 
Relational capital  
Viedma (2001)  
Intellectual capital: 
Structural capital 
Human capital 
Market capital 
Innovation capital 
Bounfour (2003b)  
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Appendix 5 Four discourses of knowledge management research 
Duality Dualism
Dissensus
Consensus
Dialogic Discourse Critical Discourse
Constructivist Discourse Neo-Functionalist Discourse
Metaphor of Knowledge: discipline
Role of Knowledge in
Organizations: deconstruction of
totalizing knowledge claims,
creation of multiple knowledges
Theories: post-structuralist theories, 
feminist theories, postmodern theories
Metaphor of Knowledge: power
Role of Knowledge in Organizational
Underclass: reformation of social
Order
Theories: labour process
Metaphor of Knowledge: mind
Role of Knowledge in
Organizations: 
coordinating action,
shared context, recovery of
integrative values, generation of
understanding
Theories: structuration theories,
theories of practice, sensemaking,
actor network theory
Metaphor of Knowledge: asset
Role of Knowledge in Organizations:
progressive enlightenment,
prediction, reduction of uncertainty,
optimal allocation of resources
Theories: resource-based view of
firm, transaction cost theory,
information processing theory,
contingency theories
 
Adopted from Schultze and Stabell (2004: 556) 
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Appendix 8  Case study interviews  
 
Respondents Number of 
interviews 
Interviews 
total                   
(hours) 
Tape-
recorded  
(hours) 
Case A       
CEO and Project Manager* 7 10,78 9,43 
Project manager/Director of R&D 3 2,83 2,69 
Business Development Manager 2 2,17 2,04 
Total: 12 15,78 14,16 
Case B       
CEO 3 2,73 1,71 
R&D Manager* 5 5,67 5,50 
Production Manager 1 0,88 0,44 
Quality Control Manager* 5 3,96 3,29 
Export Manager/Marketing manager 1 0,50 0,35 
Total: 15 13,73 11,29 
Case C       
CEO 2 1,95 1,81 
VP, Director of R&D 1 1,08 0,99 
Director of Product Development 2 1,75 1,53 
Director of Material Research 1 0,67 0,43 
Division Manager 1 1,00 0,87 
Controller 2 1,42 1,24 
IPR Manager * 6 7,38 5,01 
Marketing Manager/Inventor 1 1,00 0,80 
Project Manager 3 2,45 2,26 
Legal and Human Resource Manager 2 0,84 0,60 
Quality Control Manager 2 2,00 1,69 
Scientist of Material Research 1 0,50 0,40 
Executive Assistant 2 0,54 0,47 
Total: 26 22,58 18,11 
Interviews total (A+B+C) 53 52,09 43,55 
 
* An informant of the case study
178      Acta Wasaensia 
Appendix 9  Documents collected and information systems introduced in the field 
 
 Reports/other documents Information systems 
C
a
se
 
st
u
dy
 
 
A
 
 
Agenda for a meeting of the board of directors 
Business development report 
Management meeting agenda  
Organizational chart 
Operative-technical meeting agenda 
Project meeting agenda 
Project update report 
External documents (newspaper articles etc) 
Project management system (electronic 
reporting system) 
 
C
a
se
 
 
st
u
dy
 
B 
Evaluation of marketing processes 
Organizational chart 
Organizational main and supporting processes  
Performance evaluation of R&D 
Procurement, production and customer service 
processes (chart) 
Technical processes (chart) 
Quality assurance processes (chart) 
Quality system of R&D projects  
External documents (newspaper articles etc) 
System of internal and external 
complaints  
C
a
se
 
 
st
u
dy
 
C
 
 
Annual reports 
Business Intelligence system review 
Competitors’ review 
Customer feedback investigations 
Design and development objectives 
Design control instructions 
Design control reviews 
Financial reporting review 
Idea evaluation reports 
Idea screening templates 
Internal audit, process evaluation 
Management review instructions 
Mission and strategy statement 
Monthly reporting overview 
Organizational chart 1 (September 2005) 
Organizational chart 2 (May 2006)  
Intellectual property review  
Performance measurement system review 
Process evaluation reviews 
Product idea suggestion form 
Project schedule 
Restored team-room discussions 
Quality records, product evaluation reports 
Quality system meeting reviews 
External documents (newspaper articles etc) 
Team-room system 
IP Team-room 
Product Development team-room 
Competitor Analysis team-room 
Quality management team-room 
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Appendix 10  The system of meetings in the case study A  
 
Regular meetings 
 
Frequency Structured/ 
Unstructured 
Purpose of the meeting, active 
participants 
 
Board meetings Every 6 
weeks 
Highly 
structured 
Purpose: Strategic management 
Participants: the board and invited guests 
Management team 
meetings 
Monthly Highly 
structured 
Purpose: discussion on financial reports, 
budgets; activities of the projects, based on 
project update reports; R&D, IPR; operative 
plans; action plans.  
Participants: CEO and managers of 
departments 
Project 
management 
meetings 
Quarterly Highly 
structured 
Purpose: Performance management, 
discussion about objectives and tasks of the 
projects, emphasizing the key issues 
(activation triggers); budgets; competition; 
commercialization. Updating data in project 
management system  
Participants: CEO, project managers and 
manager of business development  
Operative- 
technical meetings 
Quarterly Highly 
structured 
Purpose: discussion of the performance and 
ongoing issues from cost-centers’ 
perspective; budget comparison.  
Participants: CEO, heads of six cost-centers, 
head of laboratory and project managers  
Staff meetings Every 2-3 
weeks 
Highly 
structured 
Purpose: information sharing and 
dissemination to employees 
Participants: all employees 
Research i.e. drug 
discovery  
meetings 
Every 2-3 
weeks 
Structured Purpose: discussion of activation triggers in  
projects 
Participants: employees from research 
department and the Director of Research; 
project managers from development 
projects 
Meetings of 
chemists 
Every 2 
weeks 
Structured Purpose: performance evaluation and 
activation triggers of chemistry 
Participants: chemists, project manager 
Meetings of 
pharmacologists 
Every 2 
weeks 
Structured Purpose: performance evaluation and 
activation triggers of pharmacology 
Participants: pharmacologists, project 
manager 
 
 
